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A. Introduction 
At.  Outline 
The main philosophical question about non-existents is 
whether there really are any. My own view is that there 
are none. But even if this is granted, we may still ask 
what they are like, just as the materialist may consider 
the nature of sensations or the nominalist the nature of 
numbers. 
On this further topic, there seem to be three main divi- 
97 sions of thought, which may be respectively labelled as: 
99 (i) platonism/empiricism; 
(ii) literalism / contextualism; 
(iii) internalism / externalism. 
Let me attempt a rough characterization of these divi- 
101 sions. More refined formulations will come later. On a 
102 platonic conception, the non-existent objects of fiction, 
104 perception, belief and the like do not depend for their 
being upon human activity or upon any empirical con- 
ditions at all; they exist, or have being, necessarily. 
Under an empirical conception, on the other hand, 
106 these objects are firmly rooted in empirical reality; they 
108 exist, or have being, contingently. On anextreme con- 
ception of this sort, these objects are literally created 
and are brought into being by the appropriate activity 
either of or within the agent. 
110 On a literalist view, Sherlock Holmes literally has the 
115 properties of being a detective, of living at Baker Street, 
120 of smoking opium, and so on. For the contextualist, on 
123 the other hand, it is not true, and perhaps even false, 
129 that Sherlock Holmes has these properties. What is true 
is that he has these properties in the appropriate stories 
(the 'context'). 
I used to contrast literalism with ellipsism. For the anti- 
130 literalist typically claims that the sentence 'Holmes i~ a 
132 detective' is, when used to express a truth, elliptical for 
136 the sentence 'In the story, Holmes is a detective'. But 
even if the first sentence is used in these cases to express 
137 the proposition expressed by the second sentence, this 
is no ordinary case of linguistic ellipsis (as when we say 
139 that 'John will' is elliptical for 'John will come'). And 
therefore I prefer to contrast literalism with contex- 
tualism. 
Non-existents lead a double life. On the one hand, they 
have certain properties within the contexts in which 
they appear; they love and hate, thrive and fail, and 
live their varied lives. On the other hand, they also 
relate to the real world; they are created by authors, 
read by readers, and compared, for better or worse, 
with one another and with what is real. According to 
internalism, a non-existent may be individuated purely 
in terms of its internal properties, in terms of those prop- 
erties which it has within the contexts in which it ap- 
pears. It is as if our only access to the object was 
through the worlds created by those contexts. Accord- 
ing to externalism, on the other Hand, a non-existent 
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may be individuated purely in terms of its external prop- 
erties, in terms of those features that are external to 
the contexts in which it appears. In this case, it is as if 
our only access to the object was through the real 
world and not the various worlds of its contexts.' On a 
typical internalist view, Holmes would be individuated 
in terms of the properties of being a detective, of living 
at Baker Street, etc. On a typical externalist view, 
Holmes would be individuated in terms of his name or 
perhaps in terms of Conan Doyle's first inkling of him. 
It should not be supposed that internalism implies 
literalism. A philosopher who holds to both doctrines 
may individuate non-existents directly in terms of the 
properties they have in their contexts. The internalist 
who is anti-literalist cannot do this. But he can in- 
dividuate the objects in terms of the properties of 
possessing a certain attribute in a context. These com- 
plex properties may themselves then be taken to pro- 
vide the appropriate internal features of the objects. 
One should also not make the common mistake of con- 
flating literalism with the view that there are or really 
are non-existents. Perhaps the line of reasoning is that 
with contextualism the truth of 'Holmes is a detective' 
may be explained in terms of an implicit in-the-story 
operator and without appeal to any reference for 
'Holmes', but that without contextualism the truth of 
the sentence will require a reference for its subject- 
term. However, neither part of this argument is par- 
ticularly compelling; there are other uses of fictional 
names whose referential role the contextualist cannot 
so easily dismiss and there may be other ways for the 
literalist to get rid of non-existents. So at least in prin- 
ciple, the distinction between literalism and some form 
of commitment to non-existents should be recognized. 
The three divisions are not, of course, exhaustive of the 
questions in the area. There are related issues. For 
example, platonism could be regarded as a more general 
doctrine of which only one strand concerned the 
necessary being of non-existents. Other strands might 
then include the question of their being abstract or the 
question of their being some sort of constructed entity. 
Again, there are other issues altogether. There is the 
question, which does not fit easily into our classifica- 
tion, of whether someone who accepts fictional entities 
must say that they exist or whether he can allow them 
to possess a broader concept of being. However, the 
present divisions do represent interesting and import- 
ant differences in the prevailing theories of non- 
existents and serve well as a preliminary scheme of 
classification. 
All in all, the three divisions provide for 8 ( = 2 3) com- 
binations of positions. Each, I think, is coherent, but 
some are more natural than others. For example it is 
natural, though not necessary, for the 'platonist' to ac- 
cept internalism and for the 'empiricist' to accept exter- 
nalism; for the means by which the objects are in- 
dividuated will naturally be taken to provide condi- 
tions for their existence or being. 
My own view on these questions is given by em- 
piricism, contextualism and externalism, not that this 
is a common combination in the literature. This view 
will be defended in the second part of this paper. In the 
present part, I am concerned to discuss a view that 
combines internalism with contextualism and 
platonism; and in the third part, I shall discuss the 
literalist position, mainly in association with platonism 
and internalism. I have not attempted systematically to 
consider all of the possible combinations of position. I 
have only looked at the more prominent or plausible of 
the views, though what I say on them should throw 
light on what is to be said of the others. 
The plan of the present part is as follows. In section A2, 
I discuss general methodological issues facing any 
philosophical study of nonexistents and, in particular, 
defend the claim that one can say what they are like 
without presupposing that there really are any. In sec- 
tion B, I try first to delineate more precisely the subject- 
matter of our theories and then to describe the prob- 
lems of providing identity and existence conditions 
with which any such theory should deal. In section C, I 
give an initial formulation of an internalist theory, 
which is successively refined in section D. Finally, in 
section E, I give two major criticisms of the theory as 
thus developed. A more detailed account of each sec- 
tion is given in the list of contents. 
It is of the greatest importance to note that the present 
part does not contain my own views on the subject. It is 
only in the last section of this part that the internalist 
position is criticized, and it is only in the second part of 
this paper that my own, more positive, views are 
developed. 
I have begun my account with the consideration of a 
false theory for a variety of reasons. First, the theory 
has been developed in order that it may more effective- 
ly be criticized. Since the internalist theory is a very 
natural one, it is of great interest that its more promis- 
ing formulations are still open to criticism. Second, 
even though the internalist theory is incorrect, it has 
theoretical advantages over certain views further 
removed from my own and therefore serves, indirectly, 
to undermine those other views. Third, many of the 
difficulties faced by an internalist theory are ones that 
face any view, and so the discussion of the solutions in 
the present case should suggest solutions in the other 
cases. Finally, the internalist theory, though not correct 
as a theory of objects, may correctly be interpreted as a 
theory of the c o n t e n t s  of those objects and, as such, 
may usefully be grafted onto the more satisfactory 
theory that is to follow. 
In stating the present theory, I have taken pains to 
make the exposition accessible to the general reader. 
For this reason, elementary points and distinctions in 
metaphysics and the philosophy of language have 
sometimes been expounded at length, and I hope that 
the experts in these fields will bear this in mind. For the 
same reason, I have not tried to formalize the theory; 
most of the technical remarks are tucked away in foot- 
notes, where they may safely be ignored. However, it i s  
fairly clear from what I say how the theory, or various 
parts of it, are to be formalized; and I certainly think 
that this is something that should be done. It is only in 
98 
this way that one can state and prove with 
mathematical precision what, for the informal theory, 
must remain at the intuitive level. 
There are various problems I have not considered, 
either in this part or the others. I have not tried to spell 
out the semantics for the in-the-story operator, nor the 
conditions for de re attribution to non-existents, nor 
the conditions for their reidentification from one con- 
text to another. I have not considered any of the tradi- 
tional questions of aesthetics bearing on the interpreta- 
tion or evaluation of works of art. And I have only 
touched incidentally on connected topics in the 
philosophy of language and metaphysics. I do not wish 
to deny that these problems have their interest; they are 
merely the casualties of some attempt at containment. 
In this part I have also not considered the views of 
others in the field. Perhaps the views closest to mine are 
Howell's '79 and van Inwagen's '77; but in many 
respects I differ from these authors. The views furthest 
from mine are those of the literalist school, including 
Castafieda and Rappaport, on the one hand, and Par- 
sons on the other. It is in the third part of the paper that 
I give more detailed attention to these other views. 
A2. Methodology 
Let us distinguish two tasks: one the task of formaliz- 
ing, and of otherwise getting straight, the principles im- 
plicit in our ordinary talk of certain objects, the other 
the task of saying whether there really are such objects. 
The first is the question of systematizing an intuitively 
given body of data; the second is the question of 
discovering the ontological ground for that data. In 
mathematics, for example, we may distinguish the task 
of formalizing intuitive number theory (something 
done by Peano's postulates) from the question at issue 
between the platonists and nominalists, as to whether 
there really are numbers. Or again, we may distinguish 
the task of systematizing the principles implicit in our 
ordinary talk of material objects (something that has 
not properly been done) from the question at issue be- 
tween the realists and idealists as to whether there really 
is an external world. 
These two tasks are more or less independent of one 
another. Two philosophers, for example, may both ac- 
cept Peano's postulates as an adequate formalization of 
intuitive number theory and yet differ on the issue of 
realism; or conversely, two philosophers may agree on 
the metaphysical issue and yet differ on how a certain 
part of mathematics is properly to be formalized. 
It is important, though, that the nature of the two tasks 
and their independence be properly understood. I am 
not suggesting that the data can be intuited in- 
dependently of and prior to any theory. In the 
systematization of the data, theoretical considerations 
will play a significant role. The contrast is not between 
the data and its theory, but between that theory which 
is at the level of the data itself and the one that attempts 
to provide its ontological underpinnings. It is here that 
the suggested independence exists. 
Secondly, it is not as if the one theory belongs entirely 
to metaphysics and the other not at all. The theory at 
the level of the data may deal with questions concern- 
ing the identity of objects, with their existence condi- 
tions and essential properties. These questions are 
metaphysical in a broad sense of the term, though they 
may be considered independently of the question of 
whether there really are such objects. Elsewhere 21 have 
called that part of metaphysics whose focus is on what 
there really is foundational and the rest naive. Thus the 
independence of the data is from foundational, not 
naive, metaphysics. 
Finally, it is not being claimed that there is complete 
autonomy between the data and the ontological theory; 
for the theory should explain, or otherwise accom- 
modate, the data. This is not to say, however, that the 
cogency of the ontological position entirely derives 
from its success in explaining the data. On the con- 
trary, it may have a strong prima facie plausibility that 
is quite independent of any view as to how the data is 
ultimately to be explained; and there may be consider- 
ations of a different sort altogether in its favour. An on- 
tological thesis is often taken to be equivalent to a 
claim of reduction; but the reduction or explanation of 
the data is better regarded as merely one piece of 
evidence in its favour. 
Nor should it be thought that, in cases of conflict, be- 
tween theory and data, the theory must always give 
way. Adjudication between theory and data, here as 
elsewhere, is a delicate matter. But even if some of the 
intuitive data is ultimately to be given up, it will be 
helpful to formalize the data prior to any ontological 
consideration; for it is only in this way that one can 
grasp the data in toto and the prima facie constraint it 
imposes on an ontological theory. If then, part of the 
data is to be given up, one will have a systematic 
understanding of what must be rejected and what may 
stay. In such a way, our understanding of intuitionism 
has been enhanced by the formalization of classical 
mathematics; for it has thereby become clear exactly 
what principles in the classical realist position need to 
be given up. In first approaching the data one should 
pose as a realist, and only when the act is no longer 
convincing should the disguise be removed. 
In applying these general remarks to the case of non- 
existent objects, we see the need to distinguish a theory 
that takes our statements about these objects at their 
face value and one that attempts to provide some type 
of ontological underpinning for them. For a variety of 
reasons, which I shall not go into, many philosophers 
have been led to underestimate the extent to which our 
ordinary talk commits us to non-existent objects. It has 
been denied that we refer to them, express propositions 
about them, and so on. The possibility of a naive 
theory has therefore not even been considered. 
However, as several philosophers 3 have recently stressed, 
we talk about non-existent objects in much the 
same way as we talk about other objects. We say that a 
character in Hamlet is a prince, that two characters in 
Hamlet appear in a play of Tom Stoppard's, that 
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'Hamlet' refers to Hamlet, and so on. It therefore ap- 
pears that the possibility of a naive theory, with quan- 
tification or other reference to non-existents, should in- 
deed be taken seriously. 
At this point, it is appropriate to consider a view of Ken 
Walton's 4 which, in a way, accepts the data yet 
disputes the commitment. On his view many apparent 
claims about non-existents are not literally assertions 
but merely assertions within a game of make-believe 
that we play with stories, dramas, films, and the like. 
Thus what makes these claims acceptable is not that 
they are true, but that they are appropriate within the 
game of make-believe. 
It is doubtful whether this theory applies across the 
board to all apparent claims about non-existents. But 
even where it does apply, Walton faces a problem of 
systematization similar to that facing the philosopher 
who takes a more literal view of these claims. For 
where the one will formalize the principles that are 
true, the other will formalize the principles that are ap- 
propriate to the game of make-believe. Moreover, even 
if our interest is ultimately in truth, this second project 
will be of great relevance, since a significant class of 
truths will be obtained by prefixing the theorems of the 
formalization with the prefix 'it is appropriate in the 
game of make-believe that'. It is in just this spirit that 
the formalist, who believes that mathematics is a game 
with symbols, may attempt to formalize the discipline, 
for he thereby comes to understand what sort of game 
it is. 
Failure to give due recognition to a naive theory of non- 
existents has led philosophers into error. For one thing, 
it has led them to distort the data, to see it in the light 
of their metaphysical views, and not as it is. One example, 
concerning reference to non-existents, has already 
been given. Another example, concerning the creation 
of non-existents will be considered in section E 1. 
This lack of recognition has also led philosophers to 
misconstrue certain problems. A good example is from 
the philosophy of language. Is 'Hamlet' a proper name 
and, if so, to what does it refer? The correct answers 
are: Yes, it refers to Hamlet. But because of their 
distrust of non-existents, many philosophers have 
hunted around for another reference for 'Hamlet' or, 
failing that, have tried to give some other account of 
how it functions in ordinary discourse. This strikes m e  
as mistaken. The idealist does not deny that the 'Eiffel 
Tower' is a proper name for the Eiffel Tower, nor the 
materialist that the sensation name'S' is a proper name 
for a sensation. At the level of semantic theory, they ac- 
cept these facts; it is only at the deeper metaphysical 
level that they will attempt to account for them in other 
terms. In exactly the same way, the fictional anti-realist 
should accept the alleged semantic facts concerning 
non-existents. Why should the semanticist kowtow to 
the metaphysical prejudices of the fictional anti-realist 
and not those of the idealist or materialist? Surely he 
should remain equally neutral on all metaphysical 
fronts. 
This confusion of the metaphysical and semantical 
enterprise is not only methodologically unsound; it also 
leads to bad theories. Suppose I ask: What proposition 
is expressed by the sentence 'Hamlet does not exist'? 
The correct answer, in my opinion, is that it is the genu- 
inely singular proposition to the effect that Hamlet 
has the property of not existing. 6 
However, seeing no alternative, the anti-realist has 
been tempted to substitute for this proposition another 
that involves no non-existents as constituents. But first, 
this obscures the generality of the semantic theory; for 
one would like to say, on current views, that the use of 
all proper names in sentences yields genuinely singular 
propositions. And second, the proposed substitution is 
wrong; for it is always possible that one should believe 
the proposition expressed by the sentence and yet not 
believe the substitute. 
But, the anti-realist may rejoin, does not the acceptance 
of propositions with non-existent constituents commit 
one, ontologically, to non-existents? The answer is no. 
How does one talk about propositions? By saying that 
they are true, are believed, are expressed by certain 
sentences, and so on. As an anti-realist, then, I should 
show how all such talk, when it involves propositions 
with non-existent objects, can be paraphrased away or 
otherwise explained. Thus I should explain in anti- 
realist terms the conditions under which one expresses 
a singular proposition to the effect that Hamlet, say, 
does not exist. But these conditions are not necessarily 
ones in which I express a proposition lacking non- 
existent constituents. It is an old saw of reduction that 
it is contexts as a whole, not individuals, that yield to 
analysis. 
We see, then, that the premature infusion of 
metaphysics into semantical theory leads one to 
mislocate the proper place for reduction; this is not in 
the propositions that the theory posits or uses, but in 
the statements that the theory itself makes about those 
propositions. 7 
My main concern in this paper is to develop a satisfac- 
tory naive theory of non-existents, though in the sec- 
ond part I also attempt to support the claim that there 
really are no non-existents. Given that the anti-realist 
position is so extremely plausible, it may be wondered 
why I should spend so much time in developing a naive 
theory. Certainly, the topic of non-existents is not one 
that should engage our deepest philosophical concerns. 
But it has an interest beyond that of the merely bizarre. 
In the first place, its study has certain general 
methodological advantages. To the extent that it is 
thought to be obvious that there really are no non- 
existents, the study may serve to throw the methods of 
naive metaphysics into relief; for it will then be clear 
that there is no real conflict between a naive 
metaphysics that accepts certain objects and a founda- 
tional metaphysics that rejects them. The study is also 
relevant to the foundational question of whether there 
really are non-existents. For it will become clear from 
the naive theory that the standard attempts of explain- 
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ing away non-existents are inadequate. It will become 
clear, for example, that non-existents are not possible 
existents, that they cannot be constructed in any 
straightforward way from properties, and that they 
cannot be eliminated in favour of any simple form of 
existential generalization. The failure of the standard 
attempts at reduction should then throw doubt on the 
standard accounts of what reduction is. For how can 
they be accepted when they are unable to sustain even 
the most plausible of anti-realist positions? The naive 
theory is relevant, in addition, to the history of 
philosophy. For the topic of non-existents has played - 
from Meinong, through Russell, to the present day - an 
integral role in the development of modern analytical 
philosophy. By carefully distinguishing between the 
naive and foundational aspects, it should be possible to 
obtain a better perspective on this development and of 
the issues that separated Meinong and Russell. Finally, 
some of the problems that arise in formulating a 
satisfactory naive theory are ones that arise elsewhere, 
particularly the problems of stating identity criteria and 
of dealing with highly intensional contexts. The sol- 
utions to these problems should then carry over to these 
other areas. 
The philosophers who have developed a naive theory 
of non-existents have usually been realists. It is 
therefore important to emphasize that I am not. In the 
last analysis, the whole theory is to be explained away. 
But by this I do not mean that any statement about 
non-existents is to be translated into a statement about 
existents alone. This may be possible, but the on- 
tological claim does not require it. Roughly what the 
claim requires is World kctualism, 8 the doctrine that 
distinct possible worlds cannot differ merely on non- 
existents, that any such difference must be consequent 
upon a difference among the existents. This is a claim 
whose plausibility is undisturbed by the usual dif- 
ficulties in setting up an eliminative translation. 
B. Preliminaries 
B1. Contexts and Objects 
Let us briefly indicate the subject-matter of this paper. 
Various objects, both existent and non-existent, occur 
or figure in such things as plays, stories, films, beliefs, 
imaginings, wishes, dreams and hallucinations. I shall 
use the technical term context for these things in which 
the objects occur. 
My use of the term has little or nothing to do with its 
use in pragmatics. In particular, I do not count possible 
worlds as contexts. There is a metaphysical ground for 
this exclusion; for contexts, as I understand them, are 
in a world, not alternatives to a world. The nature of 
this distinction will later become clearer. But there is 
also a good formal reason for the exclusion; for one of 
the peculiarities of contexts is that the propositions true 
in them need not form either a consistent or a complete 
set. The special difficulties that this and other 
peculiarities raise are not ones that arise for possible 
worlds. 
Of the objects that occur in a context, some may be 
said in a natural sense to be introduced in that context. 
The context is, as it were, their source; and on an em- 
piricist view, we would be prepared to say that the ob- 
jects derive their being from that context. It is in this 
sense that the character Holmes was introduced in 
Conan Doyle's stories and a dream-object (previously 
unconceived) is introduced in a dream. I shall follow 
Parsons 9 in calling the objects introduced in a context 
native to that context and in calling the other objects 
that occur in the context immigrant to that context. I 
shall extend Parsons' terminology slightly by calling 
belief-objects, dream-objects, etc. the objects native to 
beliefs or dreams, respectively, and by calling the home 
context (s) of an object the context (s) to which it is 
native. 
My concern in this paper is with objects of the sort that 
are introduced in contexts. I take it that all such objects 
are non-existent. There may, however, be non-existent 
objects not of this sort. Perhaps numbers do not, in the 
ordinary sense, exist; but there is no context in which 
they are introduced. Again, merely possible existents 
do not exist; yet given that possible worlds are not con- 
texts, and given, as I shall later argue, that these objects 
are distinct from the other non-existents, there is like- 
wise no context of introduction. Let us agree to use 
'non-existent' in a special narrow sense so as to exclude 
these non-contextual cases. Thus on this usage, some 
objects that do not exist may not be non-existents. 
One naturally supposes that all objects and all contexts 
are uniform, that what goes for the one goes for the 
other. However, occasionally it is helpful to distinguish 
objects and contexts of the mind (beliefs, fantasies, 
dreams, etc., and their native objects) from what may 
be called public objects and contexts (stories, plays, 
films, etc., and their native objects). Contexts of the 
mind, unlike public contexts, are identical to or con- 
stituted by certain mental states. Similarly, objects of 
the mind, unlike public objects, are essentially objects 
of some mental state. 
It is tempting to suppose that all non-existent objects 
are objects of the mind. When an author writes a story 
about a character, for example, he first conceives of it 
in some way and so the object is a native of the concep- 
tion and not the story. It is only in the relative sense of 
not being an immigrant of another story that we may 
say that the object is a native of the story itself. 
However, this view overlooks the part convention 
plays in interpreting a story or context.'~ Following an 
example of Walton '73, let us consider a game of make- 
believe in which globs of mud placed in an orange crate 
are taken to be pies cooking in a hot oven. Then given 
that a mud glob is left in the crate for a long time dur- 
ing the game, it will be true in the game as ordinarily 
construed that the mud pie is burning, even when no 
one is aware that it is. Now this point concerns prop- 
ositions of which no one is aware. But a similar point 
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will also hold for objects. It may be part of the game, 
for example, that after an hour a pie left in the oven 
turns to cinders. Under the envisaged circumstances, 
there will then be an object of the game, viz. the 
cinders, of which no one is aware. 
Of course I do not want to say that all objects native in 
the relative sense to a story are also native in the ab- 
solute sense. Often, perhaps typically, an author will 
write about an object of his imagination. My only 
point is that objects from public contexts are not 
necessarily fated to immigrant status. 
The view that all non-existents are of the mind may 
partly arise from a misplaced anti-realism; for one way 
of getting rid of non-existents is to suppose that they 
are really mental entities. It may also be abetted by an 
ambiguity in the term 'imaginary', for this term may be 
used narrowly for an object of the imagination or 
broadly for any non-existent. In any case, the view is to 
be rejected. 
Let us note that two of the previous divisions in view 
concerning non-existents can be extended to their con- 
texts. One can be platonist or empiricist, holding that 
contexts either necessarily or contingently exist; and 
one can be internalist or externalist, holding that they 
can be individuated either in terms of their internal 
content (what is true in them) or in terms of their exter- 
nal features. It is natural to extend the uniformity 
among objects and among contexts to a uniformity be- 
tween objects and contexts. But this view, though 
natural, is not necessary. One might, for example, be 
platonist about belief-objects but empiricist about 
beliefs, holding that the one had being necessarily while 
the other existed contingently. 
B2. Identity and Being 
There are two problems with which a philosophical 
theory of non-existents, or any other objects, should 
deal. They might be called the problems of existence 
(or being) and identity. The first is the question of ac- 
counting for the objects that there can be; the second is 
the question of accounting for the identity of these ob- 
jects. One says what there is, the other says what it is. 
These problems should not be confused with certain 
others. The problem of existence (or being) is not the 
previously mentioned ontological question of saying 
whether there really are certain objects. Rather it is the 
question of systematically accounting for which of 
these objects, in the ordinary sense, there are. As such, 
the answer to the question is compatible either with the 
claim that there really are or that there really are not 
any such objects. 
The !firoblem of identity, on the other hand, is not the 
epistemological question of saying how we can identify 
the object. It is a metaphysical question of what, in the 
real world, explains the identity of the object. Of 
course, the properties in terms of which its identity is 
explained may be epistemologically accessible to us, 
they may be ones in terms of which we can identify it; 
but that this be so is not itself part of the problem. 
These accounts can be made a little more precise. Let 
us suppose that we are interested in objects of a certain 
sort, be they non-existents, sets, or what have you. Let 
us also suppose that we are given certain properties 
that, in an intuitive sense, define or help to explain the 
identity of the objects in question. For the moment, let 
us not ask what this means. It may help, though, to 
bear two examples in mind. In the first, the given ob- 
jects are sets of individuals and the defining properties 
are to the effect that a given individual belongs to a set. 
In the second, the given objects are fictional ones and 
the defining properties are to the effect that an object 
has a given property in its home story, i.e. in the story 
in which it was introduced. 
Now certain clusters of properties will be satisfied by 
an object, and others will not. A solution to the exist- 
ence problem then requires that we say which 
clusters can consist of exactly those properties that are 
satisfied by some object. In the first example, this 
means that we say for which arrays of individuals there 
will be a set having exactly those individuals as 
members; and in the second example, it means that we 
say for which arrays of properties there will be a fic- 
tional object having exactly those properties in its 
home story. '~ 
The existence problem has both a positive and negative 
aspect. On the one hand, we may say, of all the clusters 
of properties that are exactly satisfied, that they are 
exactly satisfied. This is the positive or inclusive aspect. 
On the other hand, we may say, of all the other 
clusters, that they are not exactly satisfied. This is the 
negative or exclusive aspect. Putting the two aspects 
together yields a complete account of which clusters are 
exactly satisfied. 
The problem has been stated in somewhat platonic 
terms. In certain cases, it may be possible to give a 
more formalistic account. Suppose we have a language 
in which there are conditions that express the defining 
properties (these conditions may, of course, be in- 
dependently identifiable). 12 
Then we require an account of which clusters of those 
conditions will be exactly satisfied in the intended in- 
terpretation and, in so far as our interests are axio- 
matic, we may aim for a theory whose interpretations 
will be like the intended interpretation in respect of 
which clusters are exactly satisfied. 
Some of the subsequent discussion may similarly be 
defused of its platonic content. But I shall not consider, 
in any systematic way, the extent to which this can be 
done. 
A solution to the existence problem presupposes a class 
of defining properties. A solution to the identity prob- 
lem, on the other hand, requires that we find such a 
class. More exactly, it will consist of an assertion to the 
effect that the identity of the objects of the sort in ques- 
tion can be explained in terms of the given properties. 
In the set theoretic case, the assertion will be to the ef- 
fect that the identity of sets can be explained in terms of 
their members; and in the fictional case, it will be to the 
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effect that the identity of fictional objects can be defined 
in terms of the properties they have in the stories in 
which they are introduced. Thus whereas in the sol- 
ution to the one type of problem we claim that all objects 
can be defined, in the solution to the other type of prob- 
lem we say which objects are so defined. 
But what is it to define or explain the identity of objects 
of a certain sort? This is a large and difficult question. I 
shall here confine myself to a few rough and general 
remarks that will be particularly relevant to the topic at 
hand. There are many questions, concerning relative 
identity (explaining A's in terms of B's), the relation to 
the existence problem, subtleties of formulation, etc., 
that I shall not discuss. '3 
First, it is necessary to distinguish between explana- 
tions of individuality and of identity proper. (These are 
my terms; other philosophers may have used them dif- 
ferently). The individuation of an object merely ex- 
plains the identity of the object as it is; an explanation 
of identity proper, on the other hand, explains the 
identity of the object in itself. As an example, consider 
how some philosophers have sought to explain the 
identity of a material thing in terms of its spatial loca- 
tion at a given time. Now certainly they may have 
thereby explained the identity of the thing as it in fact is 
(and with its spatio-temporal features, in particular). 
But they have not thereby explained, in the full and 
proper sense, what the thing is; they have not said what 
it is in and of itself. 
To individuate the objects X, it is at least required that, 
in each possible world, there be a set P of properties for 
each actual object x of X such that: 
Uniqueness. x is the sole object to have all of the prop- 
erties in P; 
Non-modality. None of the properties of P is modal; 
Non-circularity. None of the properties of P involves x 
or any other objects of X. 
To give the identity of (or to define) the objects X, it is 
required that the Uniqueness condition be strengthened 
t o :  
Individual Essence. The set P is an individual essence of 
x in the sense that, in each world, an object has all of 
the properties of P iff it is actual and is identical to x. 
The non-modality requirement is made in order to ex- 
clude the consideration of what goes on in one world 
from the individuation of an object in another world. 
We would not want to say that we had individuated the 
object x in one world if the only difference between x 
and a distinct object y lay in the properties that they 
possibly possessed. 
The non-circularity requirement is made in order to ex- 
clude trivial explanations of identity or individuality, 
such as 'being the sole object identical to x' or 'being the 
sole object to belong to Ixl'. The sense in which I talk 
of a property involving an object should be clear from 
these examples. On a structural account of properties, 
we may say more generally that a property involves an 
object x iff x is a constituent of the property; and on 
other accounts of properties, including the standard 
one in terms of possible worlds, ' '  it is possible to make 
some sense of the notion. But even if no general defini- 
tion is forthcoming, it still seems clear from case to case 
whether or not a proposed individuation is circular. 
I do not think that the first three conditions are suffi- 
cient for individuation or that all four conditions 
together are sufficient for explanations of identity proper, 
since the defining properties should also in some 
sense be pertinent to or constitutive of the identity of 
the object. The conditions do determine, however, a 
minimal or attenuated notion of identity or individu- 
ation that is of some independent interest and provides 
an important guide to the application of the notions in 
the full sense. For although a class of properties that 
minimally defines or individuates some objects may not 
actually define or individuate them, it will tend to show 
that they are definable or individuable; and often this 
will be as important as any more specific claim. 
In applying the minimal notion itself, it is often helpful 
to use the concept of indiscernibility. Suppose we wish 
to explain the identity of the objects of X. Then we can 
say that one such object x is indiscernible in a world w 
f rom another such object y in the world v if any non- 
modal property, not presupposing the objects of X, 
that is had by x in w is also had by y in v. The in- 
dividuability of the objects of X then amounts to the 
claim that, in any world, any actual object of X is 
discernible from any other object of X. The definability 
of the objects of X, on the other hand, amounts to the 
claim that any actual object of X in one world is discer- 
nible from a distinct object of X in another (possibly 
identical) world. Thus what definability adds to in- 
dividuability is the claim that an actual object of X in 
one world is discernible from distinct objects of X in 
distinct worlds. ~5 (The reader should be able to 
reconstruct for himself the proof that X's are definable 
ifffor anyobjects x and y from X and worlds w and v, x 
in w is discernible from y in v whenever x is actual in w 
and y is distinct from x. The proof requires the 
assumption that the non-modal properties not involv- 
ing the objects of X (a) include the property of being ac- 
tual, (b) be closed under arbitrary conjunctions and 
negation, and (c) be the same from world to world. 
Condition (c) can be dropped at the cost of some com- 
plication to the formulation). 
One advantage of the explanation of identity in terms 
of discernibility is that it enables us to break down the 
individuation or definition of an object into smaller 
steps. In the case of non-existents, two significant steps 
of this sort concern the problems of intra- and inter- 
contextual individuation. The first is the question of 
distinguishing an object native to a given context from 
all of the other objects native to that context. The other 
is the question of distinguishing an object native to a 
given context from objects native to other contexts. 
Under reasonable assumptions, the general problem of 
individuation will reduce to these two special prob- 
lems. For first, a given non-existent may be 
distinguished from all existents by the mere fact that it 
does not exist. In other words, the distinction between 
existent and non-existent objects may be taken as un- 
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problematic. Now given an object native to a fixed 
context, that object may be distinguished from the 
other objects native to the same context by a solution 
to the intra-contextual problem and from the objects 
native to other contexts by a solution to the inter- 
contextual problem. Under the assumption, then, that 
all non-existents are native to some context or another, 
any non-existent will thereby be distinguished from all 
other objects. 
It is important to distinguish the inter-contextual prob- 
lem of identification from the cross-contextual prob- 
lem of re-identification. '~ The latter is the problem of 
identifying an object as it occurs in one context with 
that very same object as it occurs in another context. 
Thus it is essential to this latter problem, though not 
the former, that we conceive of the object as coming 
under different presentations (not necessarily in the 
phenomenological sense). The question, then, is: When 
are two presentations presentations of the same object? 
An analogy in terms of possible worlds should make 
the distinction clear. The inter-world problem is that of 
distinguishing an individual actual in one world from 
the distinct individuals that are actual in other worlds. 
if  the same individuals are actual in each world, then 
this is just the general problem of individuation. The 
cross-world problem, on the other hand, is that of 
distinguishing an object, as given in one world, from 
other objects, as given in other worlds. This is merely 
the attenuated version of the problem of identity and is 
clearly significant even when the same individuals are 
actual in each world and the problem of individuation 
is presumed to be solved. 
For the most part, I shall be concerned with problems 
of individuation, not re-identification. I do not wish to 
deny the interest of the latter problem; it merely lies 
beyond the natural reach of this paper. However, a cer- 
tain connection between the two types of problem 
should be noted. Call a presentation of an object in a 
context of which it is native (immigrant) a native (resp. 
immigrant) presentation. Now often a solution to the 
individuation problem will be in terms of native presen- 
tations, and in that case it may incidentally enable one 
to determine when two native presentations are of the 
same object. Let us also suppose that it is determined 
when an immigrant presentation is of the same object 
as a native presentation. Then the general problem of 
re-identification will have been solved; for given two 
immigrant presentations, we may determine native 
presentations of the same object, and then compare 
these directly. It is for this reason that the problem of 
re-identification may be formulated as one of  finding 
conditions for immigrancy. 
Although I have only considered the case of non- 
existents, it is clear that similar distinctions will apply 
to other kinds of objects. In the case of material ob- 
jects, for example, we may distinguish the problem of 
individuation (solved perhaps in terms of location at a 
time) from the problem of identity through time, which 
is a re-identification question concerning the ,,presenta- 
tions,, of an object at different times. Again, we may 
distinguish the individuation of persons (perhaps in 
terms of their occupying a single body at a given time) 
from their re-identification from one experience to 
another. Or again, we may distinguish the individu- 
ation of propositions (solved perhaps in terms of their 
structure) from their re-identification from one 
sentence to the next. 
Both problems of individuation and of re-identification 
must be distinguished, of course, from what I have call- 
ed the problem of identity. Often the problem of identi- 
ty for a given kind of object is taken to be a re- 
identification problem that is inspired by the attempt to 
reduce the object to its presentations. I think that this 
terminology invites confusion and it is not therefore 
one that I shall use. 
B3. The Identity o f  Non-existents 
Can informative explanations of the identity or in- 
dividuality of non-existents be given? It cannot in 
general be supposed that such explanations exist, even 
when taken in the attenuated sense of the previous sec- 
tion. However, the nature of certain objects may be 
such that their identity does admit of explanation. As 
an example, consider sets in the cumulative hierarchy. 
Each set can be individuated in terms of its members, 
those members, if sets, in terms of their members, and 
so on, until ultimately the set itself is individuated in 
terms of individuals. Thus it 
special nature of sets, that they 
and a similar argument can 
establish their identity. 
does follow, from the 
admit of individuation; 
be given, I think, to 
When we turn to non-existent objects, they also seem 
to be individuable. The more obvious counter exam- 
pies to this thesis fail. As a case in point, consider a 
story in which it is said that a certain crowd of people 
surged forward. ~7 It might be argued that the members 
of the crowd are non-existent objects, even though in- 
distinguishable. Yet if this is so, how many such objects 
are there? Any one answer, as opposed to another, 
seems quite arbitrary. Let us suppose, then, that the 
story states that ten people were in the crowd. Still, 
making the members of the crowd fictitious objects in 
their own right overlooks the intuitive distinction be- 
tween a story in which the members have a specific 
identity and a story in which they do not. In the first 
case, the question of whether the members are the same 
objects as those appearing in another story seems to 
have no basis, whereas in the second case it does. 
Still, such considerations are rather special, and it 
would be preferable to have a general argument for the 
individuation of non-existent objects, as in the case of 
sets. It is not that non-existent objects by their constitu- 
tion are individuable, but something along general lines 
may be said. For it might he argued, first, that each 
non-existent can be the de re object of a mental state 
such as admiration, belief or thought, and second, that 
it is necessary that each object of a mental state be in- 
dividuable. As it stands, the argument is not quite 
right, for in the possible world in which the object is 
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the object of a mental state, there may exist means of 
individuation not available in the given world. What is 
intended by the first premiss is that it should be poss- 
ible that the object be the object of a mental state e v e n  
when the means by which it is introduced remain the 
same. But since there are no other means by which the 
object can be individuated, it will be individuable in the 
other world only if it is already. 
In favour of the second premiss, it may be argued that 
this is merely a weak requirement on the de re status of 
an object. If two objects are indiscernible, then it is im- 
possible for a mental state to be of one object asopposed 
to the other, and so it is impossible for the state to be 
of either object. 
Some instances of the first premiss are trivial, for the 
non-existent object may already be an object of a con- 
text of the mind, such as a belief, or a dream, or an im- 
agining. However, other objects may be native to 
public contexts, such as stories or games of make- 
believe, and so not be the objects of any mental state. 
As we have seen, this is because the general conven- 
tions for interpreting these contexts may determine a 
content regardless of whether or not that content is 
grasped. But the contents thus ascribed are not 
something that exist independently of all human activi- 
ty or thought; the whole point of the convention is that 
it should show us how to interpret the context. Thus 
no convention, it may be argued, will count as an inter- 
pretative one unless it is possible, by applying it, to 
adopt the appropriate mental attitude towards the con- 
tent of the context; and this means then that the objects 
of the context must be able to serve, as they stand, as 
objects of that attitude. 
Note that this argument makes it plausible that non- 
existent objects should be identifiable in the 
epistemological sense. Indeed, this conclusion would 
straightforwardly follow if it were assumed that 
(necessarily) objects of mental states were identifiable 
in this further sense. However, this argument from 
metaphysical to epistemological identifiability is very 
special to the case at hand and does not presuppose any 
general conclusion to that effect. 
Even if non-existents can be individuated, can an infor- 
mative explanation of their identity be given? It is not 
possible, in general, to go from one to the other. It can 
consistently be maintained, for example, that parcels of 
matter are individuable in terms of their spatial loca- 
tion at a given time, and yet denied that there is a 
significant explanation of their identity. 
However, there is a special circumstance in which the 
transition from individuality to identity can be made. 
For suppose that the objects of X are individuable and 
that, moreover, two distinct worlds cannot merely dif- 
fer in the identities of the objects in X. Then the objects 
of X must have an identity explanation. For take any 
two distinct objects x and y of X and any two worlds w 
and v. If w and v are the same, then x and y will be 
discernible in that world by the individuality condition. 
But if w and v are distinct, then x and y will be discern- 
ible in their respective worlds, for otherwise the two 
worlds will differ only on the identities of the objects in 
X. 
Now in the case of non-existents, the additional condi- 
tion holds in a strong from; for worlds that merely dif- 
fer on the identities of non-existents will agree on exist- 
ents and hence, by World Actualism, will be the 
same. Thus, in this special case, the objects will be both 
individuable and definable. 
However, even granted that non-existents are in- 
dividuable or definable, it is still left open how they are 
to be individuated or defined. As we have noted, there 
are two main views on how this can be done: 
Internalism. All non-existents can be individuated in 
terms of their internal properties; 
Externalism. All non-existents can be individuated in 
terms of their external properties.'8 
But even if not all non-existents are individuable, we 
shall still need to say how they are to be individuated or 
distinguished in cases when this can be done. Here we 
may distinguish two weaker theses: 
Qualified Internalism. If two non-existents are 
distinguishable at all, then they are distinguished by an 
internal property; 
Qualified Externalism. If two non-existents are 
distinguishable at all, then they are distinguished by an 
external property. 
Given: 
The Individuation Thesis. All non-existent objects are 
individuable; 
then the qualified versions of internalism and exter- 
nalism will be equivalent to their respective unqua- 
lifted versions. But without the individuation thesis, 
the qualified theses will have independent interest. 
Among the various options for individuating non- 
existents, there is a great deal to be said for internalism. 
Often a non-existent may be picked out in terms of a 
name or other external mark. But given that general 
conventions may determine the objects of a context 
quite apart from our conception of them, it may be 
doubted that there must always be some mark of the 
object. In such a case, there might then be only internal 
means of individuating the object. 
But there are other reasons for espousing internalism, 
even granted that the identity of non-existents can 
always be given in external terms. One such reason 
concerns what one might call the ultimate explanation 
of identity. Given that the character Holmes is in- 
troduced in a certain way, it may be that no other ob- 
ject could be introduced in that way. But the means of 
introduction, it may be argued, do not provide the 
ultimate explanation of the identity of the object, for it 
is only because these means also introduce a certain 
content that they serve to pick out the object at all. It is 
the content that directly explains the identity of the ob- 
ject; the means of introduction only explain the identity 
indirectly, through the content. 
A related reason concerns the briefly mentioned condi- 
tion of pertinence on explanations of identity. It is 
natural to suppose that this requires, in part, that the 
defining properties give a stable or rigid feature of the 
object. That  is not simply to say that the properties 
should be essential; for this can be true even though the 
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features in virtue of which the object possesses the pro- 
perties vary from world to world. Rather, the pos- 
session of the property should itself require a constant 
feature of the object. 
Now it is plausible to suppose that the external proper- 
ties do not give stable features of the object in this 
sense. After all, could not an author have used a dif- 
ferent name for the same character (especially if it is no 
part of the story that the character has that name)? On 
the other hand, it seems clear that the internal proper- 
ties do provide stable features of the object and so this 
provides an additional reason for espousing the inter- 
nalist position. 
A final reason is that, under a natural platonic stance, 
non-existent objects are merely constructs from the 
properties they have in stories. But such a view im- 
mediately suggests an internalist position. 
Internalism, then, is an attractive doctrine and, for this 
reason, I shall push it as far as it will go. However in 
the end, it will turn out that such a theory is inadequate 
and that the arguments for both internalism and the in- 
dividuation thesis will have to be rejected. We will then 
be led to give a completely different account of the con- 
ditions under which non-existent objects can be in- 
dividuated, one that leads not to internalism but to a 
qualified form of externalism. 
C. An internalist theory 
C1. The Rudiments 
In the next two sections I shall present a preliminary 
version of a naive theory of non-existent objects. In the 
subsequent sections I shall show how the theory is to be 
modified in the light of various objections. It might be 
thought perverse that an imperfect theory should be 
presented at the start; but it is only as a response to 
criticism that the final theory is best appreciated. 
Three kinds of theory for non-existents may be 
distinguished; for one may deal with the objects from a 
particular kind of context, such as beliefs, dreams or 
stories, or with the objects from all contexts or, finally, 
with the relationship between objects from different 
kinds of contexts. It is natural to treat the theory of a 
single kind of context as representative of the general 
case, and so the theories under the first two heads 
would collapse to essentially one case. I think there are 
dangers in treating all contexts and their objects on a 
par, for even when the principles are the same the 
grounds for them may be different. However, since it 
would be awkward to deal separately with each kind of 
theory, I shall concentrate on the case of stories and 
their contexts, while indicating, on the side, the import- 
ant disanalogies and relationships to the other cases. 
For the particular case of stories, it will be convenient 
to adopt a special terminology for the objects under 
consideration. Those objects that occur in stories, 
whether as natives or immigrants, will be called 
characters, while those objects that are native to stories 
will be called fictional. Thus all fictional objects will be 
characters, though not vice versa. 
The theory of fictional objects will be divided into two 
parts, the rudimentary and the extended. Roughly 
speaking, the rudimentary part deals with the struc- 
tural relations holding between stories and the objects 
native to them, quite independently of considerations 
of content; whereas the extended part also deals with 
questions of content. The nature of the distinction will 
become clearer once the two parts of the complete 
theory have been presented. 
The rudimentary theory is based upon five primitive 
non-logical notions: first, the categories of objects and 
of stories; secondly, the property of existence; and last- 
ly, the relations of an object occurring in and being 
native to a story. The three main axioms are: 
N(ativity) O(ccurrence). Any object native to a story 
occurs in that story; 
C(ontext) U(niqueness). Each object is native to at 
most one story; 
N(on)-E(xistence). No existent object is native to a 
story. ' 9 
I take it that the axiom NE is unproblematic. Existent 
objects are not, in the relevant sense, introduced by 
stories; they are already there. If we were to supply a 
context for existents, it would be the actual world, and 
not a story. The truth of NE is particularly clear on the 
creationist view. For then the native objects are those 
that are created in the act of creating the story; and 
although existent objects may be created, it is not in 
this way. 
Axiom CU is much more problematic. One difficulty, 
considered by Parsons, is of an object being native to 
both a story and its sequel. Given the intuitive notion 
of being native to or introduced in a story, it is often 
difficult to say, in the course of fiction concerning an 
object, when it is native and when it becomes an immi- 
grant. Later I shall offer some modal advice on this 
question. But it does seem plausible that, in certain ca- 
ses, an object will be native to the combined context of 
a story and its sequel and not merely to the narrower 
context of the original story. But then, in contradistinc- 
tion to CU, the object will be native both to the original 
story and to the sequel. 
This difficulty can be overcome by distinguishing be- 
tween stories and their parts. A novel with several 
chapters is not a collection of short stories; each 
chapter tells part of the story told by the novel and not 
an entire story in its own right. The propositions true 
in stories do not present themselves to us as an undif- 
ferentiated mass. Rather, there are certain natural divi- 
sions that correspond to the entire stories. Any subdivi- 
sions then correspond to the story parts. 
An author might present a given text both as a novel 
and as a collection of short stories. Such a double 
classification might have real aesthetic significance in 
terms of how the text was to be understood and judged 
(as well as providing a simple way of enlarging the 
author's corpus). But even here, we should distinguish 
between the short story, as told by part of a text, and 
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the story part, as told by the corresponding chapter. 
For it is essential to the story part, though not the short 
story, that it be part of the story as told by the whole 
text. In addition, the characters in the short story will 
be, in general, but attenuated versions of those in the 
story part. 
Normally, the boundaries of a story are marked by the 
covers of a book.2~ But this is a convention that might 
be, and often is, overlooked. A novel may be issued in 
a serial form or several novels be bound in one volume. 
We can say, then, of our <<story,, and its sequel, that a 
single object will be native to them both only in case 
they constitute parts of a more comprehensive story. 
Thus despite appearances, there is only one story in the 
example. 
Another difficulty for CU arises from the example, 
made notorious by Borges '56, of two authors in- 
dependently telling stories with the same content. It 
might then be argued that the stories are different and 
yet the characters native to them are the same. 
However, I am inclined to believe that the counter- 
example is not convincing, either on a creationist or a 
platonist view. 
On a creationist view, it is plausible to suppose that the 
objects native to the two stories are distinct. For both 
sets of objects are created by the different authors. 
Now suppose one story is created before the other. 
How then can one of the authors create his characters, 
given that they already have been created? Moreover, 
what each author creates does not seem to depend 
upon what the other author does, and so even in the 
cases in which the stories are simultaneously created, 
we should conclude that the characters are distinct) '  
A platonist would not accept this argument. He would 
probably say that the authors just happened to hit upon 
the same characters. But he would probably contend, 
for similar reasons, that the stories were also the same. 
So depending upon whether we are creationist or 
platonist, we either get distinct characters or the same 
stories, but not the required combination of the same 
characters and distinct stories. 
It must be admitted, though, that on certain views the 
required combination would arise. If, for example, one 
were platonist about non-existents but empiricist about 
contexts, or at least some contexts such as beliefs and 
dreams, then one might well say in such cases that the 
objects were the same but the contexts distinct. I am 
not myself attracted to such an intermediate position; 
but if one were, principle CU would have to go. 
A somewhat similar case is that in which the same story 
is retold, perhaps with some slight variation in content; 
for then one might argue that the stories, the original 
and the retelling, are distinct and yet the characters the 
same. However, in this case it would be more plausible 
for either the creationist or platonist to contend that 
the stories are the same. This means, though, that the 
identity of the retold story will be fixed by the identity 
of the original story and not its own internal or exter- 
nal features. 
A more serious case is the following. Suppose that an 
author concurrently writes two different stories about 
the same character, one who is not real or immigrant 
from another context. There would then seem to result 
a single object native to two distinct stories. This 
would be a problem as much for the platonist as the 
creationist, for since the stories may differ in content he 
would have no special reason to suppose them the 
same. 
One possible objection to this example is that the 
author has, in reality, written two parts of a more com- 
prehensive story. But although he may do this, he does 
not have to. This is especially clear in the case of an art- 
ist concurrently painting two pictures of the same ob- 
ject, for there is then no temptation to suppose that 
each picture must be part of a more comprehensive pic- 
ture. 
Another objection is that the objects of the two stories 
or two paintings are, in reality, distinct and that, in 
particular, the artist's intention to be painting or 
writing about the same object is not sufficient, in nor- 
mal circumstances, to guarantee that the intention is 
fulfilled. I am inclined to think it is, at least when the 
intention is a primary one. But even if it is not suffi- 
cient, it is still plausible to suppose, whatever the 
criteria of identity are, be they public convention or 
something else, that they should not exclude the com- 
mon identity of the objects in the sort of cases under 
consideration. 
Even if it is granted that there is a single object, it might 
be argued that it must be immigrant to one or other of 
the contexts. This may not be clear in the case at hand; 
but again, given whatever it is that determines native 
status, we may suppose that the two contexts should be 
symmetric in this regard. 
Nor  need these questions of identity or native status be 
idle metaphysical ones. There may be real aesthetic 
point in making one decision rather than another. Two 
paintings of a single object may be used to illustrate dif- 
ference of perspective, or of mood, or what have you. 
If, in addition, the single object is native to one work 
but not the other, then the second work is, in a certain 
sense, derivative from the first; unlike the first work, it 
cannot stand on its own but must be evaluated in the 
light of the other work. On the other hand, if the single 
object is native to both works, then they form a unity in 
which each work-has equal status. 
These aesthetic points, moreover, are reflected by the 
modal facts. Thus in case the single object is native to 
both works, each work cannot exist without the other. 
But if the object is native to one work and not the 
other, then it may well be possible that the one can exist 
without the other. 
A final objection to the example is that even if there is a 
single object it will be an immigrant from some context 
of the mind. But we can imagine that there are general 
conventions governing the interpretation of 'studies in 
pairs' and the cases in which a single object will be 
native to both. Normally, the creator will be aware of 
the single native object; but in certain cases he may not. 
It is interesting to note in this regard that similar prob- 
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lems arise for contexts of the mind. Consider two 
children who mistakenly take a shadow to be of a 
monster who is going to attack them. Then certainly 
there is a non-existent monster that each child believes 
to exist; under normal circumstances, the monster will 
be the same for each child; and if the monster does not 
originate from a story-book or elsewhere, but from 
within the given situation, he will then be a native to 
each child's belief. 
I think that these last examples work and that therefore 
CU must go, both for stories and for the other sorts of 
context. There is, however, a technical device for 
restoring its truth. Just as stories have parts, they may 
also be compounded to form story compounds. We 
may then say that x is native to s in the technical sense 
if s is the compound of all stories to which x is native in 
the intuitive sense. If story compounds are then also 
counted as stories in the technical sense, it will then be 
a matter of definition that an object is native to at most 
one story. 
The other cases can be treated in the same way. Thus 
in the child-monster case, we may say that the monster 
is native to the belief of the children, though not the in- 
dividual belief of each child (there is a natural use here 
for a compound belief), and in the double painting 
case, we may say that the object is native to the paint- 
ings, as a compound, though not to the individual 
painting. 
There is some technical convenience in being able to 
talk of the unique context to which an object is native 
and, accordingly, CU will sometimes be retained under 
the technical construal. However, in the last analysis, 
the proper formulation of principles will be impossible 
under this construal, and it will then be important to 
formulate the principles directly in terms of stories or 
contexts in their ordinary sense. 
Related to, but independent of, CU is the question of 
whether an object can be native to two different sorts 
of context. If it could not, then we could talk without 
ambiguity of the type of a non-existent, as its being an 
object of a dream, or fiction, or what have you, depend- 
ing upon the sort of context to which it is native. 
However, I do not think the type of context need be 
unique. Consider the child who is afraid of a nonexist- 
ent monster. Then the child may also believe that the 
monster is going to attack him and that belief may, in a 
natural sense, be partly constitutive of the fear. It then 
seems plausible, in case the monster is native to the 
fear, that it is also native to the belief. 
The nature of certain sorts of context may be such that 
they exclude a common native object. Perhaps the 
same object cannot be native to both a dream and a 
film or to a belief and an imagining. But this is not a 
question we shall discuss. 
There is one other formal principle that might be laid 
down. The objects in different stories will exhibit cer- 
tain patterns of nativity and immigrancy. Such a pat- 
tern is depicted below, with the native objects of each 
story being circled. 
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It may be wondered whether any formal constraint can 
be imposed upon the patterns that might in this way be 
exhibited. Now one natural constraint here is Founda- 
tion. Say that one story s derives from another t if some 
object immigrant to s is native to t. Then the founda- 
tion principle states: 
There is no infinite sequence of stories s,, s2, s3 .... (not 
necessarily all distinct) such that s, derives from s2, s2 
from s3, and so on. 
There are, however, two ways in which this principle 
can fail. 22 First, it may be that the object x, is im- 
migrant to s, yet native to the earlier story s2, that x2 is 
immigrant to s~ yet native to the earlier story s3, and so 
on, ad infinitum. This example requires, under normal 
assumptions, that time stretch back indefinitely in the 
past, but would otherwise not appear to involve any 
difficulty in principle. 
Second, recall the artist who concurrently paints two 
pictures of the same native object. We can now imagine 
that each picture is of two objects x and y, that he first 
paints x in picture 1 and y in picture 2, thereby making 
them native to their respective pictures, and that he 
then paints y in picture 1 and x in picture 2 not as 
natives but immigrants. Then each picture will derive 
from the other, giving a counterexample of the form s, 
t, s, t .... Similar examples 'may be constructed for the 
other public contexts and, with sufficient ingenuity, 
also for the contexts of the mind. 
Although the foundation principle might appear to be 
of only recondite technical interest, its failure will later 
prove decisive in rejecting certain natural constructive 
conceptions of contexts and their objects. 
I have so far only considered stories and their objects. 
But on a theory for other sorts of contexts, such as 
beliefs or dreams, analogous principle should be laid 
down. On a general theory, it should also be asserted 
that: 
Each non-existent object is native to at least one con- 
text. 
According to this principle then, there would be no 
non-existents that did not originate in some context or 
another. Nor is the truth of this an accident. For the ra- 
tionale for having non-existent objects is to explain the 
de re content of stories, beliefs, and the like; apart from 
such contexts, they would have no use. 
C2. The Extended Theory 
The language of the extended theory contains three ad- 
ditional primitive notions. One is the category of prop- 
erties. The other two are relations of copula, the 
literal and story-relative copula. The first holds be- 
tween an object and a property when the object has the 
property; the second holds between an object, property 
and story when the object has the property in the story. 
In formulating the theory for the other sorts of con- 
texts, analogous primitives should be chosen. It is im- 
portant, however, that these primitives be properly 
understood. Suppose I conceive of a wingless horse. 
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Then it may be argued that it is not thereby necessary 
that I conceive of the wingless horse that it is a wingless 
horse or, indeed, that it have any properties at all. Now 
in such a case, we may say that it is true in the context 
of the conception that the object is a winged horse. 
Thus that this proposition is true in (or of) the context 
will not require that I conceive it to be true. If, 
however, there are contexts that are not in even this 
weak sense propositional, then this will create dif- 
ficulties for the internalist account (since there will be 
no content in terms of which to characterize the ob- 
jects), though not for the externalist account that is 
later to be developed. 
The axioms of the extended theory will fall into two 
groups, one dealing with objects and the other with 
properties. The axioms for objects are: 
Object Abstraction (1). For any condition ~5 on proper- 
ties, there is an object and a story such that the object is 
native to the story and has exactly those properties in 
the story that satisfy the condition ~; 
Object Identity (1)If objects x are native to the stories s 
and t respectively, then x -- y iff x has exactly the same 
properties in s as y has in t. 23 
In the formulation of OA, I have talked rather loosely 
of a property satisfying the condition ~. I intend of 
course that OA should be an axiom- scheme; and when 
later I talk of conditions, the axioms or principles in 
question are to be similarly understood. I shall also 
sometimes talk of classes (in the sense of NBG class 
theory) in place of conditions. 
According to OA there is, for any condition on proper- 
ties, a story in which exactly those properties satisfying 
the conditions are attributed to a native object; and ac- 
cording to OI, objects to which are attributed the same 
properties in their home stories are the same. 
Both axioms may be re-formulated in terms of what I 
call the fictional, as opposed to the literal, copula. This 
holds between an object and a property when the ob- 
ject has the property in some home story. Given Con- 
text Uniqueness, this story must be unique and so OA 
and OI may be re-expressed by: 
OA(1 ') For any condition ~ on properties, there is an 
object x such that x fictionally possesses a property iff 
that property satisfies the condition; 
0I(1 ') The fictional objects x and y are identical iff x 
fictionally possesses exactly those properties fictionally 
possessed by y. 
As introduced, the fictional copula is a defined term, 
explained in terms of the nativity relation and the 
story-relative copula. However, it may also be in- 
troduced as a primitive and then large parts of the 
theory can be formulated purely in terms of the literal 
and fictional copulas, without any aid from the nativity 
relation or the story-relative copula. Considerable in- 
terest attaches to such a formulation, both in itself and 
as a basis for comparison with other theories. I shall 
not systematically attempt such a formulation, but 
shall occasionally use the fictional copula when it is 
convenient. It is important to note, though, that on my 
theory, unlike others, there are not two forms of 
primitive predicational tie between objects and proper- 
ties; there is but one copula, strictly so-called, and then 
various copula-like relations. 
The abstraction and identity axioms for objects appear 
to solve, in the most direct and obvious manner, the 
problems of being and of individuation for fictional ob- 
jects: for the first says what fictional objects there are; 
and the second says when they are identical. Moreover, 
these axioms naturally suggest an internalist and 
platonic theory according to which fictitious objects 
are actually constructed out of the properties they fic- 
tionally possess. On the most straightforward theory of 
this sort, the objects would be identical or, in some 
strong sense, identifiable with sets of these properties. 
However, as we shall later see, there are great dif- 
ficulties both in the proposed solutions to the problems 
of identity and being, and in the conception of objects. 
Let us now consider each axiom in turn. The identity 
axiom may be broken down into two other principles: 
OI (1) (i) If x and y are native to the same story s and 
have the same properties in s, then they are the same: 
OI (1) (ii) If x and y are native to different respective 
stories s and t and if x has in s the same properties that 
y has in t, then x and y are the same. 
The first principle then provides a criterion of intra- 
story and the second of inter-story individuation. 
From the second of these principles and Context Unique- 
ness can be derived the following criterion for the 
identity of stories: 
The stories s and t are identical if there are objects x 
and y native to s and t respectively such that x has in s 
exactly the properties that y has in t. 
For, either the stories s and t are identical or, under the 
stated condition, x and y will be the same by the prin- 
ciple, and so s and t will be identical after all by CU. 
However, axiom CU is essential to the proof for, as we 
have seen, it is otherwise possible to adopt radically 
different criteria of identity for stories and their objects. 
Also, the above criterion is not complete since some 
stories contain no native objects. We shall later con- 
sider more adequate criteria of identity for stories. 
Turning to the abstraction axiom, we see that it is 
asserted for all conditions ~5. Now on a platonic con- 
ception, there is no immediate difficulty with this. But 
on an empirical conception, there is the problem that 
the empirical conditions for the existence of the ap- 
propriate story may not have been realized. In the sec- 
ond part, I shall consider how, under such a concep- 
tion, the axiom for object abstraction is to be modified. 
But let us note that, even on an empirical view, there is 
some point in considering a more platonically oriented 
axiom. For one of the most pressing problems facing a 
theory of fictional objects is to show that a suitably 
strong form of object abstraction can be consistently 
maintained. But in showing this, the empirical 
character of contexts or their objects is hardly likely to 
play a significant role; and so the proof of consistency 
for the platonic system may help to give us the 
assurance we require of consistency for the 'empirical' 
system. 
As they stand, the axioms say nothing about what prop- 
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erties there are and, indeed, are compatible with there 
being none at all. But without properties, there are no 
non-degenerate fictional objects that can be shown to 
,,exists, with the help of object abstraction. It is this fur- 
ther need that the second part of the extended theory is 
designed to serve. 
Now the question of how a theory of properties should 
go is very problematic and not one that we can proper- 
ly hope to resolve within the confines of this paper. 
However,  let us, for the moment, merely make the 
common assumption that: 
Property Abstraction (1). For any condition on objects 
there is a property such that an object has the property 
iff it satisfies the condition. 
I shall later discuss this axiom in more detail, but for 
the moment let us note a striking formal analogy be- 
tween this abstraction principle and the one for objects. 
It is an analogy that proves to play a pervasive role in 
the general study of object theories. To make it precise, 
let us suppose that the theory is formulated in a 
language which comprises variables for fictional ob- 
jects, variables for properties, and the fictional and 
literal copulas. Given a statement ~ of such a language, 
let its dual 4)' be the result of interchanging the 
variables for objects and properties and of replacing the 
literal copula with the converse of the fictional copula, 
and vice versa. Intuitively, the roles of objects and of 
properties will be reversed in the dual, with a cor- 
responding change in the copula. In terms of this no- 
tion, we see that object abstraction is simply the dual of 
property abstraction. 24 
The concept of object-property duality has an interest 
that extends far beyond the present example. First, we 
may note that it applies in an illuminating way to other 
principles. Take, for example, the extensionality prin- 
ciple of  identity for properties, viz.: 
P = Q iff the objects possessed by P are exactly those 
possessed by Q. 
Then its dual is simply the previous identity axiom for 
objects. More generally~ the result of taking the duals 
of axioms of what is intuitively a theory of properties 
will always be an object theory in something like the 
sense of Meinong. 
Second, ours is not the only concept of object-property 
duality. It is particularly appropriate to a contextualist 
theory of non-existents. But on a literalist theory, ac- 
cording to which an object literally has all or many of 
the properties that it fictionally has, it would be more 
appropriate to let the literal copula be replaced by its 
own converse in a dual. The dual of property abstrac- 
tion would then be that, for any condition on proper- 
ties, some object literally had all of the properties satis- 
fying the condition, and the dual of the extensionality 
principle would be the Leibnizian principle that objects 
were the same iff they (literally) had the same proper- 
ties. 
This literalist concept of dual gives one of the most 
natural ways of obtaining a comprehensive object 
theory. For one may simply add to a theory of proper- 
ties the duals of all its axioms. The resulting theories 
are then those that are self-dual in the sense that the 
duals of all theorems are also theorems. 
Unfortunately, any reasonable theory of this sort is in- 
consistent, for many unproblematic sets of instances of 
property abstractions will be inconsistent with their 
duals. For example, if there is a null property (had by 
no objects) and if each object has some property, it 
then follows by duality that some object has the null 
property, which is a contradiction. 2~ 
From a formal point of view, the different theories of 
non-existent objects may naturally be viewed as an at- 
tempt to reconcile a reasonable theory of properties 
with its dual. One would like property abstraction to 
be compatible with a literalist version of object abstrac- 
tion. But given that this cannot be so, one modifies one 
or the other or both so that no contradiction can arise, 
either by restricting the properties that define objects, 
or the objects over which the properties are defined, or 
by introducing two forms of the copula, or in some 
other way. 
Finally, we may note the significance of the literalist 
concept of duality to questions concerning the com- 
parative ontological status of properties and 
Meinongian objects. It is commonly supposed that prop- 
erties or sets are unproblematic in a way that objects 
with arbitrary classes of properties are not. But we may 
note that a given theory will be consistent only if its 
dual is and so, in particular, this will apply to a theory 
of properties or sets and the dual theory of objects. 
Now,  as we have already seen, both theories cannot be 
consistently maintained. But from a purely formal 
point of view, there is no good reason for giving up one 
rather than another. On what grounds, then, should 
the theory of properties be preferred? A realist view of 
properties might provide such grounds. But if, as is 
commonly supposed, the theory of properties is 
something that needs to be made out on the basis of a 
more neutral theory, it is hard to see why the develop- 
ment should proceed in the direction of properties 
rather than of objects. 
I do not wish to hold that there are no grounds for 
preferring the standard principles concerning proper- 
ties to their duals, but merely that these grounds are 
more problematic than has been commonly recognized. 
In a recent paper, Parsons '79 has complained of an 
unfair bias in the history of philosophy towards sets as 
opposed to non-existents. If I am right this complaint 
has a sort of technical vindication, for the very bias 
towards sets was a bias against the dual theory. 
D. Refinements 
D1. Implicit~Explicit Copula 
The theory of the last section is a natural attempt at 
formalizing the principles of an internalist conception 
of objects. However,  even from an internalist perspec- 
tive, the theory is subject to a wide range of difficulties. 
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One concerns a subtle but critical ambiguity in the 
sense of the story-relative copula; another arises from 
diagonal arguments similar to those that plague the 
classical theories of properties and sets; and a final dif- 
ficulty arises from objects, such as Watson and 
Holmes, that are characterized in terms of one another. 
We shall consider each difficulty in turn and show 
how, in the light of it, the theory is to be modified. 
Let us begin with the question of the ambiguity in the 
sense of the story-relative copula. It is here necessary to 
distinguish between what I shall call the implicit and 
explicit forms of that copula. This distinction, in its 
turn, is to be explained in terms of a corresponding 
distinction between internally and externally formed 
propositions. Given an object a and a property P, a 
proposition to the effect that the object has the proper- 
ty may be formed in either of two ways. In the first 
case, the proposition P(a) is formed by plugging up the 
property with the object: and in the second case, the 
proposition (Pa) is to the effect that the object has the 
property. In the one case, the copula is an internal 
feature of the proposition, whereas in the other case it 
is an external facet of how the proposition is formed. 
Suppose that the object is Holmes (a real object would 
do as well) and let the property be that of being a detec- 
tive. Then the internally formed proposition is that 
Holmes is a detective, and the externally formed prop- 
osition is that Holmes has the property of being a 
detective. The former attributes the property of being a 
detective to Holmes; the latter attributes the copula to 
Holmes and the property of being a detective. 
The distinction is even clearer in case the property is 
complex. Thus take the property to be that of not be- 
ing married. Then the internally formed proposition is 
that Holmes is not married, whereas the externally 
formed proposition is that Holmes has the property of 
not being married. In this case, the first proposition is 
the negation of a subject-predicate proposition, while 
the second proposition is itself of subject-predicate 
form. 
More generally, given a condition Ca(x), let MiCa(x) be 
the property expressed by Ca(x). Thus if Ca(x) is the con- 
dition 'x i snot  married' then MiCa(x) is the property of 
not being married. If P is the property MiCa(x) and a is a 
given object, then the internally formed proposition 
P(a) is expressed by the sentence 'Ca(a)' and the external- 
ly formed proposition (Pa) by 'a has MiCa(x)'. 26 (I have 
been careless over use-mention. The pedantic reader 
need not be disturbed; for my meaning will be clear, 
even when my expression is sloppy). 
One can, of course, accept the distinction without ac- 
cepting that the propositions are different. But on any 
reasonable structuralist view the propositions will be 
different, for the distinction is just one of structure. On 
other views of propositions, the question is not so 
clear. Given a possible worlds view, for example, it 
may be argued that the propositions are the same since 
they are true in the same worlds. However, even here 
there is room for a difference; for in order to solve prob- 
lems of impredicativity, one might maintain that the 
externally formed proposition was bivalent even in 
those cases in which the internally formed proposition 
was not. 
For the most part, I shall adopt a structural view of 
propositions; and therefore the special difficulties that 
arise or disappear on other views will not be con- 
sidered. 
Given the internal/external distinction for proposi- 
tions, its extension to the story-relative copula is readi- 
ly explained. An object will have a property in the im- 
Dlicit (the explicit) sense if the internally (resp. external- 
ly) formed proposition is true in the story. Thus 
Holmes will implicitly not-be-married in the Conan 
Doyle stories if it is true in those stories that he is not 
married, and he will explicitly not-be-married in the 
stories if it is true in those stories that he has the prop- 
erty of not being married. 
The distinction is of great relevance to the correctness 
and adequacy of the abstraction and identity axioms 
for objects. Under the explicit interpretation, the 
abstraction axiom is true (in all respects that are rele- 
vant here). It is, however, inadequate. For consider a 
novel in which the ingenious philosopher Gotman con- 
clusively establishes that there are no properties. Let us 
suppose that this is a point emphasized throughout the 
story, so although it is stated, say, that the native 
character Plat does not have a sound mind, it is ex- 
plicitly denied that there is a property, such as the prop- 
erty of not having a fine mind, that Plat has. 
It then seems clear that there are no properties that Plat 
explicitly has in this story. However, a solution to the 
problem of being requires that it be provable that there 
is an object that is native to a story in which the object 
does not have a fine mind (as opposed to possessing the 
property of not having a fine mind). But under the ex- 
plicit interpretation, this is something that object 
abstraction will not provide. 
Stories of the above sort I call logico-philosophical fan- 
tasies, because in them commonly accepted logical or 
philosophical truths are denied or, at least, not ac- 
cepted. Since I shall make frequent use of such 
examples, it is important to establish their legitimacy; 
and so I shall here consider two possible objections. 
One is that the examples are not actual or even like any 
actual literature and therefore need not fall within the 
scope of a theory of non-existents. But this objection 
misconstrues the scope of what is, after all, a 
philosophical or metaphysical theory. Such a theory is 
not concerned with what is actually true of all fiction 
and fictions, but with what must be true of all fiction 
and fictions. In so far, then, as it is possible that there is 
a logico-philosophical fantasy of the sort described, it is 
an example to which the theory should apply. 
Another, more radical, objection is that more is true in 
the story than I have allowed. In particular, it is true in 
the story that Plat has the property of not possessing a 
sound mind, even though this is not directly stated. 
But this is most implausible. The world of the story is 
one without an ontology of properties and so what 
reason is there to suppose that statements presupposing 
that ontology are true in the story. We can perfectly 
well conceive of a story in which the atomic theory of 
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matter fails. Why, then, should the nominalistic theory 
be so much worse off in this regard? 
If it is allowed that in the story Plat had the property of 
not possessing a sound mind, the story becomes incon- 
sistent in the sense that for some proposition p, both p 
and not-p are true in it; for the story also explicitly 
denies that he has such a property. The inconsistency 
then runs the danger of spreading - not that all incon- 
sistencies in stories spread, but only that they may. For 
suppose it is an important part of the story that it is an 
empirical proposition that Plat has the property in 
question, one consequence of which is that Mercury 
will deviate from a specified orbit. The deviation turns 
out not to occur, and it is on this basis that Gotman 
concludes that the proposition is false. If it were then 
true in the story that Plat had the property, it would 
then seem reasonable, in this particular case, to sup- 
pose that it was true in the story that the deviation oc- 
curred. 
On the present suggestion, then, the story may be badly 
inconsistent. Yet surely it is not, or at least not for the 
reasons given. If a story is put forward as inconsistent 
or paradoxical, then no interpretative problems are 
raised by its inconsistencies; they can simply be regarded 
as integral to its content. But if the story is put for- 
ward as a consistent one, then interpretative problems 
will arise. Of course, the inconsistency may be ap- 
parent only. But if it is not, there is a conflict between 
requiring that the story be closed under reasonable con- 
sequences, on the one hand, and restricting the con- 
sequences of the inconsistent propositions, on the 
other. One natural resolution of this conflict is to inter- 
pret the story as two overlapping sub-stories, with the 
reasonable consequences of either sub-story holding in 
the  whole story, but not the reasonable consequences 
of the whole story itself. But however the conflict is 
resolved, it seems clear that the nominalistic novel does 
not, or need not, give rise to interpretative problems of 
this sort. 
If I am right, then, the example does point to an inad- 
equacy in the abstraction axiom under the explicit inter- 
pretation. But what of the implicit interpretation? Here 
the axiom is not inadequate (at least in the same way), 
for Plat will in the implicit sense have the properties of 
not possessing a fine mind, etc. Unfortunately, under 
this interpretation the axiom is false. There are two 
basic problems, which we may consider in turn. 
First, there is the problem of exactitude. Given that an 
object implicitly has certain properties in a story, it will 
follow that it implicitly has certain other properties in 
the story. For example, if the object a implicitly has the 
property Xx(x = x) of being identical to itself in the 
story s, then italso implicitly has the property Xx(x = a) 
of being identical to a in s, and vice versa. Now if the 
condition ~ holds of one of these properties but not the 
other, then it will not be true that there is an object that 
fictionally possesses exactly those properties which 
satisfy the condition. 
Let us say that x has Q consequently upon x's having P 
if the proposition Q(x) that x has Q is the very same as 
the proposition P(x) that x has P. Then the general prob- 
lem is that, in regard to a particular condition ~b on 
properties and a particular object x, ~b may not be dosed 
under this special sense of consequence, i.e. x may 
have properties not in ~ that are consequent upon the 
properties it does have in ~. 
One solution to this problem is to require that ~ in the 
original axiom should be suitably closed. But a simpler 
and more natural solution is to leave ~ alone and to 
change the stated relation between it and the object. 
This gives: 
Object Abstraction (2). For any condition ~ on proper- 
ties, there is an object x and a story s such that: 
(a) x is native to s; 
(b) a proposition is true in s iff it is formed from a prop- 
erty satisfying the condition ~ by plugging in the ob- 
ject x. 
Since it is no longer required that x only have the prop- 
erties of ~ in s, it is clear that the problem of conse- 
quent properties no longer arises. 
The second version of the axiom involves an important 
shift in emphasis; for instead of specifying the content 
of an object in a story directly, it has been specified in 
terms of the content of the story itself. In explaining the 
relationship between these two contents, it will be 
helpful, here and elsewhere, to have some more 
general terminology. Accordingly, let the (specific) 
record of a story be the set of sentences true in the 
story. Distinguish this from the text, which merely con- 
sists of the written (or spoken) sentences. As several 
philosophers have pointed out, what is true in a story 
will usually go beyond what is in the text and may 
sometimes not even include parts of the text. Let the 
(specific) content of a story be the set of propositions 
expressed by the sentences of the record or, more 
directly, the set of propositions true in the story. Now 
say that C is the (a) content of an object x in the story s 
if the content of the story consists of exactly those prop- 
ositions of the form P(x) for P a member of C. Given a 
record of a story, the syntactic analogues of the con- 
tents of an object may be obtained by replacing any 
number of occurrences of names for the object with a 
single variable; 27 the content of the object will then 
consist of the properties expressed by the resulting for- 
mulas. 
With this terminology, the new version of abstraction 
can be simply expressed in the form: 
OA (2) Any condition ~ on properties defines the con- 
tent of a native object in some story. 
The content of an object, unlike that of a story, need 
not be unique for, thinking syntactically, different oc- 
currences of the name of the object in the record may 
be replaced by a variable. There is, however, a simplest 
and a most complex content that may naturally be 
associated with any object in a story. The most com- 
plex is the maximal content and consists of all proper- 
ties had by the object in the story. The simplest is the 
clean or pure content and consists of those properties 
had by the object in the story that do not contain the 
object in question. Under the syntactic analogue, the 
pure content will correspond to formulas obtained by 
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replacing all occurrences of names for the object with 
the given variable. 
That the maximal content is unique is trivial. That the 
pure content is unique may be proved under a 
reasonably strong structural account of propositions. I 
do not wish to work out exactly what is required to 
establish this result. But to see what is involved, let us 
give an intuitive demonstration that there is at mos t  
one pure content. So take any two pure contents C and 
C '  of the object a in s and any property P in C. Then 
for some property P'  in C ' ,  P(a) and P'(a) are the same 
proposition. Now normally the identity of P(a) and 
P'(a) does not require the identity of P and P ' .  
However, their identity is required if neither P nor P'  
contain a; for then the properties P and P'  must be ob- 
tained in exactly the same way by making argument- 
places of the ,,occurrences,, of the object a in the prop- 
osition P(a) = P'(a). Therefore P' belongs to C ' ,  as 
required. 
Although it can be proved that the pure content of an ob- 
ject is unique, it cannot be shown that any condition 
defines the pure content of an object. To appreciate the 
nature of the difficulty, consider a native object a in a 
story whose content consists solely of the property Xx 
xRx of bearing R to itself. Let us now ask whether 
there is a native object b in a story whose pure content 
consists solely of the property Xx xRa of bearing R to a. 
By OA(2), there is a native object x in a story whose 
content  solely consists of the property Xx xRa. But that 
is compatible with the object x being a and so with Xx 
xRa not being the pure content of x. 
To remedy this defect, we may strengthen OA(2) to: 
O A ( 2 '  ) Any condition ~ on properties defines the pure 
content of a native object in some story. 
This formulation requires explicit use of the notion of 
an object occurring in a property and, on this ground, 
might be thought objectionable. But I see no way of 
formulating the principle without using this notion or 
an equivalent one. 
These changes in the formulation of abstraction sug- 
gest an important change in the choice of primitives. 
Before, the primitive connection between objects and 
stories was given by the story-relative copula. We may 
now take as primitive that relation between a story and 
a proposition that holds when the proposition is true in 
the story. That relation is, of course, to be understood 
in a like implicit sense, so that what is required in 
regard to the proposition that Holmes is a detective, 
say, is that it be true in the story that Holmes is a detec- 
tive, not that it be true in the story that the proposition 
is true. 
In explaining the implicit sense of the story-relative 
copula, informal use was made of the notion of plugg- 
ing an object into a property to form a proposition. It 
may now be supposed that this notion is itself part of 
the theory. To this end, it may either be taken as a 
primitive, along with suitable axioms, or, assuming 
that the account of relations and propositions is suffi- 
ciently far developed, as a defined notion for which the 
previous axioms may be derived. 
Given that the notion of plugging is part of the theory, 
the story-relative copula and the story-relative concept 
of propositional truth are inter-definable. For instead 
of saying that x has P in s we can say that the result of 
plugging x into P is true in s; and instead of saying that 
the proposition p is true in s, we can say that some ob- 
ject has the degenerate property associated with p in s. 
Before it was an advantage to have the story-relative 
copula as primitive, since then the notion of plugging 
was not required. But given that this notion is, in any 
case, required in a more expressive theory, it then 
seems more natural to take the story-relative concept of 
propositional truth as primitive; and this is what we 
shall henceforth do. 
Given these new primitives, the explicit sense of the 
story-relative copula can be defined. For we may say 
that a explicitly has P in s iff a implicitly has the proper- 
ty Xx(x has P) of having P in s. Given suitable structural 
assumptions about properties, the original axiom, 
under the explicit interpretation of the copula, could 
then be derived. But note that such a form of the 
original axiom would not be valid on a non-structural 
account of propositions; for there would then be many 
different ways in which an object could fictionally 
possess properties consequent upon its fictional pos- 
session of properties in ~. In that case, the revised version 
of the axiom would have to be adopted for both inter- 
pretations of the copula. 
The other problem with the abstraction axiom under 
the implicit interpretation concerns occurrence. Let us 
distinguish between degenerate and non-degenerate 
properties. A degenerate property is one that results in 
the same proposition upon plugging in any object. In 
the ),-notation, it is denoted by an expression of the 
form kx~5, for ~ a sentence. A non-degenerate property 
is one that is not degenerate. On a reasonably strict 
structural account, a non-degenerate property will 
result in different propositions upon plugging in 
different objects. 
The presence of degenerate properties results in many 
new consequent properties; for associated with any 
proposition true in the story will be a degenerate prop- 
erty implicitly possessed by any object. This is an old 
problem, though, and taken care of by our revised for- 
mulation. However, let us suppose that the condition 
is only satisfied by degenerate properties. In this case, it 
would appear that the native object x has only 
degenerate properties in the story. But is this possible? 
It would appear that any object native to a story occurs 
in the story and that any object occurring in a story has 
some non-degenerate property in the story; and from 
this it follows that native objects must have some non- 
degenerate property in a story. 
It is hard to see on what grounds either of these 
premisses might be denied. But another possibility is to 
limit the properties of the theory to non-degenerate 
ones. It need then only be required that the condition q5 
be satisfied by some property. However, our theory 
should be able to prove that there are objects native to 
stories in which some propositions not containing the 
objects are true. Under the proposed revision, this 
could not be done. The axiom could be expanded so as 
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to make special provision for these propositions. But 
although the theory could be formulated in such a way 
without the use of degenerate properties, it will turn 
out to be much simpler, both here and elsewhere, to 
admit them. 
What I propose then is that it be required that one of 
the properties satisfying the condition be non- 
degenerate. Combining this proposal with the earlier 
one, we obtain: 
Object Abstraction (3)Any condition q5 satisfied by a 
non-degenerate property defines the content of some 
native object in a story. 
With the notion of non-degenerate property, we may 
define what is for an object to occur in a story; for this 
will hold just in case the object has some non- 
degenerate property in that story. However, it is still 
necessary to retain the Nativity-Occurrence Axiom, for 
although all of the native objects produced by the new 
version of Abstraction provably occur in their stories, 
this is not provable for arbitrary native objects. 
Let us now consider the consequences of the im- 
plicit/explicit distinction for the identity axiom. Under 
the explicit interpretation, this axiom is not so much 
inadequate as false. In the Gotman novel there may 
well be two distinct native characters who differ in the 
properties they implicitly have in the story. But because 
of the nominalist ontology, the characters will explicit- 
ly have the same properties in the story, viz. none, and 
so, under the explicit interpretation of the identity ax- 
iom, would be the same. 
On an internalist view, the identity axiom under the 
implicit interpretation will be true. However, it will not 
by itself provide a satisfying solution to the problem of 
individuation. True, the properties fictionally possessed 
by a fictitious object will distinguish it from all 
others. But recall that individuation was required to be 
non-circular; so if the properties used already presup- 
pose the object in question, the proposed method of in- 
dividuation will not be satisfactory. 
To bring out the nature of the difficulty more clearly, 
let us suppose the following two assumptions are 
made: 
(1) If x is native to the story s, then x has the property 
of being identical to x in s; 
(2) If x is native to s and distinct from y, then it is not 
the case that x has the property of being identical to y 
in s. 
I do not actually believe that either of these assump- 
tions is true. I merely make them for the purposes of 
the argument and might equally well have supposed 
that our interest is confined to those objects that satisfy 
them. 
Now given these assumptions, it follows that each fic- 
tional object x can be picked out in terms of the proper- 
ties that it fictionally has. For by (1), x will fictionally 
possess the property of being identical to x; and by (2), 
no other object y will fictionally possess that property. 
But is this a satisfactory solution to the problem of in- 
dividuation? We wish to individuate Holmes, let us 
say, and are told that he is the object that fictionally 
possesses the object of being identical to Holmes. In 
our discussion of circular individuation, we gave the 
example of identity properties. The present individu- 
ation (in terms of the fictional possession of identity prop- 
erties) is not as trivial, since its success depends upon 
assumptions such as (1) and (2) above. But it is equally 
unhelpful; the distinguishing properties still presuppose 
the object in question. 
The view that the identity axiom provides a solution to 
the problem of individuation arises, I think, from a false 
analogy with set theory. There the extensionality ax- 
iom does provide a non-circular way of individuating 
sets. Because our identity axiom is of a common form 
and, indeed, is in a certain sense a dual, it is thought 
that it will likewise individuate the objects. But the suc- 
cess of the extensionality axiom in securing individu- 
ation depends upon sets being well-founded with respect 
to the constituent relation, which in this particular case 
is just the membership relation; chains of members of 
members of members etc. come to an end and in par- 
ticular, the members of a set will not involve, either 
directly or indirectly, that very set. Without this 
assumption, there is no guarantee, even with exten- 
sionality, that the sets can be individuated. However, 
the corresponding assumption for objects fails. They 
may be picked out in terms of properties that presup- 
pose, either directly or indirectly, those very same ob- 
jects. It is just at this point that the supposed analogy 
breaks down. 
To overcome this particular difficulty, the original ver- 
sion of the identity axiom for objects may be replaced 
by: 
Object Identity (2) If the native object x has the same 
pure content in s as the native object y has in t, then the 
objects x and y are the same. 
This formulation requires the notion of a pure content 
or of whatever in the theory of properties defines that 
notion. One might attempt to avoid the use of the no- 
tion by stating the identity axiom in the form: 
If the native object x has in s a content had by y in t, 
then x and y are the same. 
From this axiom, 0I(2) follows. But this new axiom is 
false, since the distinct objects a and b might share the 
contents [~x xRaJ in their respective stories. Again, as 
far as I can see, the use of the concept of purity or its 
cognates is essential to the formulation of the axiom. 
I have so far talked only of object identity. But armed 
with the story-relative notion of propositional truth a 
more satisfactory criterion of story identity may be 
given. 
SI(1) The stories s and t are identical iff the same prop- 
ositions are true in each. 
Given the other assumptions, the earlier criterion in 
section C2 may then be derived. 
In discussing the problems of finding a proper formula- 
tion of the identity and abstraction axioms, I have 
discussed only two interpretations of the story-relative 
copula, the implicit and the explicit. T. Parsons has 
suggested to me another interpretation of the copula, 
one that naturally arises from the formalisation used in 
his book. It is that the result of plugging up a property 
with an object is neither the internally formed proposi- 
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tion, in which the property may get swallowed up, nor 
the externally formed proposition, which contains the 
copula explicitly, but a combination in which the ob- 
ject and property occur side by side, as it were. It is dif- 
ficult to convey the right ontological picture without 
reference to language. But if kx~(x) symbolizes the prop- 
erty and 'a' the object, then ~(a) will express the inter- 
nal proposition, and '[Xx~b(x)]a' the Parsonian or lateral 
proposition. 
There may be doubts as to whether the notion of a 
lateral proposition is coherent, but let us put these on 
one side. Now say that a has P in a story in the lateral 
sense if the laterally formed proposition is true in the 
story. It may then be thought that appeal to the lateral 
copula will avoid the objections I have levelled against 
the explicit copula. Certainly, this may be true for the 
objections as stated. It might be argued, for example, 
that lateral propositions can be true in our nominalistic 
fantasy without thereby committing the story to an on- 
tology of properties. However, similar objections will 
arise. Consider a story in which the inference from ~5(a) 
to [~,qS(x)]a is in general rejected (for whatever reasons, 
peculiar to the story, one cares to imagine). Then the 
proposition that Ham is wicked or Ham is stupid 
(WhvSh) may be true in the story, for Ham a native ob- 
ject. But Abstraction can only show that a proposition 
of the form 'Ham is wicked or stupid' ([2x(WxvSx)]h) 
is true in the story, which is not what we want." Again, 
the difference between two native objects may precisely 
consist in the story-relative truth of the former kind of 
propositions, as opposed to their lateral counterparts, 
and so the identity axiom will fail. 
Further interpretations of the copula may, of course, be 
suggested. But it seems likely that they will be subject 
to similar objections. If the full range of possible con- 
tents for stories is properly to be accounted for, it 
should seem that something like the machinery of inter- 
nal plugging would need to be used. 
D2. Diagonal  Difficulties 
The previous theory, even in its revised versions, is in- 
consistent; it is beset by paradoxes similar to the 
classical paradoxes of impredicativity. Since the dif- 
ficulties are general ones to be faced by almost any 
theory of non-existent objects, I shall here state them in 
a general form. There are two main paradoxes to con- 
sider, one arising from the abstraction axiom for prop- 
erties and the other from the abstraction axiom for 
objects. I shall consider the first paradox in this section, 
and the second, paradox in the next. 
Before presenting the first paradox, it will be helpful to 
state a general result on correlations between objects 
and properties. Let us assume the abstraction principle 
for properties, that is: 
(1) For any condition ~, there is a property P such that 
an object has P iff it satisfies the condition ~. 
I am now thinking in general terms, not merely within 
the context of a theory of objects. We may suppose 
that the language of the condition 4~ is typed, with ob- 
ject - and property - terms distinguished as the first and 
second arguments of predicational statements, so that 
the principle is impervious to the usual impredicative 
paradoxes. 
In case P and ~5 are connected by the equivalence in (1), 
I shall say that P corresponds to 4o. 
From (1), it follows that: 
(2) There is no function g taking some of the objects into 
properties and such that for each property P there is 
an object x for which g(x) = P. 
The argument is a familiar one. Suppose there were a 
function g. Then there would be a function f taking all 
of the objects into all of the properties. For pick on any 
property P ' .  (There is at least one by property abstrac- 
tion.) Now let f(x) be g(x) if g(x) is defined and other- 
wise let f(x) be P ' .  
By (1), there is a property Po such that: 
(3) For all objects x, x has Po iff x does not have f (x): 
Given the definition of f, there is an object xo such that: 
(4) f(x0) = Po. 
But then from (3) and (4), it follows that: 
(5) Xo has f(xo) iff Xo does not have f(xo). 
A contradiction. 
The first paradox arises from the fact that it is plausible 
to suppose on almost any theory of non-existents that 
there are correlations g of the sort denied by (2); for in 
any such theory there is likely to be a form of object 
abstraction which implies, for any property, P, that 
there is an object x that bears some kind of predica- 
tional tie to P alone. This was first seen by Romane 
Clark '78 in the context of a theory of Castafieda's ('72, 
'75,b); and Clark's insight was later extended by W. J. 
Rappaport ('78, '79) to other theories of the non- 
existent. The reader should consult those papers and 
Castafieda 7 9  for a discussion of the paradox within 
the context of those respective theories. Within the pres- 
ent theory, the paradox arises from the following con- 
sequence of object abstraction: 
(6) For each property P there is an object that fictional- 
ly has P and P alone. 
For we may then let g map each object which fictional- 
ly has a single property into that single property. Of  all 
the applications, the present one is perhaps the most 
compelling. For the others depend on theoretical no- 
tions and principles that might well appear dubious to 
pre-philosophical intuition. But the application to the 
contextualist theory only requires ordinary notions (the 
literal and story-relative copulas) and seemingly unob- 
jectionable principles concerning those notions. 
In order to avoid irrelevant objections, it will help to 
give a tighter formulation of the paradox. Say that P is 
an object-property if some object fictionally possesses P 
and P alone. In the formulation of the paradox, we 
may replace reference to properties throughout by 
reference to object-properties. Assumption (6) then 
disappears, and (1) becomes: 
(1)' For any condition ~5, there is an object-property P 
such that an object has P iff it satisfies the condition 4~. 
Let us note that, in the derivation of the paradox, 
assumption (6) yields a definite correlation go. Thus it 
suffices, for a contradiction, to show that go, in par- 
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ticular, does not give a correlation as described under 
(2). Examination of the proof of (2) then shows that 
this particular case of (2) follows from the single in- 
stance of (1) in which ~5 is the condition of x's literally 
lacking the unique property which it fictionally 
possesses. 
Let Para be this particular condition. Then combining 
the above point with the previous one, we see that a 
contradiction follows from the single assumption that: 
(7) There is an object-property P had by an object iff it 
satisfies the condition Para. 
Assumption (7) posits two facts of the property P, one 
that it is an object-property, and the other that it cor- 
responds to the condition Para. If it is supposed that 
Para expresses a property, call it Paraprop, and that 
Paraprop will satisfy (7) if anything does, then (7) may 
be broken down into the two assumptions that: 
(7a) Paraprop corresponds to Para; and 
(7b) Paraprop is an object-property. 
Under this revision, the paradox may be stated in stark 
and dramatic form. For suppose that we actually write 
a story about the native object Paraob, whose sole 
sentence is: 
Paraob literally lacks the unique property which it fic- 
tionally possesses. 
By inspection, we see that Paraprop is the unique prop- 
erty which Paraob fictionally possesses. But it then 
follows that Paraob has Paraprop iff it lacks Paraprop. 
A contradiction. 
In order to solve the paradox, let us consider some 
possible objections to the crucial assumption (7). The 
objections will first be centred on the object-theoretic 
aspect (7b) of (7), and only later on the property- 
theoretic aspect (7a) of (7). 
First it may be objected that some consolidation in at- 
tributions is required to establish an object as native to 
a story. This appears to be the view of Parsons. 's Con- 
sider a written story in which the sole sentence is 
,Humbold is a doctor,,. Then it might be argued that 
even if it is true in the story that someone is a doctor, 
there is no object of which it is true in the story that it is 
a doctor; the de re claim needs to be backed up by a 
sufficient body of attributions. Thus we have no reason 
to suppose that the property Paraprop is the sole prop- 
erty fictionally possessed by some object, and our 
own one-line story will be insufficient to establish this. 
I find this view most implausible. It is almost irresistible 
to say that of Humbold only one thing is stated in the 
story, that he is a doctor, and similarly for Paraob. 
There is perhaps a rich literary notion of character ac- 
cording to which a character should have character; 
but clearly this is not relevant to the question of when 
de re reference to objects can be made. 
Nor is it clear that any defensible distinction can be 
drawn between those collections of attributions that 
establish de re reference and those that do not. If one 
collection will do, then why should it be possible that 
the result of subtracting one of its members will not? 
Perhaps it would be argued that the conditions support- 
ing de re reference are, to some extent, indeterminate. 
I do not see this. In certain cases, it may be unclear 
what de re claims should be made; but this is because it 
is not clear what the stories say, not because of any 
unclarity in the notion of de re reference itself. Even if 
the notion is vague, theoretical purposes may demand 
that we make it precise; and then the only viable alter- 
native is one that does away with restrictions. 
There is also a strong positive argument in favour of 
there being de re reference in the one-sentence story. 
For it would appear to be a sufficient (though not 
necessary) condition for de re reference that a name be 
used in the story; and in our example a name is indeed 
used. 
This principle concerning names may itself be based 
upon a more general principle of uniformity concerning 
the connection between fictional and ordinary 
discourse. This principle has been espoused by several 
philosophers and, as we shall see, is essential to a proper 
understanding of fictional objects. It is hard to state 
in precise terms, but it says, roughly, that fictional 
discourse is conceived in the image of ordinary 
discourse, that it will function, in the context of a 
pretence, much as ordinary discourse functions in real 
life. Now our understanding of ordinary discourse 
depends upon setting up a certain sort of cor- 
respondence between language and the real world; so, 
in our understanding of fictional discourse, we must 
suppose that there is a like correspondence between 
language and a pretend world. Indeed, unless 
something like this were true, it is hard to see how, on 
the basis of our understanding of ordinary discourse 
and our grasp of the general conventions governing 
story-telling, we could come to an understanding of fic- 
tional discourse at all. 
If, then, we are interested in what proposition is ex- 
pressed by a sentence of fiction, we should ask what 
proposition that sentence would have expressed as a 
part of ordinary discourse. It will then express, vis-~i-vis 
the fictional world, the same sort of proposition it 
would have expressed vis-~-vis the real world. 
Now in ordinary discourse names refer or 'rigidly 
designate'; they are used to express singular proposi- 
tions. Therefore names have a similar role in fiction. A 
sentence containing a name will express in a story a 
singular proposition to the effect that the bearer of the 
name has a certain property. But that means that it will 
be true of the object that it has the property in the 
story; for it is just the truth of the singular proposition 
that secures the de re attribution. Successful reference 
in fictional discourse no more requires the consolida- 
tion of attributions than it does in ordinary discourse; 
the single use of a name will suffice. 
Another objection to (7) is that even if we consider the 
texts of stories in which a given object is stated to have 
only one property, there still will be many unstated 
properties had by the object in the story. Certainly this 
is true for realistic fiction. But imagine a group of 
authors who object to the way in which critics read so 
much into what they write. In protest against this prac- 
tice, they institute a new genre of inert literature which 
leaves no room for such interpretation; anything true 
in the work is stated to be true. 
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Considered as realistic fiction, the works of such a 
genre would be strange, but, in terms of what is said 
and unsaid, they might have their own peculiar charm 
and merit. 
Within such a genre there is now no difficulty in sup- 
posing that a native object might have only one prop- 
erty in a given story. Of course, there is no actual genre 
of inert literature (and I hope my remarks do nothing to 
encourage one). But as I have pointed out, a theory of 
fictional objects should apply to all possible stories, 
and this embraces the possibility not only of new works 
within old genres but also of new works within new 
genres. 
Even if the last two objections are maintained, it is 
unlikely that the consolidation of attributions required 
for de re reference or that the necessary interpretative 
licence of all stories will provide the right sort of 
theoretical constraint to block the paradox. Let us 
replace (6) by the weaker assumption that: 
(8) For each property P, there is a finite set of proper- 
ties X containing P and an object x such that X is the 
set of properties fictionally had by x. 
Then as long as there are infinitely many properties, 
the paradox can still be derived. 29 However, it is hard 
to see how the last two objections can tell against (8), 
as opposed to (6). 
A creationist might also object to (6) on the grounds 
that there may be no actual story in which an object 
has Paraprop as its sole fictional property. However, if 
one can derive a contradiction from the truth of certain 
premisses, then one can also derive a contradiction 
from their possible truth. The question, then, is 
whether the premiss (7) might be true even for stories 
and objects on the creationist conception. And the 
answer appears to be clearly yes; for all that is required 
is that the relevant piece of inert literature be created. 
The objection is removed with a few strokes of the pen. 
The paradox now strikes us with full force: the 
assumptions upon which it rests are individually 
reasonable; and yet, together, they are inconsistent. 
I think, however, that a closer examination shows that 
property abstraction is at fault. Suppose that no type 
restrictions are placed on the language of the scheme 
and that the object variables are taken to include prop- 
erties in their range. Then, as is well known, the 
resulting scheme becomes inconsistent upon letting (~ 
be the condition that x does not possess x. Now the 
paradoxes have often been blamed on the absence of 
type-restrictions and, since our scheme of property 
abstraction is subject to such restrictions, it is tempting 
to think it unobjectionable. Not so. Although our 
scheme is self-consistent, it is implausible for reasons 
similar to those for which the unrestricted scheme is in- 
consistent. For, through the abstraction principle for 
objects, there will be some sort of correlation between 
objects and properties; and so even though properties 
cannot be directly attributed to themselves, the effect of 
such attributions can be gained by means of the cor- 
relation. Even if the specific correlation contemplated 
in (6) is rejected, the mere possibility of some sort of 
correlation should make us suspicious of the scheme. 
The point can be reinforced by an analogy. Suppose 
that we reformulate the argument using sets of proper- 
ties in place of objects and the converse of the member- 
ship relation in place of the fictional copula. Then (1) 
remains as an abstraction principle and (6) becomes the 
claim that for each property there is a singleton set of 
that property. In this case, it is clear that we should 
give up abstraction; for although properties are not 
directly attributed to themselves, they are, indirectly, as 
the members of sets. Now non-existents are not built 
up from properties in the way that sets are from their 
members, and so there is not the same stark im- 
predicativity. But from a formal point of view this is ir- 
relevant; as long as our conception of non-existents ad- 
mits of analogous correlations witch properties, the two 
cases should be treated in the same way. 
Incidentally, this analogy also serves to show that the 
paradox is not peculiar to non-existents. It arises 
whenever properties are applied to entities, such as sets 
or propositions, that admit of a correlation with those 
properties. It would therefore be premature to con- 
clude, simply on the basis of the paradox, that the very 
notion of a non-existent is incoherent. 
But if abstraction is rejected, what should be put in its 
place? I should like to consider two solutions here; one 
classical (in the sense of bivalence) and the other not. 
The most natural classical solution is to restrict the 
ranges of properties defined by Abstraction to sets. 
Thus the axiom then becomes: 
(9) For any condition ~5 and any set of objects X, there 
is a property P such that for each object x in X, x has P 
iff it satisfies the condition. TM 
The restricted scheme will conform to a cumulative 
conception of non-existent objects. This conception ex- 
tends the previous idea of non-existents as constructed 
or generated from properties they fictionally have, by 
supposing that those properties are themselves con- 
structed or generated from the objects in their exten- 
sion. Thus we may imagine that the objects and prop- 
erties are generated at stages, with the objects (prop- 
erties) of one stage being generated from the proper- 
ties (resp. objects) of the previous stage. Under this 
conception, the restricted axiom-scheme will then be 
justified, since all of the objects in a set will have been 
generated by some stage; but the unrestricted scheme 
will not be justified, since at no stage will all of the ob- 
jects have been defined. 3~ 
If it is granted that the existent objects form a set, then, 
as a special case of (9), we obtain: 
(10) Given any condition ~5, there is a property P such 
that for each existent object x, x has P iff x satisfies the 
condition, 
which is reminiscent of Parsons' abstraction principle 
for nuclear properties (to be discussed in the third 
part). On the other hand, the fact that the unrestricted 
scheme (1) is inconsistent will show that all objects do 
not form a set. Indeed, given any set X, the original 
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derivation of the paradox may be converted into a proof 
that an object xo (determined relative to X) does not 
belong to X. 
In one way, the schemes (9) and (10) are uninforma- 
tive; for they do not tell us how the properties defined 
by a given condition 0(x) and set X behave on ob- 
jects outside of X. Although there are different 
possibilities here, the most plausible proposal within 
the classical context is that the properties are false of 
the objects outside of their specified range. Under this 
oroposal, axiom (9) becomes: 
(11) For any condition ~ and set X, there is a property 
P such that for any object x, x has P iff x belongs to X 
and satisfies the condition. 
The new scheme is then reminiscent of the separation 
axiom in set theory. 
Unfortunately, the extended axiom is not adequate to 
the purpose of object theory. For there are many prop- 
erties whose extensions are not sets but which may be 
used to define objects. One example is non-existence; 
another, perhaps under suitable empirical conditions, 
is the property of being admirable. 
To overcome this difficulty, the scheme (9) should be 
opened up, though not so far as to admit contradiction. 
The most natural solution I have thought of goes as 
follows. Say that a property is partially defined if, for 
some set, the property is false of all objects outside of 
the set, and that otherwise it is totally defined. Thus (9) 
only guarantees the existence of partially defined prop- 
erties. Now supplement (9) with any instances of the 
abstraction scheme (1) in which all of the property 
quantifiers in 0 are restricted to the partially defined 
properties. Then the new scheme will give us many of 
the properties that we want. For example, since the 
definition of non-existence in terms of existence does 
not involve quantifiers, we may show that there is a 
property true of exactly the objects that do not exist. 
On the other hand, it will not be (directly) provable 
that there is a property corresponding to the paradoxi- 
cal condition, since that condition requires property 
quantifiers for its formulation. 32 
Although this whole approach has its attractions, it is 
open to two fundamental objections, even when (9) is 
used without its supplements. One objection is that the 
approach is incompatible with the principle that pro- 
vides for the general existence of properties. 
(12) Property Existence. For any condition ~(x) there is 
a property (kx0(x)) of 0-ing. 
For on a bivalent approach, the adoption of (12) im- 
mediately makes plausible the specific form of property 
abstraction: 
(13) An object x has the property kx0(x) of 0-ing iff it 
satisfies the condition ~; 
and so leads to contradiction. 
There are, however, various reasons for insisting upon 
(12). One is that it has a plausibility that is quite in- 
dependent of the truth of (13). Even if we cannot be 
sure that the extension of kx0(x) works out in accor- 
dance with (13), we can be sure that there is such a prop- 
erty as hx4~(x). It is necessary here to distinguish 
sharply between the question of whether there is a prop- 
erty expressed by the condition ~b and whether there is 
a property corresponding to 0. The former is the ques- 
tion of whether there is a property with a certain struc- 
ture, the latter a question of whether there is a property 
with a certain extension. The one, I am suggesting, is 
problematic in a way that the other is not. For surely 
we can suppose that there is a property with the ap- 
propriate structure; for we may suppose that it is built 
up in something like the same manner as the condition 
itself. But who knows what hidden difficulities there are 
in assigning the appropriate extension to some prop- 
erty? 
In addition to this intuitive argument, there are general 
reasons from property theory (which I shall not go into) 
and special reasons from object theory for upholding 
(12). The special reasons all arise from the requirement 
that statements of the form: 
(a) Within the context c, the object a 0's; 
should be equivalent to statements of the form: 
(b) The object a has the property P in c. 
For the equivalence of (a) to (b) would seem to require 
that P be the property of 0-ing and hence that (12) 
generally holds. 
But there are now various reasons, from within object 
theory, for insisting upon the equivalence: 
(14) The object x has the property kx0(x) in context c 
iff x 0's in c. 
One is that many things cannot be said without presup- 
posing it. We may wish to say that two objects differ in 
content within their respective contexts, without 
mentioning the specific points of difference. But if the 
only differences turned on conditions not expressive of 
properties, then this could not be put in terms of the 
objects having different properties in those contexts. 
One might try to use quantification over conditions in- 
stead; but this would face familiar difficulties. 
Secondly, we may note that for internalism there is a 
special need to uphold (14). For if some conditions 
were not expressive of properties, then the only dif- 
ference in the content of two objects might rest on such 
conditions; and so internalism would be unable to 
distinguish the objects. 
Finally, the usual arguments against (12) really tell 
against (13) rather than (14). It is only because (12) is 
thought to entail (13) and (14) entails (12), that the 
arguments are also thought to tell against (14). But 
once the connection between (13) and (12) is broken, it 
is possible to retain (14) and yet reject (13). Indeed, 
despite their superficial similarity, (13) and (14) relate 
to two completely different roles of properties; one as 
the determiner of extension, the other as the determiner 
of content. It is only the second role that is directly rele- 
vant to object theory; for what is required is the general 
means of determining the content of objects, and to this 
end the extension of the properties is irrelevant. It 
therefore seems excessively hard on object theory that 
the failure of properties to perform their one role 
should be made to impugn their other role. 
But can the connection between (12) and (13) be so 
easily severed? Surely, any property kx0(x) that exists 
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should satisfy (13)? Certainly some sort of connection 
should hold between the structure of the property ~5, as 
given by the condition ~, and the conditions for its ap- 
plication. Although such a connection is not required 
by the immediate needs of object theory, we cannot 
suppose that the connection is completely flee- 
wheeling; for the structure of the property is essentially 
the means by which its applications are determined." 
But we need not suppose, as far as I can see, that the 
connection is given by the classical principle of 
),-abstraction, according to which the property kx~5 is 
true of all objects that satisfy ~ and false of all the 
others. It may be that the semantics for the underlying 
language of the conditions obliges us to concede that a 
condition may be neither true nor false of a given ob- 
ject. (It may even be the existence of properties kx~(x) 
that obliges us to make the concession.) The intuitive 
connection between structure and application will then 
be unbroken if we can say that kx~5 is true of the objects 
that satisfy ~, false of the objects that 'dissatisfy'~, and 
neither true nor false of the others. So it does seem 
open to us, after all, to maintain (12) and (14) in the 
face of the paradoxical (13). 
The other objection to the classical solution is that it is 
incompatible with a structuralist criterion of identity 
for properties. According to such a criterion, two prop- 
erties will be the same only if they have the same 
structure. The concept of structure here is, of course, 
not straightforward, and there are various ways in 
which it can be made out. On a very strict conception, 
the properties of ~5-ing and of ~-ing will be the same 
only if ~ and ~ are the same conditions. On a weaker 
and more plausible conception, alphabetic variance in 
the bound variables of the conditions is allowed; and 
probably further weakenings should be allowed and 
even divergences from the structure of the condition.34 
However, the question of getting the criteria exactly 
right need not concern us; for most of our positive and 
negative pointswill be independent of which particular 
criteria, within a broadly structuralist framework, are 
adopted. 
Now given such a criterion, the axiom (9) will lead to 
contradiction. For on the basis of (9), a concept of 
truth for propositions can be defined; and on the basis 
of a structuralist criterion, something along the lines of 
Tarski's theorem on truth may be used to show that 
there is no such concept. (A modest amount of set 
theory is required, but not object abstraction). 
But why accept a structuralist criterion? Philosophers 
often talk as if one had a choice of criteria here. But it 
seems to me that our concept of properties is such that 
some sort of structuralist criterion just is correct. 
Although non-structuralist accounts have been proposed, 
they all seem to lead to counter-intuitive results. 
There are also special" reasons from the theory of non- 
existents for adopting a structuralist criterion; for if ob- 
jects satisfying different conditions in a story are proper- 
ly to be distinguished, then a faithful account of 
their different contents seems to require a close connec- 
tion between the identity of the properties and the 
structure of the conditions. 
We see then that there are two quite distinct problems 
with the classical solution, both arising from demands 
within the theory of properties. One is that it is incom- 
patible with a general principle of property existence, 
and the other is that it is incompatible with a struc- 
turalist criterion of identity for properties. 
How then should these demands be met? I should like 
to suggest a theory along the lines of Kripke's '75 
theory of truth or Feferman's '75 theory of sets. The 
application of a property is determined in accordance 
with a well-founded verification of the object either 
having or lacking the property; if there is no such 
verification then the property is neither true nor false of 
the object. Thus the paradoxical arguments will now 
show, not that there is no paradoxical property, but 
that it does not apply truly or falsely to certain objects. 
Such a theory allows one to give a uniform solution to 
many difficulties. First, it is compatible with a struc- 
turalist criterion for properties and with the general exist- 
ence principle for properties. Secondly, it allows us 
to lift the arbitrary type-theoretical restriction on the 
application of properties to objects, as opposed to 
other properties. Finally, the account seems to allow 
the kind of totally defined properties that initially raised 
difficulties for the classical solution. Consider, for 
example, the property of non-existence. It would seem 
reasonable to postulate a primitive existence property 
that applied bivalently to all objects; but then the prop- 
erty of non-existence will likewise be universally 
bivalent. 
Of course, the account as presented is only a sketch. A 
great deal more needs to be done. One question is 
peculiar to object theory. For on a structuralist 
criterion, there will be simple properties and so it needs 
to be said how they apply to non-existents. There are 
two main solutions here; one is that they are false and 
the other is that they are neither true nor false of non- 
existents (with perhaps a few exceptions aside). I am 
inclined to adopt the former solution; but this is a mat- 
ter I shall discuss more thoroughly in part III of the 
paper. 
However, most of the further details concern the 
theory of properties as such. It must be decided what 
structure properties are to have, what primitive logical 
notions are to be used, how the theory is axiomatized, 
and so on. Such matters lie beyond the scope of this 
paper. It must be supposed that a satisfactory theory of 
properties has somehow been worked out and that the 
rest of the theory of objects is then grafted onto it. 
In one way, this is undesirable. For we no longer have a 
definite theory and so metamathematical questions, 
such as consistency, no longer have a definite answer. 
But I make no apologies for this lacuna in my presenta- 
tion. The theory of properties is highly undeveloped 
and highly problematic, and it is hardly to be expected 
that much progress can be made in a paper devoted to 
another topic. It should be borne in mind that the 
theory of properties cannot be tailor-made to suit the 
subject at hand. The properties that figure in the theory 
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of objects are the properties that figure elsewhere. The 
only satisfactory account of properties in object theory 
is one that is generally satisfactory. 
D3. Dual Diagonal Difficulties 
The second difficulty arises from the following abstrac- 
tion principle for objects: 
(1) For any condition ~ on properties, there is an object 
x such that x fictionally has a property P iff P satisfies 
the condition. 
This principle is a straightforward consequence of the 
axioms of Object Abstraction (1) and of Context Unique- 
ness and should even be assumed when Context 
Uniqueness is dropped. 
From (1), it follows that: 
(2) There is no function G taking some of the proper- 
ties into objects and such that for each object x there is 
a property P such that G(P) = x. 
The proof is formally analogous to the derivation in the 
previous section of (2) from (1). 
It now seems reasonable to suppose that: 
(3) For each object x there is a property P such that P is 
literally had by x and by no other object. 
But this conflicts with (2), since we may let G map each 
property literally had by a single object into that object. 
Let us note that the two paradoxes are dual in the sense 
of section C2; the one may be obtained from the other 
by interchanging the object- and property-variables 
and by interchanging the fictional copula with the con- 
verse of the literal copula. As we have seen, there is a 
straightforward conflict between the principle of prop- 
erty abstraction and its literalist dual: for by property 
abstraction there is a property had by no objects; and 
by its literalist dual, there is an object that has the prop- 
erty. One naturally supposes that the conflict can be 
avoided by using different forms of the copula in the 
two abstraction principles, for the more obvious 
sources of conflict are thereby insulated from one 
another. It is therefore something of a surprise thatthis 
is not so. 
The difficulties arise in two ways. On the one hand, we 
may assume property abstraction in full generality; 
from this it follows that there is no correlation between 
some of the objects and all of the properties, which is in 
conflict with a modest use of object abstraction. This is 
the first paradox. On the other hand, we may assume 
object abstraction in full generality; from this it follows 
that there is no correlation between some of the proper- 
ties and all of the objects, which is in conflict with a 
modest use of property abstraction. This is the second 
paradox. 
In the present case, which of the assumptions (1) and 
(3) of the paradox should be rejected? There can be little 
question about (3). For the dual assumption (6) of 
the previous section and, more particularly, for (7b), 
certain doubts were entertained. But the analogous 
doubts seem quite out of place here. Surely, given any 
object x, there is a property, viz. that of being identical 
to x, that is possessed by x and x alone. Nor  do the 
earlier general doubts over property abstraction have 
any relevance here. The property of being identical to x 
applies well-foundedly to any object; and even if prop- 
erties are only to be defined over sets, as in axiom (9) 
of the previous section, it can still be shown, by letting 
the set contain x, that some property will truly apply to 
x and to x alone. 
It is interesting to note that the correlation G can be ob- 
tained through a modest use of the structural criterion 
of identity for properties and without the use of prop- 
erty abstraction. For let it be supposed that: 
(4) For any object x, there is the property of being ident- 
ical to x; and 
(4) For distinct objects x and y, the properties of being 
identical to x and of being identical to y are distinct. 
Then G may be defined by letting it map the property 
of being identical to x into x . "  Thus even if we follow 
the previously mentioned policy of detaching the 
theory of the application of properties from the theory 
of non-existents, the paradox will still arise. 
If the culprit is (1), then how is it wrong? As with the 
previous paradox, only a single instance of (1) is re- 
quired, and examination shows that it is the one in 
which ~ is the condition of P ' s  not being fictionally had 
by the unique object that literally possesses P. Putting 
this condition for ~ in (1) yields: 
(1)' There is an object Xo such that Xo fictionally has a 
property P iff P is not fictionally had by the sole object 
that literally possesses P. 
Letting P be a property had by Xo alone then im- 
mediately gives a contradiction. 
So the question, more particularly, is: What is wrong 
with the instance (1)' of (1)? As already noted, (1) or 
(1)' are not quite correct on the implicit interpretation 
of the fictional copula; for first, it should be required 
that a non-degenerate property satisfy ~; and second, 
may not give exactly the properties fictionally possess- 
ed by the object. But both difficulties may easily be 
removed by insisting that the fictional copula bear the 
explicit interpretation. Although the implicit inter- 
pretation is required for an adequate formulation of 
object abstraction, there is no harm in sometimes adopt- 
ing the explicit interpretation, and this turns out to be 
more convenient for the formulation of the paradox. 
Another response is the empiricist one that (1) is not 
true for actual stories and their objects. But as before, 
the ques.tion is not whether (1)' is true, but whether it 
could be true. (I assume that (3) holds as a matter of 
necessity.) Now we do not have the same dramatic 
means as before of removing this difficulty. To write a 
story in which an object has all those properties not fic- 
tionally had by the sole object that literally possesses 
them would seem to require not merely a few strokes of 
the pen, but a handsome volume; and one may well ad- 
mit to empirical doubts as to whether such hand- 
someness is to be found in the real world. But to admit 
to such doubts is not to justify them; and some ex- 
planation of the impossibility, beyond the mere asser- 
tion of its existence, does seem to be required. 
A third response to the paradox is that certain proper- 
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ties are intrinsically incapable of figuring in stories. 
Call a property that is capable of figuring in a story a 
story-property. Then on this view, we are only justified 
in maintaining that the object x fictionally has those 
story properties that satisfy the condition. But this 
response is not impervious to reformulation. For let us 
suppose that all of the properties, throughout the argu- 
ment, are restricted to the story ones. Assumption (1) 
then becomes an unobjectionable form of object 
abstraction, and (3) becomes the claim that each object 
x is singly had by some story property. Thus it must 
now be denied that the property of being identical to x 
is a story property. But this is not at all plausible. Sure- 
ly each object x can occur in a story in which it has the 
property of being identical to itself. 
Yet another response is that although there are no con- 
straints on which individual properties figure in stories, 
there are holistic constraints on which conditions of 
properties can be exactly realized by an object in a 
story. There are two main constraints of this sort, the 
coherence and closure ones. According to the first, cer- 
tain classes of properties just do not cohere and so there 
can be no story in which an object has all the properties 
in the class. According to the second sort of constraint, 
some classes of properties are 'unclosed', their posses- 
sion in a story implies the possession in the story of 
properties outside of the class, and so there can be no 
story in which an object has exactly the properties in 
the class. If both constraints are combined, then it 
should only be required of conditions that define a 
coherent and closed class that there is an object that fic- 
tionally possesses all of the properties in the class. 
An example of a coherence constraint is that it should 
be possible (in some sense) that some object literally 
possess all of the properties in the class. An example of 
a closure constraint, previously given, is that the prop- 
erties in the class should be consolidated. Another 
example, related to the previous coherence constraint, is 
that the class should contain any property whose 
possession is implied by the possession of the properties 
in the class. I do not wish to suggest that these con- 
straints are correct; but they do illustrate the idea. 
I have already argued against the consolidation con- 
straint in section 2, and others have argued against the 
logical constraints (e.g., Parsons in section 7.1 of his 
book). However, I am opposed to any constraint of the 
envisaged sort. For although there may be meaningful 
constraints on actual literature, there are none that ap- 
ply to all possible stories. Thus the case of inert 
literature already rules out the closure constraints and 
the case of logical fantasy may be used to rule out the 
coherence constraints. The previous example of a 
logical fantasy was fairly realistic, but we can imagine a 
genre of literature which delights in more and more 
flagrant violations of accepted law. Perhaps arithmetic 
is inconsistent, contradictions true, and objects self- 
distinct. There seems to be no difficulty in imagining a 
genre of literature which contains stories of this sort. 
Indeed, some of the more peripheral work in logic and 
philosophy is probably best regarded in this light. 
Even if these arguments were resisted, it is not clear 
that the proposed constraints are of the right sort, 
theoretically, to block the paradox. In the derivation of 
the paradox, as actually given, the instance o f ( l )  used 
was the one in which ~ defined the class of properties P 
not fictionally had by the unique object that literally 
has P. Now it does indeed seem reasonable to suppose 
that such a condition will not satisfy the proposed con- 
straints. But other, more satisfactory, conditions can 
be used in its place. Let it be supposed, for example, 
that for any object there is a property which only that 
object lacks. Then ~ can be taken to define the class of 
properties P not fictionally possessed by the sole object 
that literally lacks them. This seems to be a more 
satisfactory condition. In a similar way, a certain 
amount of closure can be tolerated; and so on. It thus 
begins to look clear that if the constraints are to be in- 
troduced, it must be for reasons independent of the 
paradoxes. 
My own response to the paradox is that it should be re- 
quired that the condition ~5 define a set. The abstrac- 
tion axiom would then become: 
(4) For any set A of properties, there is an object x such 
that x fictionally has a property P iff P belongs to the 
set; 
or if the previous modifications are made, the axiom 
would take the form: 
OA(4) Any set of properties containing a non- 
degenerate property is the pure content of some native 
object in a story. 
The transition from (4) to (1) would now depend upon 
the illegitimate assumption that the paradoxical condi- 
tion defined a set of properties; and, indeed, the deriva- 
tion of the paradox could be used to show that that 
assumption was false. 
It also seems to me, although this is not required as a 
solution to the paradox, that we should have a sort of 
converse to (4): 
Story Closure. The propositions true in any story form 
a set. 
Such an axiom helps to solve the exclusive aspect of the 
problem of being; for we not only say, through 
abstraction, that sets of properties define objects, but 
also that only sets will define such objects. 
T. Parsons has raised an interesting objection to this 
axiom and, implicitly, to our solution of the paradox. 
Suppose a logical fantasy were written about a univer- 
sal Meinongian object with all properties. Then it 
would seem reasonable to conclude that, for each prop- 
erty, the object had that property in the story. But 
then, for each property, the distinct proposition that 
the object had that property would be true in the story; 
and since there is a proper class of properties, there 
would be a proper class of propositions true in the 
story, in contradistinction to the axiom of Story 
Closure. 
Now what is directly true in the story is that the object 
has all properties; and from the fact that a universal 
proposition is true in a story, it does not automatically 
follow that all of its instances are also true. But often 
many of the instances are true without being directly 
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stated, and so what reason do we have to suppose that 
all of them are not true in the present case? 
Consider, by way of analogy, a novel in which it is 
stated that all men are mean. Suppose that Holmes is 
not a character of the novel. Then we would not con- 
clude that it is true in the story that Holmes (if a man) is 
mean, for otherwise a singular proposition about 
Holmes would be true in the story and Holmes would 
thereby become a character of the novel. The instanc- 
ing of universal propositions within a story should not 
result in new characters. 
Now the universal proposition in our logical fantasy 
concerns properties, not objects. But the properties 
may themselves contain objects as constituents and 
therefore we must be careful, when instancing the 
universal proposition, that those constituent objects 
already be characters of the novel. But then we cannot 
conclude of all properties, but only of those whose con- 
stituents are characters of the novel, that the universal 
object has such a property in the story. If, as now seems 
reasonable, the class of such properties forms a set, 36 
there will be no obstacle to maintaining Story Closure. 
To this response, T. Parsons has asked why writers 
should not set up a convention whereby all instances of 
a universal proposition true in a story are also true in 
the story. After all, I have admitted the conventions of 
logico-philosophical fantasy and of inert literature, so 
why not this further convention? My answer is that 
conventions concerning the interpretation of literature 
cannot alter the metaphysical facts. Let us suppose, for 
example, that literalism were false. Then novelists 
could not make it true by stipulating that in their works 
the objects were literally to have the properties at- 
tributed to them in the story. Similarly, I would say, no 
legitimate convention can force a story to be about a 
proper class of objects. 
It must be admitted, though, that this reply creates a 
methodological worry. I have argued against certain 
views on the grounds that they do not allow for new 
conventions of interpretation, as in logical fantasy or 
inert literature. But the proponents of these views may 
reply, as I have done, that these conventions fly in the 
face of the metaphysical facts. To this reply, I can say 
two things. First, there seems to be a real intuitive dif- 
ference between the convention for inert literature and 
the convention for applying Specification unrestrictedly 
within a story. The former really does seem to be un- 
problematic where the latter is not; for surely we 
should be suspicious of a convention that creates ob- 
jects of a story out of thin air. We do not suppose that 
our beliefs could be about all objects by means of such 
a simple interpretative device; so why should it be any 
different for stories? Secondly there are general 
grounds, rooted in the nature of fictional discourse, for 
favouring the intuitive distinction. This is a matter I 
hope to discuss further in Part II, along with the more 
general question of permissible bounds on inter- 
pretative licence. 
If the axioms are accepted, then they will conform to 
the cumulative conception of objects and of properties 
outlined in the previous section. It will be recalled that, 
under such a conception, the objects and properties are 
generated at stages, with the objects (or properties) at 
one stage being generated from the properties (resp. 
objects) of the previous stages. Certain properties con- 
stitute a set only if they have all been formed at some 
stage, and so it is only of sets of properties that we can 
say that they determine an object. It would be nice if all 
objects or all properties could be generated at some 
stage. There could then be a universal fiction, fictional- 
ly possessing all properties. But as with the universal 
set, the paradoxes teach us that such things are not to 
be had. 
Formally, our requirement that ~ define a set is 
analogous to a coherence constraint; for it is to the ef- 
fect that no object can have all of the properties in a 
proper class. But our requirement is a coherence one in 
form only, not spirit. For the reason a proper class 
determines no object is not because of any incoherence, 
in some intuitive sense, among its members but merely 
because those members form an illegitimate totality. 
In the classical solution to the original paradox, it was 
required that the properties only be defined over sets of 
objects. Thus we see that the present solution is 
analogous to the earlier one or, to put it more formally, 
(4) is the dual of (9). It was objected to the earlier sol- 
ution that it disallowed totally defined properties and 
was incompatible with the universal existence of prop- 
erties and with a structural criterion for their identity. 
The analogous objections have no force in the present 
case. There is no need for objects determined by a class 
rather than a set and there is no intensional structure 
relevant to the way in which objects are to be formed 
from properties. The relevant intensional structure is 
already given in the properties. 
It might be thought strange that the present solution 
should be disanalogous to the one ultimately adopted 
to the first paradox. But dual problems need not have 
dual solutions. There is, in fact, a perfectly clear ration- 
ale for our differential treatment of objects and 
properties. As already pointed out, we have a 
cumulative conception of both; the objects are 
generated from the properties, and the properties from 
the objects. However, whereas the objects are 
generated from the properties that they fictionally 
have, the properties are not generated from the objects 
that they literally have but from the objects that figure 
in their constitutive structure. It is only once the whole 
hierarchy of objects and properties is given that we 
work out, as best we can, what the extensions of the 
properties are. The differential treatment, then, 
depends upon this contrast between the generating 
relations and the different copulas. Thus we see that 
this treatment is not merely a clever piece of engineer- 
ing designed to avert catastrophe, but is rooted in com- 




Let us say that two objects are R-correlates if they are 
native to a story in which one (implicitly) bears the 
relation R to the other, and that the objects are cor- 
relates if they are R-correlates for some R. Watson and 
Holmes, for example, are correlates; for in the Conan 
Doyle stories, to which they are native, Watson bears 
the relation of admiration to Holmes. 
In almost all stories there are correlates; for in most 
stories there are native objects and, when there are, 
they will usually have some relation in the story. In- 
deed, even when no relationship is directly asserted, 
there will usually be some properties P and Q such that 
it is true in the story that the one object has P and the 
other Q; so in the story the objects will stand in the 
complex relation of x having P and y having Q. 
Given the prevalence of correlates, it is of interest that 
our theory, as so far developed, is incapable of dealing 
with them, both in regard to the problems of being and 
of identity." Let us begin with the first problem. There 
are two main difficulties, which may both be illustrated 
with the previous example of Holmes and Watson. 
Under the demands of the problem of being, we should 
like our theory to explain how there can be the objects, 
Holmes and Watson, with the story-relative properties 
that they have. To some extent, this can already be 
done. For example, given constants for the properties 
of being a detective and being a doctor, it can be shown 
on the basis of object abstraction that there is an object 
that fictionally possesses the one property and an ob- 
ject that fictionally possesses the other. However, it 
cannot be shown that there is a single story of which 
Holmes and Watson are natives and in which they have 
the respective properties of being a detective and a doc- 
tor. By treating the proposition that Watson is a doctor 
as a degenerate property of Holmes, it can be shown 
that there is a story of which Holmes is a native and in 
which Holmes is a detective and Watson a doctor. But 
it cannot be shown that Watson is native to this story. 
Indeed, it cannot be shown of any story that it has two 
native characters. 
The obvious way of meeting this difficulty is to for- 
mulate objects abstraction so as to allow for the multiple 
occurrence of native objects. This gives: 
OA(5) For any sets A,, A2 .... Anof properties contain- 
ing at least one non-degenerate property each, there is a 
story s and distinct objects x,, x2 .... xn such that 
(i) x~, x=,.., xnare native to s; and 
(ii) the propositions of the form P(x,) for P in A,, 
i= 1,2 .... ,n, comprise the content of s. 
This axiom might even be formulated for infinitely 
many native objects and the first clause might be 
strengthened to: 
(i)' x,, x ...... xn are exactly the native objects of s; 
to rule out the possibility that the properties in the sets 
A~,/~= .... /~n contain other native objects of s. 
However, there is a more fundamental difficulty with 
correlates that cannot be met in this way. In the sto W 
Watson admires Holmes. So we should like to be able 
to prove that there are distinct objects native to a story 
in which one admires the other. But within the theory 
as originally formulated, this claim cannot even be ex- 
pressed since it is properties, not relations, that are at- 
tributed to objects in stories. This short-coming might 
be treated as a saving grace, since then the absence of 
the principle from the theory would not result in in- 
completeness. But if, as seems desirable, the attribution 
of relations to objects in a story is to be expressible, 
then the given claim should be provable within the 
theory. 
There are various ways in which a notation for such at- 
tributes might be introduced into the theory. One 
possibility is to set up a special primitive notation for 
them, in analogy to the story-relative copula. However, 
it is possible, within something like the resources of the 
present theory, to define such attributions. We may say 
that x beats R to y in s if the proposition R(x,y) obtained 
by (internally) plugging up R with x and y, respect- 
ively, is true in the story s. Alternatively, we may 
follow the lead of Parsons' and let [yR] be the result of 
plugging up the first argument-place and [Ry] the result 
of plugging up the second argument-place of R with y. 
The object x will then bear R to y in s if x (implicitly) 
has [Ry] in s or, equivalently, if y (implicitly) has [xR] 
in s. 
But even though relational attributions can now be ex- 
pressed, the existence of R-correlates for any R, or even 
for some R, still cannot be proved. Within the new 
notation what must be shown is that there is a relation 
R and distinct objects x and y native to a story in which 
x has the property [Ry]. 38 But how is this 'co be done? If 
I secure y as an object native to a story s, I have no 
guarantee that the story in which the native object x 
has [Ry] is s. Nor does the extension OA(5) help. This 
enables the distinct native objects of a story to be in- 
dependently determined. But what is here required is 
that they be simultaneously determined.39 
The obvious way of removing this difficulty is to 
modify the abstraction axiom for objects. But there 
may be some reluctance to do this. One reason is that 
the an.alogy with Extensionality and the more general 
considerations of duality suggest the adequacy of the 
abstraction axiom; and another reason is that the ax- 
iom appears to be adequate to the highly attractive 
cumulative model of D2. I do not think these reasons 
stand up; but still it may be worth considering what 
can be done without modifying the axiom. 
One possibility is to attribute the inadequacies to the 
use of the implicit, as opposed to the explicit, story- 
relative copula. I have already argued that the explicit 
copula is inadequate to express the content of an object 
in a story. But even if it is used, correlates will still give 
rise to difficulties, though in a different form. First, it 
will not even be possible to express that x implicitly or 
explicitly bears R to y in s in the form of an explicit at- 
tribution of a property to x (or to y) in s.The best we 
can do is to say that x explicitly has [Ry] in the story or 
that y explicitly has [xR] in the story. But these condi- 
tions individually are not necessary and collectively are 
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not sufficient. For in regard to the first case, imagine a 
logical fantasy in which it does not follow from xRy or 
from x bearing R to y that x has [Ry] or that y has [xR] 
(perhaps because there are no relational properties); 
and in regard to the second case, imagine a logical fan- 
tasy in which x having [Rx] and y having [xR] does not 
imply that xRy or that x bears R to y (perhaps because 
only statements in the form of property attributions are 
true). But if relational attributions cannot be for- 
mulated in these terms, there will be no way of extract- 
ing them from the standard applications of the 
abstraction axiom under the explicit interpretation. We 
see then another exoressive defect in the external 
copula. 
But setting this point aside, there still will arise a dif- 
ficulty analogous to our original problem with cor- 
relates. Let us now say that x and y are correlates if 
they are both native to a story in which, for some rela- 
tion R, x explicitly has [Ry]. Then, under this defini- 
tion, it remains unprovable that there are correlates. 
Indeed, note that in this case the correlates x and y may 
be the same. In the other case, identical correlates raise 
no problem for we may say that the single object x im- 
plicitly has the property of bearing R to itself in a story. 
But in the present case, to say that x explicitly has this 
property in the story is not to say that it explicitly has 
the property [Rx]. 
Another conservative diagnosis is that the underivabili- 
ty arises from the restriction of the condition q5 in the 
axiom for object abstraction to those that define sets. 
Let it be granted that the paradox can somehow be 
solved without such restriction on the abstraction ax- 
iom. Then rather surprisingly, it can be shown that 
there are distinct R-correlates for any R, at least if the 
modification OA(5) is used. For we may suppose that x 
and y are distinct objects native to a story in which x 
has all properties; it will then follow, in particular, that 
x has [Ry] in the story. 
But although I have concentrated on this result, the 
problem of correlates is of much broader scope. For we 
want to show not merely that x and y are R-correlates 
for some special R, but also that certain sets of cor- 
relative properties constitute exactly those properties 
possessed by x and y in a story. For example, we may 
wish to show that there are distinct objects x and v 
native to a story s such that [Ry] is the sole property of 
x in s and [xR] the sole property of y in s. But in regard 
to this more general problem, the unrestricted abstrac- 
tion axiom is of very little help. 
One final conservative diagnosis of the underivability is 
that it arises, at least in part, from our adoption of a 
structural identity criterion for properties. Thus 
perhaps it could be shown that there were distinct 
R-correlates if it were not presupposed, as on the struc- 
turalist conception, that the properties [xR] and [Ry] 
were distinct. To  meet this point, let us adopt an exten- 
sional criterion of identity. Then for certain relations R 
it will be provable that there are distinct R-correlates. 
If, for example, R is the null relation, [Ry] may be 
defined independently of y, and so OA(5) may be used 
to establish the existence of R-correlates. But this can- 
not in general be done. Suppose R were distinctness. 
Then it must be shown that there is a story s and 
distinct objects x and y native to s such that x has in s 
the property lacked solely by y. But agait3, it is not clear 
how this property, even up to extension, can be 
characterized independently of the object y. 
If I am right, the most satisfactory solution to the prob- 
lem of correlates is the most obvious one, viz. that the ax- 
iom for object abstraction be supplemented. How 
should this be done? Roughly, by substituting relations 
for properties in the original axiom. 
To be more exact, let us define R(x~..., x ,) ,  for any 
n-place relation R '~ and objects x,,  x2,..., Xn, tO be the 
proposition formed by plugging the objects x,, x=,..., 
x .  into the relation R. Then we may say that Xl, x2 ..... 
x,  have R in the story s if the proposition R(x,, x2,... 
xn) is (in the implicit sense) true in s. (The explicit rela- 
tional copula may be defined in an analogous way). If 
now a relational version of object abstraction is for- 
mulated in strict analogy to the original version OA(1), 
we obtain: 
For any condition ~ on n-place relations, n -> o, there 
are n distinct objects x,,  x2,..., xn and a story s such 
that: 
(a)x,,  x2 ..... x,  are native to s; 
(b)the n-place relations satisfying ~ are exactly the ones 
relating Xl, x~,..., xn in s. 
However,  this version is subject to the same sort of 
defects as the earlier one and must be modified in the 
same sort of way. First, x,,  x2,..., x ,  will have certain 
consequent relations in s. So let us say that C is the (a) 
content of  the objects x,, x=,..., xo in s if the proposi- 
tions true in s are exactly those of the form R(x,, x2,..., 
xn), obtained from an n-place relation R by plugging in 
the objects x,,  x2,..., xn. Then in place of clause (b), we 
should have: 
~b defines a content of the objects x,,  x2 ..... x,  in s. 
Second, all of the relations satisfying ~5 may be 
degenerate. In this case, we have to ensure that all of 
the objects x,,  x2,..., xn occur in the story s. According- 
ly, let us say that the n-place relation R is degenerate in 
its i-tb argument place if, for any given x, . . . . .  x,.~, 
xi.,,..., x , ,  the proposition R(x,, . . . ,  x , l ,  x,., ..... x,)  is 
the same for all values of x,; and let us say that a class C 
of n-place relations is non-degenerate if, for each 
i=  1,2,. . . ,n, at least one of the relations in C is non- 
degenerate in its i-th argument-place. Then it should be 
required of ~b that it define a non-degenerate class of 
n-place relations. Third, in view of the diagonal-type 
paradoxes, the class defined by ~ should be replaced by 
a set. 
The new version of object abstraction may also be 
strengthened in the manner of OA(5); for instead of 
merely requiring that x,, xa,..., x,  be native to s, it can 
also be required that they be the only native objects of 
s. ' '  Combining these changes then gives: 
OA(6) For any non-degenerate set C of n-place rela- 
tions, n _> o, there are distinct objects x,,  x2,..., xn and 
a sto W s such that 
(a)x,,  x= ..... xn are the native obiects of s; 
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(b)C is the content of x,, x2,..., Xn in s. 
Finally, considerations of purity may be introduced. 
Say that C is a pure content ofx~, x2,..., xn in s if (i) C 
is a content of x,, x~ ..... x, in s and (ii) no relation of C 
contains any of x,, x2 .... , x~ As before, it should be 
possible to show that the pure content is unique, 
though only under the assumption that x,, x2, .... xn 
are all distinct. For suppose the content of a story is 
[P(a)l. Then both )xxy Px and Xxy Py are the pure con- 
tent of a,a. There will, however, be a unique maximal 
or full pure content of x,, x2,..., x~whether the objects 
are distinct or not. 
Now as with the non-relational form of object abstrac- 
tion, OA(2), it is still not provable that any suitable set 
of relations is the pure content of the objects 
x~,x2,...,x,. So to this end, we may replace (b) by the 
clause that C is the pure content of X~,X~,...,Xn in s. 
With all of these changes, it becomes possible to give a 
simple formulation of the axiom. Let us say that C is 
the (an) abstract content of the story s if C is the pure 
content of the distinct objects x,,x2 ..... x~ in s, where 
x,,x2 .... ,x~ are all the native objects of s. In syntactic 
terms, the relations of the abstract content are expressed 
by formulas obtained from sentences of the record 
by replacing all occurrences of names for x, ,x~ ..... xn by 
distinct variables. Intuitively, the abstract content of a 
story is its propositional content divorced from the par- 
ticularity of its native objects. In these terms, the ex- 
tended abstraction axiom then becomes: 
OA(7) Any non'-degenerate set of n-place relations, n 
---o, is the abstract content of some story. 
Two subtleties in the formulation of the axiom should 
be noted. First, it is essential to its proper application 
that degenerate argument-places in the relations of C 
be allowed. If we wish to show, for example, that Wat- 
son is a doctor in the Conan Doyle stories, then we 
must interpret this as the native characters bearing in 
the story a relation that is degenerate in all but one 
argument-place. This may strike the reader as artificial. 
But we need only attempt to state the axiom exclusively 
in terms of completely non-degenerate relations to see 
that the artificiality is a small price to pay for ease of 
general formulation. 
Secondly, it is not merely required that there be the ob- 
jects x,,x= .... ,x,, but also that they be distinct. Suppose 
we wished to show that there were distinct objects x, 
and x2 that were native to a story in which x~ was a 
doctor, x~ a detective, and x, admired x~. Then without 
the qualification, the axiom would be compatible with 
its always being the same object that was a doctor and 
a detective, and admired itself. Nor would it do to add 
distinctness to the relations in C, since the single object 
x, = x= might, in the story, be an impossible object that 
was distinct from itself. Therefore we must explicitly 
require that the objects x,,x2,...,x~ be distinct. 
If Context Uniqueness and Foundation are assumed, 
then the above principle strikes me as an adequate for- 
mulation of object abstraction'L However, if either of 
these assumptions is denied, additional problems arise. 
Let me illustrate. Suppose that there are objects x and y 
and stories s and t such that x is native to s and im- 
migrant to t while y is immigrant to s and native to t. 
The situation is diagrammed below: 
| y i x | I 
s t 
Then to characterize x in s we need y and to 
characterize y in t we need x. This difficulty is, at the 
level of stories, the same as our previous difficulty at 
the level of correlative objects; and it may be met in the 
same way, viz. by simultaneously characterizing 
several stories. However, I shall not go into details 4'. 
Let us now turn to the bearing of correlates on the 
identity axiom for objects. It will be recalled that the 
identity axiom as originally formulated was not suffi- 
cient for the individuation of all fictitious objects; for it 
allowed among the distinguishing properties those that 
presupposed the object in question. It was therefore 
proposed that objects with the same pure content in 
their respective stories should be the same (axiom 
OI(2)). But in the presence of correlates, even this 
amended axiom is not sufficient for individuation; for 
the pure content of one correlate x will involve the 
other correlate y, whose pure content will then involve 
the original object x. Consider, for example, a story 
with native objects Watson and Holmes whose sole 
proposition is that Watson admires Holmes (nothing 
turns on the artificiality of this example). By the 
amended axiom, Watson is the sole native object in s to 
have the content of admiring Holmes and Holmes is 
the sole native object in s to have the content of being 
admired by Watson. However neither content suffices 
to individuate its object, since each leads back, through 
the other.content, to that object. 
Now on an internalist view it should be possible to in- 
dividuate the objects in terms of the properties they 
have in the story; and since this is not possible for the 
objects taken singly, it must presumably be possible for 
the objects taken together, so that both can be deter- 
mined simultaneously as the ones with certain cor- 
relative properties in the story. This means that it 
should be provable that there is only one pair of objects 
x and y native to a story in which the content of x is ad- 
miring y (and the content of y being admired by x). But 
on the basis of the present axiom, this and similar 
results cannot be proved. 
As with the earlier difficulty, one solution here is to 
locate the inadequacy in the other axioms. The sugges- 
tion that the implicit copula be replaced by the explicit 
form is subject to the same difficulties as were raised in 
section D1. A more interesting suggestion is that the 
basis for the individuation of fictional objects should be 
changed. Call a property pure if it involves no fictional 
objects, and otherwise call it impure. Now the present 
difficulties arise from our use of the impure properties 
fictionally possessed by an object in its individuation. It 
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might therefore be proposed that all of the objects be 
individuated exclusively in terms of the pure properties 
that they fictionally possess. 
Such a proposal may have advantaged beyond the 
removal of the present difficulties. For first, it simplifies 
the formulation of the abstraction axiom and the sol- 
ution to the problem of being, since only the fictional 
possession of pure properties need be considered. Sec- 
ond, it ties in with a fictional anti-realism, since the 
identity of the objects is immediately explained in terms 
of properties acceptable to the anti-realist. Lastly, it 
belongs to a more general philosophical outlook accord- 
ing to which all objects are to admit purist explana- 
tions of identity or all properties are to be identical or 
identifiable with purist ones. 
H o w  does the purist proposal work? Consider the prop- 
erties of a native object in a story. Imagine now that 
the properties are conjoined and the fictional objects in 
the resulting conjunction are 'existentially generalised'. 
Thus the property of x's admiring and living with 
Holmes becomes the property of there being someone 
whom x admires and lives with. The resulting property 
may be called the (or a) Ramsey property of the given 
object. It may then be proposed that fictional objects be 
individuated in terms of their Ramsey properties. 
There are, however, various problems here. First, the 
object may not have its Ramsey properties in a story; 
for the inferences of adjunction (from p,q to p&q)  or 
of existential generalisation (from Fa to vxFx) may not 
be licensed within the story. Perhaps the story is a case 
of inert literature, or perhaps it is a logical fantasy in 
which limitations on these rules have been discovered, 
or perhaps it is realistic work with an unintended in- 
consistency, which is prevented from spreading by not 
conjoining arbitrary propositions from the two 
distinct but consistent substories. In all such cases, 
then, there may not be enough purist properties to 
distinguish objects that are otherwise indistinguishable. 
But even when the Ramsey properties apply, they may 
not suffice to distinguish the objects. Suppose that the 
content of one story consists in one native object hav- 
ing a certain pure relation to another native object, 
while the content of another story consists in a native 
object having that pure relation to some object or 
another. Then the two objects will have the same pure 
properties in their respective stories (assuming we can 
Ramsify) even though they are distinct. Or again, sup- 
pose that the content of one story consists in a native 
object bearing a certain pure relation to one immigrant 
object, while the content of another story consists of a 
native object bearing the same pure relation to another 
immigrant object. Then again the objects will be in- 
distinguishable in terms of their Ramsey properties. 
These counterexamples all concern objects from dif- 
ferent stories, but they can be modified to fit the intra- 
story case by supposing that the two given stories are 
combined into a single story. Further difficulties with 
the purist proposal also arise from the Dum-Dee story 
of section E2. 
Analogous points hold against the purist account of 
story content. Fictional anti-realists have often been 
tempted to say that the propositions true in a story are 
just those obtainable by existentially generalising upon 
the fictional names that occur in the sentences of its 
record 4'. For the general reasons already given in sec- 
tion A2, the motivation for this view is misplaced. The 
truth of a sentence "in the story, ~b", where ~ contains a 
fictional name, is not to be explained in terms of a 
sentence of the form "in the story, ~b", where ~ contains 
no fictional name, but in terms of a sentence or 
sentences of a different form altogether. It is the 
sentence as a whole, not its sub-sentence, that yields to 
analysis. But, in any case, the proposed elimination is 
not adequate to the facts. The examples of inert 
literature, logical fantasy or inconsistent stories show 
that the existential gem'ralisation may not even be true 
in the story. Some of the ,~ther examples show that the 
singular propositions may not be true even when the 
generalization is. These considerations are also sup- 
ported by the uniformity principle. For it must be 
acknowledged that there is a general distinction in or- 
dinary discourse between a singular proposition and its 
existential generalization; the former requiring of a 
particular object that it have the given property, the lat- 
ter only requiring that some object or another have the 
property. So by uniformity, there should be analogous 
distinction in fictional discourse, with the singular prop- 
osition requiring of a particular object in the pretend 
world that it have the property, and the existential prop- 
osition only requiring this of some object of another. 
The basis for the distinction is complicated somewhat 
by the fact that a story about a definite object may 
begin with the words "There was (is) a man called 
,,Smith,, who...". But this is analogous to the use of the 
same form of words in addressing someone who does 
not know the man in question; these words serve the 
pragmatic function of introducing a name. Once the 
name is introduced, it is used to express singular prop- 
ositions. 
Purity then is no virtue. As before, the most satisfac- 
tory solution is the most obvious one, viz. that the 
identity axiom for objects be supplemented. But how? 
Internalism leads, it seems to me, to the requirement 
that the native objects of a story should be individuable 
on the basis of its abstract content. For internalism at 
least requires that the objects be individuable on the 
basis of the full content. But the individuation should 
be non-circular, and so upon individuating all of the 
objects it should not be necessary to take cognizance of 
any of them. But once the particular identity of the ob- 
jects is subtracted from the full content, all that re- 
mains is the abstract content. 
What we should say then is: 
0I(3). If the distinct native objects x,, x2,...,xo have the 
same pure content in the story s as the distinct native 
objects y,,y2,...,yn have in the story t, then the objects 
are the same, i.e. x, = y,,x2 = y2,..., xn =y , .  
O r using the notion of abstract content, we may say: 
0I(3') If s and t have a common abstract content, 
then their native objects are respectively the same. 
That is, the native objects of a story are recoverable 
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from its abstract content. Or stating the axiom directly 
in terms of relations, we may say; 
01(3 ") If the distinct native objects x,,x~ ..... x,  (implici- 
tly) have in s the same relations not involving 
x,,x2,. . . ,x. ,  y,,y~,...,y, as the distinct native objects 
yl,y2,...,yn have in t, then the respective objects are 
the same. 
We see then a relationship between the relational iden- 
tity and abstraction axioms, OI(3) and OA(7), com- 
parable to the relationship between their non-relational 
counterparts, OI(2) and OA(2') .  In either case, the 
<<existence>> of the objects is postulated in terms of the 
same conditions as its identity. 
It is important to distinguish OI(3) from what one 
might regard as the natural relational analogue of our 
original identity axiom, OI(1 ), viz.: 
(*) If x~,x2 .... ,x, have the same relations in s as 
y,,y2,... ,y, in t, then x, =y, ,  x2 = y2,...,x, =y , .  
The antecedent of (*), unlike that of OI(3), is very 
strong; it requires the common fictional possession of 
all relations, whether or not they involve the objects in 
question. Indeed, (*) is simply equivalent to OI(1); for 
0I(1 ) is the special case of (*) in which two single ob- 
jects x, and y, are compared; and once degenerate rela- 
tions are countenanced, the antecedent of (*) will imply 
the an t eceden t  of  0 I ( 1 )  for  all o f  the pairs  
(x,,y,),(x,,y2) ...... (x~,y,). 
It is also important to distinguish OI(3) from the prin- 
ciple in which the distinctness condition on the objects 
x,,x2 .... ,x, and y,,y=,...,y, is dropped: 
( + ) If the native objects x,,x2 ..... x~ have a common 
pure content in s with the native objects y,,y2,...,y, in t, 
then x, = y,,...,x~ = y n -  
This principle is extremely strong and extremely im- 
plausible. Basically, it means that the properties of a 
single character in a story cannot be shared between 
characters. Consider, as an example, an actual story 
whose content is [ = (a,a),P(a),Q(b)} for a distinct from 
b (and = (a,a) the proposition that a is identical to a). 
Then the.principle would exclude a story whose con- 
tent was { =  (c,c),P(c),Q(c)}, since a, b and c,c would 
share the content {)~xyx = x,)VxyPx, 2xyPy }. 
There is, however, a more plausible version of object 
identity, that effects a compromise between OI(3) and 
(+): 
01(4). If the native objects x,,x=,...,xn in s have the 
same maximal pure content as the native objects 
y,,y2,...,yo in t, then x, =y, ,  x2 = ya,...,x. =y , .  
In terms of the record, this principle means that if each 
occurrence of a name is of distinct type, then it should 
be possible to determine from the attributions made 
which of the names refer to the same object and which 
did not. However, and this is the crucial difference 
from ( + ), it must be supposed that the record contains 
all truths from the given language, even when they ex- 
press the same proposition. Thus if the record contains 
<<m = m>> and m is co-referential with n, then the record 
must also contain <<m =m>. It follows, in particular, 
that the previous example will not work against the 
presen t  p r inc ip le ,  since the con ten t  
[~,xyx=x,~,xyPx,LxyPyl would have to include Xx- 
yx = y in order to be full. 
Interestingly and surprisingly, OI(4) follows from 
OI(3) ̀5 . First, note that OI(4) follows from OI(3) and 
the principle that the identity and distinctness of native 
objects can be recovered from their full content or, 
more exactly: 
D(ifferentiation) P(rinciple). If the native objects 
x,,x2,.. . ,x, of s and the native objects y,,y2,...,y, of t 
have the same full pure content in their respective 
stories, then x l = x  i iff Yi=Yi for i,j -< 1,2 .... , n. 
For assume the antecedent of OI(4) (which is the same as 
the antecedent of DP). Then x, = x i iff y~ = Yi for i,j _ 
1,2,...,n. Choose i~,i2,...,i, so that xi,,x~ 2 .... ,xi, are 
pairwise distinct and {Xil,Xi2 . . . .  ,Xi m ] = {Xl,X2 . . . .  ;Xn]. 
(This may be called "weeding"). Then also y,, ,yi2 .... ,Yim 
are pairwise distinct and [Yil,Yi2 .... ,Yiml = [Y,,Y2,"', 
Yn }" Since x, ,x2,... , x m and y, ,Y2 "",Ym have the same full 
pure content in their respective stories, xi, ,Xi2,...,Xim 
and jlVi ,Yi2-.., Yi= have the same relations not involving 
these objects in the stories and so, by OI(3"), x I = Yl' 
x2 = Y 2 " ' " X n  = Y n '  
It now suffices to show that DP follows from OI(3). In 
fact, a much stronger result can be established, viz. that 
DP is equivalent to the original identity axiom OI(1) 
for the case in which s and t are the same story. For, 
first, suppose that the distinct native objects x and y 
have the same properties in s. Then it is readily seen 
that, x,x,y and x,y,y have the same maximal pure con- 
tent in s, contradicting DP. Now suppose that DP fails, 
so that the antecedent holds and the consequent fails. 
Without loss of generality, we may suppose that 
x, :/:x2 and y, =y2. We may now show that x~ and x2 
have the same properties in s. For suppose the proposi- 
tion that ~b(x, ,x, ,x2,x3,...,xn) is true in s. It must be shown 
that the proposition that 0 (x2,x,,x2,x3 .... ,x,)  is 
true in s. But looking at the relation Lx,Xx2... 
~,Xn0(X,,X,,X2,X3,...,Xn), we see that  the p rop-  
osition that ~ (y, ,y, ,y, ,y3 ..... y .) is true in t; and look- 
ing at the relation ~.x,Lx2... Lx,O (x2, x~, x2, x3,..., x,) ,  
we see that the proposition that 0(x2,x,,x=,x3 .... ,xn) is 
true in s, as required. 
Note that it is OI(3), for s and t the same story, that im- 
plies OI(4). It would still be possible to accept OI(3) for 
distinct stories and yet reject OI(4). 
Philosophically, OI(4) is an advance on OI(3). Accord- 
ing to OI(3), the objects can be recovered from their 
full pure content, given that the objects are distinct 
(and that the content is maximally pure). But the 
distinctness of the objects is external, as it were, to 
their content, and so it might be thought that it should 
not be available on an internalist view. The principle 
OI(4), on the other hand, states that the objects can be 
recovered from their full content, quite apart from con- 
siderations of identity or distinctness, and so is not sub- 
ject to this defect. 
The advantage of OI(3), or more exactly OI(3 '), is that 
the abstract content of given objects, is unique up to an 
ordering of the objects. Therefore OI(3) yields a 
canonical representation of the objects in terms of their 
content. 
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Later, I shall argue against these identity axioms. But 
for the present, we may note an internal difficulty in 
the theory; for the axioms, as stated, are incompatible 
with object abstraction. Consider an abstract content 
whose relations are of the form My Px and Lxy Py. 
Thus the first relation holds of a pair of objects x,y 
when x has P and the second when y has P. By the 
abstraction axiom, there are distinct native objects x 
and y which have this pure content in some story. The 
story is one in which x and y have P but no other (non- 
degenerate) properties. Now x and y have the same 
pure properties in the story and so, by the identity ax- 
iom, are identical. A contradiction. 
Clearly, what is wrong is the particular instance of the 
abstraction axiom. This gives two objects that are in- 
discernible within a story, in flat contradiction to inter- 
nalist intuitions. 
This difficulty may be met by appropriately restricting 
the possible contents of stories. Given any relation, a 
transformation of it may be induced by a transposition 
of its argument-places. For example, the converse of a 
relation may be obtained by switching the first and sec- 
ond argument-places. Similarly, given a set of n-place 
relations, this may be transformed, via a transposition 
of the n argument-places, into the set of corresponding- 
ly transformed relations. Now most sets of relations 
cannot be properly transformed into themselves; these 
we may call normal. However some, such as the one 
above, can be; and it is these that must be excluded 
from the reach of the abstraction axiom. Thus we may 
now say: 
OA(7') Any normal non-degenerate set of n-place rela- 
tions is the abstract content of some story. 
As far as I can see, this new axiom then removes the 
difficulties in reconciling suitable versions of the 
abstraction and identity axioms. 
From the extended identity axiom may be derived a 
new internalist criterion of identity for stories. What 
we may show is: 
SI(2). Stories with the same abstract content are the 
same. 
For suppose s and t have the same abstract content C, 
so that the distinct native objects x,,x2,...,x, have the 
pure content C in s and the distinct native objects 
y,,y2 ..... y, have the pure content C in t. By object iden- 
tity, x, =y, ,x2=y, , . . .xn=yn.  But then the same prop- 
ositions are true in the two stories and so, by SI(1), 
they are the same. 
However, we cannot assert, conversely, that identical 
stories have the same abstract contents. The problem 
is this. Suppose that the dyadic relations R and S con- 
stitute the abstract content of the story s. Let R. and 
be the respective converses of these relations. Then if 
the distinct objects x,,x2 have {R,SI as their abstract 
content in s, the objects x2,x, will have [R-,'S'I as theirs. 
Thus [il[,~l will also be an abstract content of s, but it 
will, in general, be distinct from { R,S }. 
To overcome this difficulty, let us say that two sets of 
n-place relations are equivalent if there is a permuta- 
tion of the argument-places 1,2 ..... n under which the 
relations of the one set transform into the relations of 
the other. For example, interchanging the first and sec- 
ond arguments, transforms IR,SI into [R,S}. We may 
now show, on the basis of the other axioms, that: 
SI(2 '). Stories are identical iff they have equivalent 
abstract contents. 
I have so far dealt with the difficulties that correlates 
raise in finding a proper formulation of the identity and 
abstraction axioms for objects. But correlates also raise 
difficulties for the cumulative model of section C2. 
Recall that under this model, objects and properties are 
generated in stages; objects from properties, and prop- 
erties from objects. But now consider Watson and 
Holmes. Watson must be generated with the help of 
the property of admiring Holmes, this property with 
the help of the object Holmes, that object with the help 
of the property of being admired by Watson, and final- 
ly that property with the help of the object Watson. But 
then Watson must be generated with the help of Wat- 
son, which is impossible. Thus we see that, in the 
presence of correlates, the cumulative model falls to the 
ground (or better: never gets off the ground). 
Of course, this failing in the cumulative model is not 
unconnected to the inadequacy in our original axioms. 
For what we require of our axioms is that they should 
provide for a fair quota of correlates. But the 
cumulative model renders the original axioms true, and 
so the fact that the model contains no correlates shows 
that this requirement on the axioms cannot be met. 
The standard internalist theories have been ones in 
which the objects have been generated, in some way or 
another, from properties. It is therefore of the greatest 
importance to see that, in the presence of correlates, 
such a simple picture of the objects can no longer be 
maintained. What, then, should be put in its place? 
One suggestion here is that the native objects of a story 
should be generated not from all of the properties they 
have in the story but only from those not involving the 
native objects of the story. But such a suggestion im- 
mediately runs into problems of individuation similar 
to those facing the earlier purist proposal; for different 
native objects may share their non-relational properties 
in a story and yet differ on their relational properties. 
Such an account also leads to an awkward asymmetry 
in the treatment of properties and relations; for it will 
be immediately clear from the construction of an object 
whether it has a (non-relational) property in its home 
story, but whether it bears a relation in the story to 
another native object will be completely problematic. 
It therefore seems better to take a more radical step and 
to follow the nev~ly revised axioms in taking the 
abstract contents of the story as primary. Under the 
original model, the native objects and abstract content 
of a story were generated independently from the prop- 
erties or relations not containing these objects: 
native objects abstract content 
"-.. / 
properties (relations) 
Under the new model, the abstract content will be 
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Recall that the abstract content was a class of n-place 
relations (for n the number of native objects). We may 
now think of each native object as corresponding to 
one of the n argument-places of an abstract content; 
set-theoretically, we might identify it with the ordered 
pair < C , i >  for C the content and i=1,2 , . . . ,n  the 
number of the argument-place. If before objects were 
identified with something like concepts, they are now 
identified with roles. 
The differences between the two models is quite sharp. 
Whereas the original model constructed the native ob- 
jects, one by one, from their respective defining proper- 
ties, the new model constructs them, in one go, from a 
common abstract content. Whereas the original model 
cannot easily deal with relations among native objects 
in a story and cannot, in any case, treat relations on a 
par with (non-relational) properties, the new model 
deals easily with both properties and relations, for it 
will immediately be clear, from the underlying abstract 
content, what properties the native objects have and 
what relations they bear to one another in the story. 
Another difference concerns the nativity relation. On 
the concept model, it is not clear, in purely abstract 
terms, when an object is native or immigrant to a story; 
for the story will just correspond to a bundle of pro- 
positions and so there will be no way of telling, just 
from the objects that occur in those propositions, 
which are native and which are immigrant. However, 
on the role model, this will not be a problem. For the 
story will correspond to an abstract content and so it 
will be clear from the internal construction of the ob- 
ject or its counterpart what its home story will be. 
Non-existents, like snails, will carry their homes upon 
their backs. 
These differences become further accentuated once 
Foundation or Context Uniqueness is dropped. For 
then instead of looking at the stories one at a time, we 
must construct the abstract contents and native objects 
of a whole class of stories, lest an object occurring in 
one of the stories be native to a story outside of the 
class. However, the basic idea behind the model will re- 
main the same. 
Even though objects are now generated from abstract 
contents or relational types, there is still no departure 
from the framework of section B2 in which objects are 
individuated in terms of properties. True, there need be 
no properties from within the story that serve to in- 
dividuate the objects; but there will be properties from 
without the story. To illustrate this point, consider our 
contrived story with native characters Watson and 
Holmes, whose sole proposition is that Watson ad- 
mires Holmes. Then in this story, Watson will be the 
unique object x such that, for some distinct object y 
and story s, that x admires y is the abstract-content of 
s, and similarly for more complicated cases. The ob- 
jects could, of course, be generated from these story- 
structural properties, just as any objects could be 
generated from properties which individuate them. But 
generating the non-existents from the abstract contents 
relates the construction most directly to the internalist 
position. 
1)5.  M o d a l  M a t t e r s  
The theory, as so far developed, has been exclusively 
non-modal. Let me now deal briefly with the modal 
aspects of the theory. As before, the discussion will be 
confined to the internalist-platonic framework. I hope 
in the next part to give a more thorough, and less de- 
pendent, account of the matter. 
The modal theory will fall naturally into three parts. 
First, we may assert that all of our previous axioms 
hold of necessity. Secondly, we may state certain rigidi- 
ty assumptions for the relations of being native to and 
of occurring in, and for the story-relative copula. For 
the nativity relation, we should say that if x is ever 
native to s then necessarily, whenever x is and s exists, 
x should be native to s; 46 and similarly for the other 
relations. Finally, we should lay down certain 
dependency assumptions, one for contents and stories 
and the other for contents and objects. The first says 
that if a story has a certain abstract content then 
necessarily the story exists iff the content does. The sec- 
ond says that if an object is native to a story then 
necessarily the object is iff the story exists. Thus stories 
are mutually dependent upon their contents and objects 
upon their stories. 
From these axioms, it follows that the being and the 
identity of fictional objects and stories is entirely ex- 
plained in terms of the appropriate abstract content. 
For given that the native objects x,,x2 ..... x~ have the 
abstract content C in the story s, it will follow that, 
necessarily, the story and each of the objects is if and 
only if the abstract content exists and that, necessarily, 
whenever the objects x~,x2,... ,xn or the story s are, they 
will be uniquely fixed by the fact that the objects have 
the content C in the story. Thus the theory will give a 
complete solution to the modal problems of identity 
and of being. 
Note that I have not assumed that contents necessarily 
exist. If one makes this assumption, then stories and 
their objects necessarily are and the theory becomes the 
trivial one in which the relevant structure of each world 
is the same. There is, however, a weaker or qualified 
form of platonism that allows for the contingent ex- 
istence of some abstract entities. On this view, if one 
entity is constructed from others, then (necessarily) the 
constructed entity has being only if the others do. Now 
on a certain conception of properties, propositions and 
sets, these entities will be constructed from other en- 
tities and ultimately from individuals. If those in- 
dividuals contingently exist, then so will the con- 
structed entities. A modal theory of propositions of this 
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sort has been partially worked out in Fine '79. If such a 
theory is grafted onto the present one, then abstract 
contents will be subject to the vagaries of individual exist- 
ence, as will the stories and their objects. 
E .  C r i t i c i s m s .  
El. Against Platonism 
The criticisms of the previous section were in a certain 
way technical. For they showed that certain formulat- 
ions of the axioms were not adequate to the underly- 
ing conception of non-existent objects; some ap- 
propriate modification in the formulation was then 
able to meet each difficulty. The present criticisms will 
be more fundamental; for they will show, not that the 
particular formulations are wrong, but that the 
underlying conception is mistaken. What is required to 
meet these difficulties is not some modification in the 
existing axioms, but a totally new theory. 
If the internalist part of the conception is retained, but 
not the platonic part, then one might be able to get by 
with something like the present theory. It is not exactly 
clear what the resulting conception would be like, but 
it might be one in which the identity of the contexts and 
objects was given in internalist terms, even though their 
existence or being required that the appropriate 
abstract content be empirically realized. In formulating 
this theory, the only changes from the existing theory 
that would be needed are first, that the contents in ob- 
ject abstraction be restricted to those that are em- 
pirically realized and, second, that in the dependency 
assumption for stories and contents, the existence of 
the story should require and be required by the em- 
pirical realization of the corresponding content. 
However,  empiricism and internalism are uneasy 
bedfellows; and once internalism is also dropped, it is 
unlikely that such a simple solution will still be 
available. We could, of course, just retain as much of 
the present theory as is true. But we require of a theory 
not just that it be true but that it solve various problems 
- in the present case, the problems of being and identi- 
ty. But without internalism, it is highly unlikely that 
these problems could be solved within the resources of 
the present theory; for these only allow us to 
characterize the objects and contexts in terms of their 
content. Some new concepts and insights would seem 
to be required. 
In criticizing the present conception, I shall try not to 
presuppose an alternative theory. Later, however, 
when an alternative theory is developed, these criticisms 
will assume a greater depth and it will become dear  
how radically mistaken is the present conception of 
non-existent objects. Of  the three components in this 
conception, the first, platonism, will be discussed in 
this section, and the second, internalism, in the next. 
The third component, contextualism, is one that I en- 
dorse, and it is only in the third part that I shall argue 
against the rival opinions of the literalist school. 
First, let us consider the issue of platonism for stories 
and their objects, Do these entities have their being 
contingently (even when no immigrant objects are in- 
volved) or only necessarily? My own view is the ex- 
treme empirical one that stories and their objects are 
created not discovered (and this as a matter of 
necessity). They do not exist or have being independent- 
ly of the appropriate activity of the author. Rather, 
they come into being as the result of that activity, in 
much the same way as a table comes into being as the 
result of the activity of a carpenter." Since the proposi- 
tion that x is created is presumably a contingent one, it 
follows that stories and their objects have their being 
contingently. 
I hold a similar view of operas, films, plays and the 
like. But what of the contexts and objects of dreams, 
beliefs, hallucinations, which are not ordinarily said to 
be created? Considerations of uniformity among the 
different contexts suggests an empirical view of these 
contexts and their objects as well. But this general 
point is also supported by a more particular consider- 
ation. For the creation of a story or a character, let us 
say, is merely the characteristic means by which that 
context or its object is introduced. It therefore seems 
reasonable that other contexts and their objects should 
be dependent upon their characteristic means of in- 
troduction, even when there is no single word, like 
"creation", to cover these cases. In this way, many of 
the other considerations concerning stories and their 
objects apply to all contexts and, for this reason, I shall 
often confine myself to stories, even though I have the 
general case in mind. 
Against the creationist view, the platonist may argue 
that it is only in a metaphorical sense that we talk of an 
author creating a story or its characters. What really 
happens is that the author discovers or hits upon the 
story. However,  when one considers this question in- 
dependently of the theories in question, there appear to 
be no grounds for supposing the use of language to be 
metaphorical. We most naturally talk of creation. On 
the other hand, it just seems false to say that 
Shakespeare discovered or first represented Hamlet. By 
what strange perversion of language, then, does the 
literal truth appear false and the metaphorically false 
appear true? 
All too often, philosophers have appealed to 
metaphorical or other non-literal usage when their 
theory will not fit the linguistic facts. But instead of 
maligning the data, they should question their theories. 
In this case, I suspect, what underlies the platonist's 
position is a certain ontological prejudice. He sees, cor- 
rectly, that a story or character is not identical to a text 
or name or to any other existing concrete thing. But 
from this he concludes, incorrectly, that it is abstract 
and incapable of  being created. 
These philosophers operate within too limited a 
framework of ontological categories. They suppose 
that certain features should go together, so that the 
same entities will be material, will exist in space and 
time, will exist contingently, etc., and the same entities 
will be immaterial, not exist in space and time, be 
necessarily existent,  etc. N o w  although the 
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paradigmatic cases of concrete and abstract objects 
may have exactly the features from one or other of 
these groups, it must be recognized that there are ob- 
jects of intermediate status that share features from 
both. 
This is not to deny, though, that even for a platonist all 
objects may ultimately reduce to objects of the 
paradigmatic sort. The category o f  intermediate ob- 
jects is one that belongs at the level of naive ontology, 
of what in the ordinary sense is said to be. Its presence 
is therefore compatible with their being, at the ultimate 
level, only objects of the paradigmatic sorts. 
The simple-minded dualism between the abstract and 
the concrete may have been fostered by the symbolism 
of modern quantificational logic. For it is natural to 
suppose that anything must be a value of an individual 
term and hence straightforwardly concrete or a value of 
a predicate term and hence straightforwardly abstract. 
But of course there is no reason why the symbolism 
need be interpreted in such a restricted way. 
However, while conceding these general theoretical 
points, the platonist may doubt whether any specific 
account of stories and their object will accord with 
everything we want to say about them. In order to meet 
this point, let me suggest an account of stories, and 
other contexts, that will accord with our creationist in- 
tuitions. The account I give may not be quite right, but 
at the very least it will point to the possibility of a cor- 
rect account of this sort. Given any object x (called the 
basis) and any property P possessed by x (called the 
description), I should like to say there is another object, 
x qua P or x under the description P. In a book under 
progress, I have developed the theory of qua objects in 
great detail. Now when an author creates a story, he 
will bear a certain relation, which we may call "in- 
dicating", to the abstract content of that story. We may 
then say that the story is the abstract content under the 
description of having being indicated, in the way that it 
was, by the author 48. 
It may be wondered why we have picked out one qua 
object rather than another, given the enormous range 
of descriptions that might have been applied to its 
basis. This is essentially a matter of our interests. Thus 
the fact that authorship is built into the description is a 
reflection of our interest in the relationship between an 
author and his work. In a society with different in- 
terests, other qua objects might have been picked out, 
even though the underlying objects were the same. 
A similar view can be developed for certain other con- 
texts, such as plays and films, and also for certain non- 
contextual works of art, such as musical works. (These 
are non-contextual in the technical sense of not being 
habitats of the non-existent). Dreams and beliefs, 
statues and paintings, might also be treated as qua ob- 
jects, though for different reasons and not in the same 
way. 
This view of stories and other contexts as qua objects 
should help to make intelligible to the platonically in- 
clined philosopher the peculiar nature of these entities. 
First of all, it explains their intermediate status. For in 
so far as the basis of the qua object (the content) is 
abstract, the qua object itself will share in many of the 
properties of an abstract object. However, a qua object 
exists only if the basis satisfies the description. And so, 
in that the description is only contingently satisfied, the 
qua object will be like an empirical entity. 
The theory also explains how stories, though not con- 
crete, can be created. In my book I develop a general 
account of creation, according to which to create a qua 
object x qua P is to bring it about (in a certain way) that 
x has P. This account applies to ordinary acts of crea- 
tion and, when applied to stories, gives the correct 
result that they are created only when their abstract 
content is appropriately indicated. 
Finally, the view can be used to vindicate the platonist's 
claim that, at the most fundamental level, there is a 
simple dichotomy between the abstract and the con- 
crete. For it may be argued that qua objects have no in- 
dependent ontological status, but are reducible to their 
bases and descriptions. But then stories will be reduc- 
ible to entities of a more orthodox kind and so will 
themselves provide no evidence against such a 
dichotomy. 
In some such way, one might allay the platonist's 
qualms over an empiricist conception of contexts. Un- 
fortunately, a similar account of non-existents will not 
work. The most promising line is to take a non-existent 
to be a certain abstract role under the description of be- 
ing indicated in a certain way. But first, it will appear 
from the next section that certain non-existents cannot 
be distinguished, in this way, in terms of their basis and 
description. And second, such an account does not 
square with the peculiar status of these objects as non- 
existents. 
In the second part, I shall develop a more satisfactory 
account of the nature of non-existents. But apart from 
this general point, there is a special doubt that the 
platonist may have over adopting a creationist view of 
objects as well as contexts. For to create an object, he 
will say, is to bring it about that it exists. How then can 
a non-existent be created? Or more generally, a con- 
tingent object is one that contingently exists. How then 
can a non-existent be contingent? 
To dispose of this objection, it is necessary to 
distinguish between existence and being. Fictitious ob- 
jects and the like do not, in the ordinary sense, exist. 
But there is a broader sense of being that they may 
possess; and it is their being in this sense that results 
from creative activity, not their existence. 
But what is this broad sense of being which fictitious 
objects possess? Must it not be rather mysterious? I 
think that fictitious objects are merely in the sense of 
being actual. Not, though, in any or every sense of "ac- 
tual". Some philosophers, myself included, have used 
the term interchangeably with "existent", and others 
have used it in a special narrow sense. However, in 
maintaining that fictitious objects are actual, I now 
wish to use the term as it is currently used in modal 
logic, and that is as a contrast to the merely possible. 
An actual object, then, is one that is not merely poss- 
ible. 
Now in this sense of the term, all existing objects are 
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actual, for no existent is a merely possible object. 
However, not all actual objects are existent, at least on 
a creationist view of fictitious objects. For on this view, 
fictitious objects acquire their being through the ap- 
propriate creative activity. Now this is a being they 
might not have possessed, for I assume that there 
would not have been the object if the appropriate ac- 
tivity had not taken place. Thus these objects have their 
being in contrast to merely possible fictions that might 
have had such being but, in fact, do not. These objects 
are actual ones. ~9 
On my view, then, there is a tripartite division within 
the realm of objects. There is the usual division be- 
tween the actuals and the merely possibles. But among 
the actuals, there is a subdivision into the existents, and 
the non-existents. '~ 
Most philosophers now would maintain that there is 
but a single univocal concept of being. Such 
philosophers might accept our distinctions, but would 
deny they were ontological distinctions, distinctions of 
being. For them, to be an object is to exist. Therefore 
any divisions within the realm of objects would be of 
beings, not of being. 
The reasons for this doctrine are not compelling and 
seem to depend upon mistaken views concerning the 
connection between the so-called existential quantifier 
and the concept of existence. Let us not go into these 
reasons here. But let us note that the contrary doctrine is 
a very intuitive one. Of some distinctions, e.g. between 
cats and dogs and perhaps even between abstract and 
concrete objects, we wish to say that they are distinc- 
tions in what the objects are and not in how they are. 
But of other distinctions e.g. between the actual and 
merely possible or between the existent and non- 
existent, we are very much inclined to say that they are 
distinctions in how the objects are and not merely or 
not all in what they are. Admittedly, it is hard to say 
what this distinction between the "what" and the 
"how" of an object amounts to. But it is an intuitive 
one and not to be lightly dismissed ~'. 
In fact, some of the things we ordinarily want to say 
depend upon distinguishing senses of being. Surely to 
create is not to endow new properties on an object 
already with Being, but to bring a new object into be- 
ing. Yet unless we distinguish between the being of ac- 
tuals and of mere possibles, it is not possible to main- 
tain this connection between creation and a sense of be- 
ing. 
Perhaps what is more important is that certain 
systematic metaphysical purposes may be served by 
distinguishing different senses of being. As an example, 
consider the picture of reality that is suggested by our 
own distinctions between the actual and possible and 
between the existent and non-existent. It is as if we 
start off with the actual world, endowed with various 
relations among existents. The actual world may then 
be expanded in either of two directions. Possible 
worlds may be introduced, corresponding to the 
possibilities of the actual world. Or, within each poss- 
ible world, fictitious worlds may be introduced, cor- 
responding to the stories and other contexts of that 
world. The possible objects will then be those that 
originate in the possible worlds, while the non-existent 
objects will be those that originate in the fictitious 
worlds. Thus we see that the difference in being be- 
tween non-existents and mere possibles will reflect a 
fundamental difference in how these objects are to be 
introduced from the starting point of an ontology that 
accepts neither of them. 
E2. Against Internalism 
In this section, I shall argue against internalism and 
even against the very possibility of individuating non- 
existent objects. 
According to the internalist position, contexts and their 
objects can be individuated without circularity, on the 
basis of their internal features. As we have seen, this 
position requires the following two identity principles. 
Story Identity. Stories with the same abstract content 
are the same; 
Object Identity. Native objects with the same abstract 
content in their respective stories s and t are the same. 
Let me deal, first of all, with the axiom of story identity 
and the axiom of object identity for the case in 
which the stories s and t are distinct (inter-story 
individuation). For these cases, it suffices to consider 
the earlier example of two authors independently 
creating stories with the same text (and in so far as it is 
relevant, within the same kind of culture). Without go- 
ing into the meaning of independence, we may suppose 
that it is guaranteed by the authors working in societies 
that are causally isolated from one another. 
It then seems clear that the abstract contents of the 
stories are the same, even though the stories themselves 
and their native objects are distinct. But there is no 
need to appeal to unadorned intuition here; for the 
position is also supported by the creationist view of 
stories and their objects. If this view, as previously 
argued for, is accepted, then it follows by the con- 
siderations of section C1 that the stories and their ob- 
jects are distinct in such a case. 
A similar argument does not apply of course to un- 
created contexts and their objects. But there the intu- 
ition seems to be stronger that the contexts and their ob- 
jects are distinct in cases of independence. Suppose that 
two men independently fantasize about a beautiful 
damsel who has in their respective fantasies the same 
pure properties (in the technical sense, that is). Then do 
we not want to say that the fantasy objects are distinct? 
This becomes even clearer if in their subsequent fantasy 
lives the objects are endowed with completely different 
properties, for there is then no danger of confusing the 
objects with their types. 
Let us now turn to the axiom of object identity for the 
case in which the stories s and t are the same (intra- 
story individuation). For this case, it must be imposs- 
ible that the native objects x and y of a story are sym- 
metrically placed in the story, with the one object hav- 
ing the same sort of properties vis-a-vis the other as 
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that object has vis-fi-vis it; for then x,y and y,x would 
have the same abstract content in the story s. 
But surely there can be stories of this sort ~2. We can im- 
agine that the story proceeds in the following manner: 
Once upon a time there were two twins, Dum and Dee. 
They had much in common; Dum was rotund and so 
was Dee; Dum had a fear of heights and so did Dee; . . . .  
Then Dum and Dee are distinct yet indiscernible (i.e. 
symmetrically placed) within the story. 
This example tends to give rise to certain 
misunderstandings; and in dealing with them, it will be 
helpful to consider an analogous example using pic- 
tures. Imagine then a painting of a symmetric universe. 
To be specific, we may suppose that the picture is 
realized on the surface of a sphere and is symmetric 
about its two hemispheres. Each object portrayed on 
the one hemisphere will then be distinct and yet in- 
discernible from its counterpart portrayed on the other 
hemisphere. Some philosophers think that a symmetric 
universe is impossible. But they would surely not argue 
against the possibility of portraying such a universe. 
There are two sorts of objections againstthese examples, 
one against the indiscernibility claim and the 
other against the distinctness claim. Let us consider 
each sort in turn. First, it may be argued that Dum, 
say, is distinguished from Dee by having the property 
of being called ~Dum)~ in the story. But following the 
lead of Parsons," we should distinguish here between 
what might be called internal and external names. An 
internal name of a character is one that it has in the 
story, an external name one that it does not have in the 
story. We of course may use an external name for a 
character, but so may the author in writing the story. 
He may make it dear, for example, that all of the people 
in the story communicate by high frequency radio 
waves. There is thus no possibility of their actually 
having in the story the names that the author uses for 
them. We may suppose then that our Dum and Dee 
story is of this sort. 
The comparable point for the symmetric picture is par- 
ticularly clear, for it is not even generally true that it is 
part of the content of the picture that the objects are be- 
ing portrayed by whatever represents them in that pic- 
ture. 
Another objection against symmetry is that Dum and 
Dee are distinguished by the fact that they have dif- 
ferent properties in the story. But there is an ambiguity 
here. It is, or may be, true in the story that they differ in 
their properties; but this is a respect in which they are 
symmetrically placed. On the other hand, there is no 
particular (pure) property on which they differ in the 
story. 
Turning to the distinctness claim, one objection may 
concede that there are the characters Dum and Dee but 
contend that they are the same. But the story may ex- 
plicitly state that Dum and Dee are distinct; and 
granted that the story is not a logical fantasy, it must 
then be true in the story that Dum is distinct from 
Dum, which is absurd. Even ignoring this difficulty, 
the view will not account for the intuitive distinction 
between the present story and one that is about a single 
character with the properties attributed to Dum and 
Dee. 
In the case of the symmetric picture, it is particularly 
clear that the objects and their counterparts are distinct 
and that the content of the separate hemispheres needs 
to be distinguished from the content of the sphere as a 
whole. 
A more radical objection to the distinctness claim is 
that the story is not about the putative characters Dum 
and Dee at all but about a pair of objects, which we 
may call Dum-Dee (this seems to be Parsons' view in 
his book). A peculiarity of the story is that although the 
pair Dum-Dee is an object of the story, no components 
of the pair are also objects of the story. In this respect it 
is like the familiar example of a crowd, with the crowd 
being an object of the story, but not its members. 
Now I do not wish to deny in general that an object can 
figure in a story as a pair without any objects figuring 
in the story as members of that pair. But I do not think 
the present story is of this sort, for it differs significant- 
ly from the crowd example in that the names~{Dum~) 
and ~Dee~ are apparently used to refer to the different 
members of the pair. 
We should then ask what, on the present view, the 
names refer to? It cannot be to the pair Dum-Dee, for 
then the story will attribute the wrong properties to 
that pair. It must therefore be concluded that the names 
do not refer at all. The different sentences that are ap- 
parently about Dum and Dee must be bundled together 
in pairs, as it were, and treated as claims about Dum- 
Dee. 
But this seems absurd. Surely in determining the con- 
tent of the story, the names must be treated as they 
would be in ordinary discourse, viz. to refer. 
This general point is reinforced by more particular con- 
siderations. For it would be accepted, on the present 
view, that the names refer when some difference in prop- 
erty is attributed to their putative bearers. Now in or- 
dinary discourse, the referential role of names is in- 
dependent of what attributions are made. It is perfectly 
conceivable that the Dum-Dee script could be used in 
ordinary discourse to refer to two distinct objects, the 
agreement of attribution not withstanding. Why then 
should it make such a difference to the fictional case? Is 
it really conceivable that the whole linguistic role of the 
names and of the sentences in which they occur should 
change upon introducing the slightest discrepancy in 
the story between putative Dum and putative Dee? 
Again, these points become particularly clear in the pic- 
ture case. One is under no temptation to say that the 
picture portrays a symmetrical pair without portraying 
its members (imagine what such a painting would be 
like), and nor is the portrayal of a specific object on one 
hemisphere dependent upon a discrepancy in the other 
hemisphere. 
I conclude then that the examples may stand. Indeed, I 
think that a far more radical counterexample to inter- 
nalism may be given. It will be recalled that our 
original identity axiom, to the effect that native objects 
with the same properties in their stories be the same, 
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did not allow for the non-circular individuation of non- 
existents. But even this very weak principle is false. 
This is not established by our earlier examples. For cer- 
tain relational propositions may be true of Dum and 
Dee in the story. It may be true, for example, that Dum 
is Dee's brother. Now the final identity axiom only re- 
quires that it then be true in the story that Dee is Dum's 
brother. But the original identity axiom requires that it 
then be true in the story that Dum is Dum's brother, 
which is implausible. Even if no relational propositions 
of the usual kind concerning Dum and Dee are true in 
the story, it is still likely to be true in the story that 
Dum is identical to Dum and distinct from Dee. But 
then the original identity axiom requires it to be true in 
the story that Dee is identical to Dum and distinct from 
Dee, which again is implausible. 
I think, however, that the original example can be 
modified so as to get round these difficulties. Suppose 
that the Dum-Dee story is now a logical fantasy in 
which it has been discovered that the world is monistic, 
with no simple 5' relations holding between objects. It 
then seems reasonable, though it does not strictly 
follow, that for no simple relation should any objects 
have that relation in the story. We may also suppose 
that various properties (not involving Dum or Dee) are 
attributed to Dum in the story and that exactly the 
same properties are attributed to Dee. Finally, we may 
suppose that it is clear from the author's intentions or 
from literary convention or what have you that the 
characters Dum and Dee are distinct. We would then 
seem to have a counterexample of the required sort, 
with Dum and Dee distinct and yet agreeing on all of 
their properties in the story. 
As I have set up the story, it is not clear whether Dum 
and Dee have any relations in the story. There is no ob- 
jection to this, however, as long as whenever Dum and 
Dee have a certain relation in the story, so do Dum and 
Dum, Dee and Dum, and Dee and Dee. In particular, 
we may allow that Dum and Dee have any complex 
relation in the story whose possession follows (within 
first-order logic without identity) from the original at- 
tributions. We may allow, for example, that Dum and 
Dee have the complex property of x's being rotund and 
y's being fearful of heights; for, as is easily seen, it will 
also be true in the story that Dum and Dum, Dum and 
Dee, and Dee and Dee have that relation in the story. 
There is some problem as to whether it should be true 
in the story that Dum is identical to Dum or that Dum 
is distinct from Dee. If the first holds, it should also be 
true in the story that Dum is identical to Dee; and if the 
second holds, it should also be true in the story that 
Dum is distinct from Dum. Since I wish to avoid these 
consequences, I shall assume that it is neither true in 
the story that Dum (or Dee) is self-identical nor that 
Dum is distinct from Dee. 
It therefore follows that our story is an example of 
what I have called a logico-philosophical fantasy. It 
would be desirable to give a counterexample to the 
original identity axiom without appealing to such fan- 
tasies; but this is impossible. For let us suppose (a) that 
each native object is self-identical in its home story, and 
(b) that distinct native objects are not identical in their 
home story. Then the intra-story version of the original 
axiom will hold; for within any story, each native ob- 
ject will be the unique one to have the property of being 
identical to that object. This means that in order to find 
a counterexample to the axiom, we must violate one or 
other of the assumptions (a) and (b), thereby 
generating a logical fantasy. Although I could have 
given an example in which either (or both) of the 
assumptions failed, I have preferred to drop (a) as be- 
ing the least fanciful of the two alternatives. 
As I have argued, a theory of non-existents should deal 
with the most outrageous of logico-philosophical fan- 
tasies. But for those who would demur, we might note 
that the present story is a very mild example of such a 
fantasy. On the philosophical side, we have a story that 
corresponds to what many philosophers have believed. 
On the logical side, we have a story compatible with 
first-order classical logic without identity. Indeed, 
relative to such a logic, the story may be both consist- 
ent and complete. Thus if we suppose that the proper- 
ties used and the objects mentioned comprise the 
monistic ontology of the story, then the story would 
give, by its own lights, a complete account of reality." 
Admittedly, it will not be true in the story that either 
Dum or Dee is self-identical. But that these identities 
not hold may appear quite reasonable from within the 
story. Perhaps it is held (as some philosophers have) 
that alleged claims of identity say nothing and are 
therefore to be eschewed; or perhaps it has been 
discovered, given an empirical view of logic, that drop- 
ping the Law of Identity is the only way to save the 
phenomena. 
Still, it may be thought that the odd internal logic of 
our story raises special problems. For surely, it may be 
argued, if objects are distinct, they must be distinct in 
the story in which they occur. But, by my own admis- 
sion, the characters Dum and Dee are not distinct 
within the story. 
I think it may be shown, however, that these oddities 
are not peculiar to my own story, but also arise for 
realistic fiction. Certainly, it is not generally true, even 
in realistic fiction, that distinct native objects are 
distinct in their home story. For what if the identity of 
the two objects is left open in the story, so that it is 
neither true in the story that they are the same nor true 
that they are distinct? There are many stories in which 
the identity of two characters is left unresolved until the 
very end, and we may easily imagine stories in which 
the question of identity remains forever unresolved. In 
such a case, we should say that the characters are 
distinct. For if they are the same, then one of the 
characters, say x, will have the property of being ident- 
ical to x in the story and so the other character will 
also have that property in the story, contrary to their 
identity being left open. But the characters are either 
the same or distinct; and since they are not the same, 
they are distinct". Say that native objects are internally 
identical (distinct) if they are identical (distinct) in their 
home story and that, by contrast, the objects are exter- 
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nally identical (distinct) if they are identical (distinct) 
simpliciter. Then the point may be put like this: in 
realistic fiction, objects which are internally neither the 
same nor distinct should externally be distinct. 
We see, then, that the mere fact that Dum and Dee are 
not distinct in the story does not entitle us to conclude 
that they are in fact the same. Of course, the same 
argument as in the case of open identity cannot be used 
to" conclude that Dum and Dee are distinct; since it was 
essential to that argument that each character be self- 
identical in the story and yet essential to our example 
that the characters not be. However, it seems to me 
that, even in realistic fiction, it may be external con- 
siderations, such as author's intentions, that determine 
the identity or distinctness of characters, and not con- 
siderations of content; and so it is not as if this dif- 
ference in the fanciful element of the two examples 
should prevent us from maintaining the distinctness of 
Dum and Dee. 
For consider a piece of realistic fiction about the two 
native characters Ham and Hum. How do we deter- 
mine whether, in fact, Ham and Hum are the same? 
On the basis of the text and the general conventions for 
interpreting it, we can decide that various sentences 
containing (~Ham)> and ~Hum>> are true in the story. To 
put it in technical terms, we can determine a pure con- 
tent for Ham and Hum. Perhaps these sentences, under 
the assumption that the story is realistic, will enable us 
to see that Hum and Ham are distinct. Perhaps it is said 
that Ham and Hum are distinct or that Ham has prop- 
erties incompatible with those possessed by Hum. But 
what if these things are not said or cannot be 
gathered from what is said? How do we then decide 
whether Ham and Hum are in fact the same or are 
distinct characters whose identity is left open in the 
story? 
It seems that here we must appeal to something like the 
intentions of the author. Perhaps he tells us, in an in- 
troduction to the story, that Ham and Hum are the 
same character who, for reasons of literary elegance, 
have been called different names throughout the text, 
or perhaps he tells us, instead, that Ham and Hum are 
characters whose identity is left open in the story, 
thereby implying that they are distinct. In any case, we 
must appeal to something that goes beyond what is 
directly given by the text or its interpretation. 
It is important to note that this admission does not in 
itself conflict with the Differentiation Principle of sec- 
tion D4. For this principle says that the identity or 
distinctness of characters can be recovered from their 
full pure content. But this can be done in the present 
case. Suppose that in fact Ham and Hum are the same. 
Then it will be part of the full content that Ham and 
Hum are the same and so, since the fiction is realistic, 
we may conclude that they are the same. My point is 
that the full content may not itself be directly given. To 
then decide whether Ham and Hum are identical in the 
story we must first determine whether they are actually 
identical. We settle the question of internal identity on 
the basis of external identity, not the other way round. 
Indeed, it seems to me to be generally true that the 
questions as to the identity or distinctness of characters 
are decided on the basis of external considerations or, 
more precisely, that whatever the pure content of the 
native objects x,,x~ ..... x , ,  it should be compatible with 
all of the relationships of identity and distinctness that 
may hold among those objects; in the different stories 
in which the native objects may have that pure content, 
some should have x~,x~,...,x, all the same, some 
X,,X=,...,Xn all distinct, some x,,x~ the same and 
x3,x,,...,x~ distinct, and so on. It may be, for example, 
that a story with the same content as the Sherlock 
Holmes story should be about a single extraordinary 
individual with the combined properties of both 
Holmes and Watson, even to the point of being both 
identical and distinct from itself. If this is right then 
questions of internal and external identity are com- 
pletely independent of one another; from the identity 
or distinctness of objects in a story or from the failure 
of such identity or distinctness, nothing follows as to 
the actual identity or distinctness of the objects, even 
granted as much further information about the content 
of the objects as one likes. 
Now this general point depends upon accepting the 
most outrageous cases of logico-philosophical fantasy. 
Perhaps our critic is not prepared to go that far. But 
given that external considerations can determine 
distinctness in some cases of realistic fiction, surely he 
should be prepared to admit that like considerations 
should determine distinctness in our  own but 
moderately fanciful story of Dum and Dee. 
In all of the previous examples, the objects, though in- 
ternally indiscernible have been externally discernible. 
It has been uniquely true of Dum that he is named by 
(~Dum>> and of Dee that he is named by ~Dee>>. Thus the 
examples have gone against internalism, in either 
qualified or unqualified form, but have left the truth of 
externalism open. 
It may now be wondered whether there are any 
examples of absolutely indiscernible non-existents, of 
non-existents discernible on neither internal nor exter- 
nal grounds. For some time I thought not and was in- 
clined to accept the arguments of B3 for the universal 
individuation of non-existent objects. But I have now 
been led" to give up even this weaker thesis. 
Let us not commit ourselves to how the word "they" is 
actually used, but let us imagine that it is used to make 
singular reference to several individuals. If the in- 
dividuals are x,,x2, then the sentence "they ~" will ex- 
press the propositions (or the conjunction of the prop- 
X ' ' . ositions) that q~ s and that x q~ s Let us now sup- 
1 ,, ,, . 2 . 
pose that the word they is used m this sense to refer 
to two native characters in a story and that the same at- 
tributions are made to these characters, always with 
the use of the term. Then the story would seem to be 
about two distinct, yet absolutely indiscernible, ob- 
jects. 
It might, of course, be argued that the story is about a 
pair, but not about the members. But this would be in 
violation of the uniformity principle. If, in ordinary 
discourse, the term "they" is used to make singular 
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reference to several individuals, then we should make 
the same supposition about the use of the term in fic- 
tional discourse. 
We thus see that the alleged role of non-existents in the 
argument of section B3 must be given up. It need not be 
possible for non-existents to serve as the de re objects 
of mental states. Their primary role is to provide a de 
re content for certain contexts. This will usually entail 
that they can be discriminated, but not always. 
E3. Other Theories. 
Various objections have been levelled against the inter- 
nalist theory of section C. Some of these were more in 
the nature of difficulties and merely called for a 
modification in the axioms. Others were more serious 
and called for a total revision in our approach to non- 
existents. 
Both kinds of objection apply, in a related form, to 
other internalist theories, e.g. to those of Castafieda, 
Rappaport, Zalta and Parsons, or to the Fregean 
theory considered by Parsons [1982]. There is some 
difficulty in attributing internalism to these various 
authors (I am grateful to T. Parsons for pointing this 
out to me); for the authors, as far as I know, do not 
directly address the question, and the principles of their 
theories do not, in themselves, preclude other ways of 
individuating non-existents. However, it is natural to 
take these theories to be committed to at least a 
qualified form of internalism. For it is natural to sup- 
pose that it is a part of these theories, that any non- 
existent, in so far as it can be individuated, can be in- 
dividuated within the resources of the theory, even if 
not on the basis of the stated axioms. Without this sup- 
position, the theories would be badly incomplete. But 
the only means of individuation allowed by these 
theories are internalist, and so it would follow that, in 
so far as an object could be individuated, it could be in- 
dividuated by purely internalist means. 
It is only in the third part that I shall give detailed con- 
sideration to these other theories. But for the moment, 
we may note that the previous difficulties arise for these 
theories in broadly two different ways. First of all the 
theories do not characterize the objects directly in 
terms of their properties in a context but in rather dif- 
ferent terms. In Parsons' theory, for example, the ob- 
jects are characterized in terms of their "nuclear" prop- 
erties and, in the theories of Castafieda, Zalta and 
Rappaport, they are characterized in terms of bearing 
an internal predicative tie to various properties. But 
although the objects are not characterized directly in 
contextualist terms, it is necessary, for the application 
of the theory, that the theoretical terms in which an ob- 
ject is given be related to its contextualist properties, 
for otherwise it will be unclear how the theory applies 
to the non-existent objects, as they are ordinarily given. 
The desired connection may be effected by a bridging 
principle. For Parsons' theory, this might take the 
form: 
Any native object has exactly those nuclear properties 
that it has in its home context; 
and, for the theories of Castafieda, Zalta and Rap- 
paport, it might take a related form. Given such a 
bridging principle, the basic theory will have conse- 
quences for the behavior of objects in contexts. It will 
follow from Parsons' theory, for example, that native 
objects with the same nuclear properties in their respec- 
tive stories are the same. Thus even if the theory is not 
formulated directly in contextualist terms, it will have 
contextualist consequences. Usually, these conse- 
quences have not been explicitly recognized, since the 
bridging principle has been regarded, not as a part of 
the official theory itself, but as an adjunct to its ap- 
plication. But there is, of course, no reason why both 
aspects should not be incorporated under a broader, 
more comprehensive, theory. 
Given this broader theory, the very same questions will 
arise as for our own internalist theory. We may judge, 
for example, that that part of the theory is false on the 
grounds that the standard axiom for object identity can 
be derived, or that it is inadequate on the grounds that 
a suitable correlative form of object abstraction cannot 
be derived. Indeed, Parsons' theory may be criticized 
on both these counts, since it permits the derivation of 
the standard identity axiom but not of a correlative 
form of the abstraction axiom. 
The second way difficulties arise is that analogues of 
our earlier objections will apply directly to the official 
theory itself. For even though this theory will not 
characterize the objects in contextualist terms, it will 
presumably contain some form of the abstraction and 
identity axioms. In Parsons' theory, for example, 
Abstraction takes the form that for any class of nuclear 
properties there is an object with exactly those nuclear 
properties, and Identity takes the form that objects 
with the same nuclear properties are the same. It is then 
clear that the difficulties of section D may be presented 
in terms that are directly relevant to the new formula- 
tions. In Parsons' theory, for example, the problem of 
correlates takes the form of asking whether it can be 
proved that there are objects with correlative nuclear 
properties ~' and, in the theories of Castafieda, Zalta 
and Rappaport, it takes the form of asking whether 
objects can bear the internal predicative tie to cor- 
relative properties. As with our own theory, these prob- 
lems may be overcome by some suitable modification 
to the axioms. However, the more fundamental objec- 
tions of the present section will probably also apply. 
For the adequacy of the theory will depend upon some 
suitable form of bridging principle; and it is then likely 
that the identity and abstraction axioms of the official 
theory will stand or fall with their contextualist 
counterparts. Thus these objections are not to be 
avoided by any change to the terms in which the theory 
is formulated. 
There is another way altogether in which our contex- 
tualist theory presents a problem for these other 
theories. For the contextualist theory contains no 
theoretical notions, but only such pre-philosophical 
notions as occurring in a context or being true in a con- 
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text. The other theories, however,  do contain 
theoretical notions (or so I would say) and principles 
concerning them. Parsons' theory, for example, uses 
the distinction between nudear and extra-nudear prop- 
erties, and the theories of Rappaport, Zalta and 
Castafieda use a form of internal predication. 
It may be asked whether the theoretical component of 
these theories is necessary. Examination shows that the 
need for theoretical terms arises not from the demands 
of a theory of non-existents as such but from the desire 
for literalism. It is desired not only that the object 
should have a given property in a context but also that 
it should, in some sense, literally have a property. But 
the dangers of conflict with property abstraction then 
become much more immediate, since the abstraction 
axioms for properties and objects will both be for- 
mulated in terms of the literal copula, and in order that 
the more obvious sources of contradiction be removed, 
it is necessary to resort to a theoretical device, such as 
some restriction on the properties that an object might 
literally possess or some revision in the sense in which 
they are to be possessed. N o w  if, as I shall later argue, 
the doctrine of literalism is untenable, the theoretical 
component of these theories will be completely idle; the 
demands of a satisfactory theory will be met as well 
without it. Thus if one is going to adopt an internalist 
theory at all, it should be one along the lines of the 
theory that has been set out and developed in the body 
of this paper. 
Notes 
(') The internal /external  distinction and the corresponding 
distinction between the internalist and externalist positions seem to 
be of general significance to problems of identity. In the case of 
material things, for example, we may think of the internal features 
of the object in terms of its matter  and the external features in terms 
of its spatial and temporal relations to other objects; and again, in 
the case of persons, we may think of the internal features in terms 
of the individual's experience and the external features in terms of 
his body and its relation to the environment.  
(2)In a book under preparation,  entitled Objects Under A 
Description. I make no claim of originality for the distinction; it oc- 
curs in one form or another  throughout  the history of philosophy. 
(') They include Crittenden '73, Woods '74, Stine 7 8 ,  Howell 
'79, Parsons '80 and Routley '80. 
(') Adumbrated in various works,  but principally Walton '78a, 
Walton '78b, and a book in preparation. 
(~) For a somewhat similar defense of the use of non-existents in 
the semantics for natural language, see Rappaport  '80. 
(6) This does not  solve the problem raised by  names that  purport  
but fail to refer to an existent. What  I should like to say here is that 
in most of these cases the name refers to a non-existent object of 
belief. In the sentence 'Homer does not  exist', the name 'Homer '  
refers to the object that  is believed to have written the Odyssey, etc. 
It refers to a non-existent object if true and to an existent object if 
false. It is readily understandable how a name may refer to a non- 
existent even when the speaker intends to refer to an existent. For 
suppose he intends to refer to the existent ~-er. Then he believes of 
some (possibly non-existent) object that  it ~'s and exists, and so he 
also intends to refer to that  object. Since ordinary discourse abhors 
empty reference, it is only natural in case there is no ~-er that  the 
reference should slip, as it were, from the grip of the one intention 
to the other. 
I do not wish to suggest that all names refer. Suppose that an in- 
structor writes down various sentences containing the name 'Mary '  
as examples in a logic class, bu twi thou t  having any person in mind. 
Then each of those sentences had, in its original use, no truth- 
value - even the sentence 'Mary does not exist'. 
Many of the proposed solutions to the problem of 'empty reference' 
fail to respect or even explain the distinction between this case and 
the more or thodox ones. It is a great advantage of the present 
theory that it does. Thus our theory is not  one of unbridled 
Meinongianism; it gives reference to many, though not all, of our 
singular terms. 
(7) We have here the germ of a solution to the paradox of 
analysis. How can 'p---q' constitute an informative analysis given 
that p and q express the same proposition? The recent causal theory 
of names suggests one answer, that p and q can express the same 
proposition without  our knowing that they do. But this solution is 
not applicable in all cases, and so I should like to suggest another.  
This is that  the paradox rests upon a confusion between the 
analysis of a proposition (into constitutents, etc.) and a 
metaphysically significant analysis of its truth-conditions. The con- 
fusion arose because it was thought  that the propositions 
themselves must be constructed from ontologically basic elements 
and would not therefore be the subjects of analysis in the second 
sense. If I give a metaphysically significant analysis q of the truth 
conditions of p, then I need not  be claiming that  p and q express the 
same proposition. Thus p and q may not be substitutable in all con- 
texts salve veritate. For contexts such as 'x expresses the proposi- 
tion that p',  in which substitution fails, a separate account of the 
truth-conditions must  then be given. 
(') See Fine '77, or Hunter  '79 for the particular application to 
non-existents. The doctrine represents a way of formulating on- 
tological claims that has far-reaching applications. I use 'actual'  
here as synonymous with 'existent'; later it is used in a broader 
sense. 
(9) See sect. 3.2 Parsons '80 and also pp. 43-44 of Woods '74. 
('~ I shall use interpretation in a special narrow sense for the 
determination of what  is true in a context. My point  is closely 
related to what  Walton '73 says on p. 292 concerning the distinc- 
tion between make-believe and imaginary truth. 
(' ') Strictly speaking, we should give a general account for each 
possible world of what  objects there are. But in case the possibilities 
for existence are the same from world to world, this distinction will 
not be important.  
(,2) I also have in mind that the conditions or formulas may con- 
tain names of objects from the given interpretation. This will be my 
usual usage. 
(,3) I say more on this question in Fine '81 and in the book Ob- 
jects Under a Description. I hope to deal with it systematically 
elsewhere.. 
(,4) See sect.-VII of Fine '77. 
('~) Let 0,I be the modal structure relative to which the explana- 
tions of identity are given. Then a more formal characterization of 
the indiscernibility relation (w,x) -= (v,y) is that there is an isomor- 
phism from 0d w onto ~I~ that takes x into y and is an identity of  the 
objects outside of X. 
Consult Fine '81 for further details. But note that  this account does 
not completely eliminate the notion of non-circularity, since it must  
be assumed that  the underlying relations of 0d do not, in an intuitive 
sense, presuppose the objects of X. 
Further use of the indiscernibility relation is made in Rabinowicz 
'79. 
(,6) There is a related distinction between the intra-contextual 
problem of individuation and the problem of re-identifying an ob- 
ject through its occurrences in a single context. This latter problem, 
though,  is not usually awarded the same interest as its cross- 
contextual counterpart .  
( ' )  A similar example has been considered in Walton 7 3 ,  Howell 
'79, Lewis '78, and Parsons '79. 
(,8) The properties in terms of which the objects are individuated 
must  also, of course, be non-modal  and non-circular. 
(,9) The theory may be presented within a many-sorted first-order 
language. There would be two styles of variables, x,y,z .... and 
s,t ,u,. . . ,  ranging over objects and stories respectively; E could be 
used for existence, O for the occurrence relation, and N for the 
native-of relation. The three axioms are then: 
N O  VxVs(xNs ~ xOs) 
CU VxVsYt((xNs A xNt) D s = t )  
NE VxYs(xNs D - Ex). 
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In presenting the various axioms I shall often have a formal theory 
in mind, althotigh the details will usually be suppressed. 
(20) Given the class of all propositions true in a story, one might 
wonder whether there is an internal or intrinsic way of determining 
which subclasses correspond to stories. If all stories and their parts 
satisfy the condition that they contain a conjuction iff they contain 
all conjuncts, then, conversely, all maximal subclasses satisfying 
the condition will correspond to stories or their story parts; con- 
junction will be the glue by which the propositions of stories are 
bound together. However, in the light of subsequent examples of 
logical fantasy, it is doubtful whether all stories need satisfy this 
condition; and, in general, the determination of the boundaries of a 
story would appear to be an external matter depending upon such 
factors as what the author intends or how his output is regarded. 
This question of boundaries should be sharply distinguished from 
the extremely interesting aesthetic question as to what constitutes 
the perceived unity of a story or, in general, of a work of art. In 
framing an answer to the latter question, the answer to the first is 
not required but presupposed. 
(~') Similar considerations are advanced in Levinson '80. 
(22) The principle is to be distinguished from a related principle 
with far greater plausibility. We may talk in an obvious sense of an 
object deriving its occurrence (or reference) in one story from its oc- 
currence in another story. It may then be denied that a single object 
can derive its occurrence in s, from s~, its occurrence in s~ from s3, 
and so on ad infinitum (and perhaps similarly for the other cases of 
derived reference). None of my arguments tells against this alter- 
native form of the foundation principle. 
(2~) Let p,q,r .... range over properties, and let us use xLy for the 
literal and xHy,s for the story-relative copula. Then a formal 
rendering of the axioms is: 
OA 3x3s(xNs A Yp(xHp,s --- ~)), 
where 4~ is a formula not containing free occurrences of x or s; 
Ol vxYyvsvt((xNs A yNt) D x = y  ~ vp(xHp,s -= yHp,t)). 
(2,) From which it follows that property abstraction is the dual of 
object abstraction. These facts become clear from the formaliza- 
tions: 
3xYP(xFP --- O'(P)); 
and 3Pvx(xLP --- ~(x)), 
where F is used for the fictional and L for the.literal copula. 
(~) There are single instances of property abstraction that are in- 
consistent with their duals, e.g. 3PVx(xLP ---i- ~xV P - xLP). It might 
be of interest to give some general characterization of which self- 
dual theories are consistent. 
(~) Some subtle questions have been ignored. I have assumed that 
simple properties can be plugged up with objects. But it might be 
supposed that only the copula can be plugged up. In that case, the 
basis of the distinction for simple properties would have to move up 
a level; the internally formedproposition would be the result of 
plugging with an object and property and the externally formed 
proposition the result of plugging with the object, the property and 
the ordinary copula. 
The distinction has a significance in metaphysics and the 
philosophy of language that I shall also ignore. 
(2~) To be exact, it must be allowed that several formulas can be 
obtained from the same sentence in this way. 
(~) See section 7.7 of the book. A similar question arises for ob- 
jects immigrant to a story. In this case, only a single attribution may 
be explicitly made; but it might be argued that the object brings 
with it properties from its source. I do not think this need be so or 
even that any relationship of content need underlie immigrancy. But 
this is not a question we need discuss here. 
(~) The derivation requires the set-theoretic result that if there is 
a function f from an infinite class X into the class of finite subsets 
of X such that x 8 f(x) for all x 8 X, then there is a one-one function 
from the range of f onto the domain of f. This result, in its turn, re- 
quires the axiom of choice. 
(30) In the formal language of the theory we must then introduce 
set variables X,Y,Z,... and a symbol ~; for membership. To be 
specific, we may suppose that the whole of the previous theory is 
embedded in ZFI, with the objects, properties, and stories as the 
urelements. 
( ' )  These, and similar, remarks should provide the basis for cer- 
tain natural consistency proofs. I have not carried the formalization 
of the theories far enough through to make these proofs rigorous, 
but I do not foresee any essential difficulties. 
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(32) In working with this proposal, it may be helpful to think in 
terms of a model in which the non-existent objects are sets of prop- 
erties (those that they fictionally have), the partially defined prop- 
erties are sets of objects, and the totally defined properties are con- 
ditions, with parameters, subject to the quantifier restriction. Start- 
ing off with the existent objects, entities of each sort can be con- 
structed at the ordinal stages. One then defines when an object 
literally has a totally defined property in terms of satisfaction of the 
condition. Given the quantifier restriction, it then turns out that the 
definition is well-founded. Such a model, and its variants, may be 
used to prove various consistency results. 
( ' )  Indeed, it is in this external yet essential connection between 
structure and application conditions that the special nature of in- 
tensional entities is to be sought. No such peculiar duality is to be 
found in extensional entities. 
(3,) There is some discussion of the options, though by no means 
an exhaustive one, in Church '51. 
( ' )  In this form the paradox bears some resemblance to a 
paradox in Parsons' theory, which is raised in section 9.1 of his 
book and is further discussed in Fine '82. 
(3~) There may be other reasons for supposing that properties 
defined from a set of objects do not form a set. If so, Story Closure 
should be appropriately modified. The essential idea behind the ax- 
iom is that the objects of a story should form a set. 
(3,) Correlates constitute an extreme case of the sort of difficulty I 
have in mind. If X is a set of native objects of s, let O, (X) be the set 
of native objects of s that figure in the properties had by any 
member of X. Then the general difficulty will arise whenever 
n 
OsOs... Os({ x }) is non-empty for each n. Usually, however, the 
general difficulty will arise only when an extreme case does. 
(3,) In this formulation, essential use is made of the story-relative 
copula. If Foundation is assumed, the fictional copula may be used 
in its place; for we can then say that x fictionally has [Ry] and y fic- 
tionally has [xR]. As long as the relations have no degenerate 
argument-places, Foundation will imply that x and y are native to 
the same story. 
(39) A parallel point for Parsons' theory is raised in section 7.6 of 
his book and is further discussed in Fine '82. 
(40) In a more satisfactory account it would be supposed that the 
relations R were of degree c~, for any ordinal c~. However, for 
simplicity, I shall suppose in the text that the relations are of finite 
.degree. 
('~) At this point, it is of particular importance in a general theory 
to allow infinitary relations; for otherwise the existence of stories 
with infinitely many native objects will be unprovable. In case 
n =o,  C defines the content of a story without any native objects. 
This instance of the axiom is of no relevance to the theory of objects 
but is required in a satisfactory account of stories. As the axiom 
stands, I have allowed the empty story (in which no proposition is 
true). If it were desired, this could be excluded by requiring that C 
be non-empty. 
(,2) Let the rank of a story be the least ordinal greater than the 
rank of all of the immigrant objects; and let the rank of a fictitious 
object be the rank of the story to which it is native. With the help of 
the two assumptions, it follows that each story and object has a 
rank. Within the context of set theory, OA(7) then represents a 
natural attempt to characterize the stories and objects of each rank. 
(~) Let me merely sketch a solution. Call a class of stories closed 
if the story t is in the class whenever the story s is and some object 
both occurs in s and is native to t. (It should be assumed that each 
story belongs to a closed set of stories). To formulate the axiom, it 
should be supposed (a) that Ci,...,Cm are sets of n-place relations, 
(b) that to each Ci is associated a subset Ni of [1,2 ..... nl with 
N, tO N2 tO... tO Nm = [1,2, . . . ,n l  and (c) that for each i = 1,2 ...... and 
each member j of Ni, one relation of Ci is nun-degenerate in its j-th 
argument-place. Under this supposition, the axiom should then let 
us conclude that there is a closed set of distinct stories {S,,S2,...,Sml 
and distinct objects x,,x~,...,xn such that, for i = 1,2,...,m, C, is the 
content of x, ,x2 ..... x~ in s, and xi, for jeNi, are the native objects of 
s~. An infinitary version of the axiom might also be given. 
(") The error here was briefly discussed in my review (Fine '76) 
of The Nature of Necessity (Plantinga '74). 
(") The derivation is a little technical and may be omitted by the 
reader who is so inclined. 
('~) There are certain niceties of formulation, concerning the sup- 
pression of outermost quantifiers and modal operators, that are be- 
ing overlooked here. 
(47) That works of art are genuinely created is a point also stressed 
by Levinson '80. 
(48) The basis may include more than the abstract content, 
perhaps the style or other structural features. But this is not too im- 
portant here. Levinson gives a similar account of musical works in 
his paper, though without the benefit of a general theory of qua ob- 
jects. One small discrepancy is that he does not include the manner 
of indication into the description. This discrepancy, though small, 
is of some significance to the modal features of stories and the like. 
Incidentally, Levinson takes a performance to be an event that hap- 
pens to have certain properties. Detailed considerations show that a 
performance should be taken to be a qua object, which includes 
those properties in its description. 
(4,) I briefly discuss the same view in section 1 of Fine '81. 
(~~ Indeed, I am inclined to think that a proper account of 
"being" requires a whole hierarchy of ontological categories, but 
this broader view need not concern us here. 
( ' )  Alston '67 defends the doctrine of different modes of being 
and his defence is criticized by Hunter '79 (Chapter 2.2). However, 
Alston's arguments for the doctrine are not ones that I myself would 
want to use. 
(~2) The reader should consult section 7.5 of Parsons' book for an 
opposing view on this question. 
( ' )  In section 7.5 of his book. 
(~4) As will later become clear, nothing critical will turn on my 
use of the term "simple" here. 
(~) The world of such a story corresponds to a model for first- 
order logic without identity. The indiscernibles, such as Dum and 
Dee, then correspond to the elements of the model that need to be 
identified in order to obtain a normal model of first-order logic 
with identity (as in the standard completeness proof). 
(~) We may mention two objections to this argument. One is that 
the expression "being identical to in the story" creates an in- 
tensional context. The other, pointed out to me by Peter Railston, 
is that the disjunction x--y or xg:y might be denied on quasi- 
intuitionistic grounds. However, these objections stray so far from 
the logical framework of the present paper, that I shall not attempt 
to give them serious consideration. 
( ' )  This was through a conversation with Jose Bernadete at 
Syracuse University. 
(~) A more extended critique of Parsons' theory is given in Fine 
'82. 
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